Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome Conference

1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darryl Robinson

On July 17, 1998, the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Rome Conference) adopted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). One of the many significant provisions of the ICC statute is Article 7, which defines “crimes against humanity” for the purpose of the ICC. A significant difference between the definition in the ICC statute and the major precedents on crimes against humanity is that the former definition was not imposed by victors (as were those in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters) or by the Security Council (as were those in the Statutes of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals). In contrast, Article 7 was developed through multilateral negotiations involving 160 states. For this reason, one could reasonably expect Article 7 to be more detailed than previous definitions, given the interest of participating states in knowing the precise contours of the corresponding obligations they would be undertaking. For the same reason, one might expect the definition to be more restrictive than previous definitions. Fortunately, although the definition in the ICC statute is more detailed than previous definitions, it generally seems to reflect most of the positive developments identified in recent authorities. For example, the definition does not require any nexus to armed conflict, does not require proof of a discriminatory motive, and recognizes the crime of apartheid and enforced disappearance as inhumane acts.

2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 897-904 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID SCHEFFER

AbstractFour discrete issues demonstrate how complex the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court will be following the amendments approved in Kampala in June 2010. First, the absence of an explicit magnitude, or gravity, requirement for determining an act of aggression ignores the reality of how matters are referred to the ICC as well as how one first determines the existence of aggression. The gravity test of a crime of aggression is insufficient and misleading in arriving at a methodology for a logical determination of both acts and crimes of aggression. An agreed understanding in Kampala to resolve the dilemma is fraught with contradictions. Second, the amendments fail to address how the ICC should respond to a Security Council determination that an act of aggression has not occurred. Third, the lingering debate over how the Rome Statute should have been amended to activate the crime of aggression will burden the Assembly of States Parties, which should focus on arriving at a united interpretation of the procedures used to approve the Kampala amendments. Fourth, given the many permutations of how states will fall within or outside the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court regarding the crime of aggression, the resulting patchy landscape of coverage should surprise no one.


2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-385 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ademola Abass

AbstractThis article examines whether the International Criminal Court (ICC) can exercise universal jurisdiction. In particular, the author responds to the argument that the ICC can exercise universal jurisdiction on the basis of delegated criminal jurisdiction and the aut dedere aut judicare principle, and challenges the view that the trial of nationals of non-parties by the ICC neither creates obligations for such states nor contravenes the Monetary Gold principle. The author argues that although some Rome Statute crimes have universal character, this does not automatically entitle the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over non-party nationals outside such limited universal jurisdiction as may be conferred on the Court through the Security Council referral.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 567-591
Author(s):  
Talita de Souza Dias

Abstract On 17 July 2018, in celebration of the 20th anniversary of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC, the Court), the jurisdiction of the Court was finally activated for the crime of aggression, following a decision made by the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) in December 2017. This resulted from a long and painstaking process which not only furthered the divide between states parties and non-parties but also generated controversy within the ASP itself. In an attempt to reach a minimum common denominator, the ASP decided to exclude from the ICC’s jurisdiction situations involving states parties that have not ratified the amendments in respect of that crime (‘the Kampala Amendments’). Moreover, since the adoption of the Amendments in 2010, it has been agreed that the ICC will not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression if committed by nationals or on the territory of non-states parties, except when there is a Security Council referral. This combination of jurisdictional hurdles has led many to believe that the crime of aggression will have a limited role to play before the ICC. Nonetheless, a closer look at the Activation Decision, the Kampala Amendments and certain key provisions of the ICC Statute reveals that the activation of the crime of aggression might have a series of overlooked implications for non-parties and parties alike, including those that have not ratified the amendments. In particular, this article will argue that, aside from Security Council referrals, there may still be instances where the Court can apply the crime of aggression to situations involving those states.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-109
Author(s):  
Angela Mudukuti

In 2009, the International Criminal Court (ICC) stepped into uncharted waters as it issued its first arrest warrant for a sitting head of state, then President of Sudan Omar Al-Bashir. Following the UN Security Council's referral of the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan to the ICC, Al-Bashir was charged by the Court with war crimes and crimes against humanity, and in 2010, he was also charged with genocide. As a consequence, all of the states parties to the Rome Statute had a duty to arrest Al-Bashir. Several states have nonetheless failed to arrest him during country visits, allowing Al-Bashir to evade the ICC. This has given rise to a number of cases before the ICC Chambers, including this Appeals Chamber judgment regarding the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.


2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melanie O'BRIEN

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established to prosecute crimes that “threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world”. Maritime piracy has a long history as a threat to international security and was in fact the first international crime. Yet piracy was excluded from the Rome Statute. In the years since the drafting of the Rome Statute, piracy has increased dramatically to become more like the threat it was in the “Golden Age of Piracy”. Criminal accountability for piracy has been minimal, due to logistical and jurisdictional difficulties. This paper offers an analysis of the potential of the ICC for prosecuting pirates: why it should be considered as a potential forum for ensuring criminal accountability for piracy, how piracy fits within the ICC's jurisdiction, and whether or not piracy should be added to the Rome Statute as a stand-alone crime or under the rubric of crimes against humanity.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 539-571 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gwilym David Blunt

Pogge has repeatedly compared the causes of global poverty with historical crimes against humanity. This claim, however, has been treated as mere rhetoric. This article argues that there are good reasons to take it seriously. It does this by comparing Pogge’s thesis on the causes of global poverty with the baseline definition of crimes against humanity found in international law, especially the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It argues that the causes of global poverty are comparable with the crimes of slavery and apartheid. This has important consequences for cosmopolitan thought, as it makes the need for practical solutions to global poverty more urgent and raises questions about the global poor’s right to resist the international system by violent means.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (6) ◽  
pp. 2199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mella Fitriyatul Hilmi

Kekerasan terhadap perempuan dan anak sebagai kaum rentan dapat terjadi dalam segala situasi yakni saat konflik berlangsung, proses melarikan diri, maupun di tenda pengungsian. The International Rescue Committee melakukan survei pada tahun 2015 yang menunjukkan bahwa 40% dari 190 perempuan dan anak perempuan di Dara’a dan Quneitra telah mengalami kekerasan seksual dari para personil Organisasi Internasional saat mengakses layanan bantuan kemanusiaan. Kekerasan seksual yang terjadi di Suriah adalah tindak kekerasan seksual dengan penyalahgunaan kekuasaan, atau penyalahgunaan kepercayaan, untuk tujuan kepuasan seksual, maupun untuk memperoleh keuntungan dalam bentuk uang, sosial, politik dan lain sebagainya. Berdasarkan Pasal 7 Ayat (1) Rome Statute of The International Criminal Court, kekerasan seksual adalah tindak kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan (crimes against humanity) yang masuk dalam kategori The most Serious Crime, sehingga Hukum Internasional punya peran dalam hal ini. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian yuridis normatif, dimana membahas terkait asas dan konsep Hukum Internasional mengenai kedudukan Organisasi Internasional selaku Subjek Hukum Internasional yang memiliki Legal Personality dan Legal Capacity. Oleh karena itu perlu diketahui pengaturan terkait dengan kekerasan seksual dalam hukum internasional.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 14 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 14 is really the completion of article 13(a). Article 13 lists three sources of ‘triggering’ or authorization for exercise of jurisdiction: the Security Council, a State Party, and the propriomotu initiative of the Prosecutor. Article 14 contrasts with the brief text governing Security Council referral found in article 13(b). Arguably, the two processes are similar, and the different formulations of the concept of referral in articles 13(b) and 14 are puzzling. It would have been preferable to use equivalent language and terminology, given the substantive similarities. The differences can be explained by the complex drafting process, and the fact that the two concepts originate in different provisions within the early versions of the Statute.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 7 defines crimes against humanity, one of four categories of offence within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The classic definitions of crimes against humanity, in such instruments as the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, are vague and open-ended, leaving courts to interpret the scope of such expressions as ‘persecution’ and ‘inhumane acts’. Out of concern with the uncertain parameters of the crime, the drafters of the Rome Statute included extra language designed to restrain efforts at generous or liberal interpretation. The five distinct ‘contextual elements’ of crimes against humanity are: (i) an attack directed against any civilian population; (ii) a State or organizational policy; (iii) an attack of a widespread or systematic nature; (iv) a nexus between the individual act and the attack; and (v) knowledge of the attack.


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