English Reports in Law and Equity, Embracing the Reports of Cases in the House of Lords, Privy Council, Courts of Equity and Common Law, and in the Admiralty and Ecclesiastical Courts, Vol. XXVI

1855 ◽  
Vol 3 (9) ◽  
pp. 576
Author(s):  
Edmund H. Bennett ◽  
Chauncey Smith
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Ecclesiastical Courts

The Development of the High Court's Willingness to Overrule Common Law Precedent

2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-314
Author(s):  
Sonali Walpola
Keyword(s):  
National Identity ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Detailed Account ◽  
State Supreme Courts ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
High Court ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Economic Ties

In its first 60 years the High Court showed a complete deference to English precedent, and did not of itself initiate changes to common law doctrines. The High Court took its first steps towards autonomy in common law matters only in the 1960s when it abandoned its policy of following decisions of the House of Lords, thereby ending the practice of automatically incorporating English common law developments into Australian law. It is shown that the Court acquired a willingness to overturn ‘recent’ common law rules (those of 20th century origin) after the abolition of appeals from the High Court to the Privy Council in the 1970s. The elimination of appeals from State Supreme Courts to the Privy Council in the 1980s led to a further broadening of the range of doctrines the Court was prepared to reconsider. Notably, since the 1990s, the Court has shown its willingness, in compelling circumstances, to overrule ancient common law doctrines acquired before Federation. This paper gives a detailed account of the emergence and expansion of the High Court's willingness to overrule common law precedent. It reveals how the High Court's autonomy in common law matters was developed in distinct stages that are linked to Australia's changing legal, political and socio-economic ties with Britain, and its growing sense of an independent national identity.

Exclusive jurisdiction clauses in international trust deeds

Legal Studies ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Ardavan Arzandeh
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Exclusive Jurisdiction ◽  
Contentious Issue

Abstract Jurisdiction clauses commonly feature in high-value international contracts. Recently, these clauses are also increasingly utilised in international trust instruments. At common law, a contentious issue vis-à-vis exclusive jurisdiction clauses in trust deeds has been whether they should be upheld in the same way as their contractual equivalents. In obiter remarks in Crociani v Crociani, in 2014, the Privy Council stated that these clauses should be afforded less weight in trusts than in contracts. However, as this paper seeks to demonstrate, the reasoning underpinning the treatment of exclusive jurisdiction clauses in trust deeds in this manner is questionable. The paper's key contention is that exclusive jurisdiction clauses in trust deeds should be enforced in the same way as those in contracts. Accordingly, an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a trust instrument should be upheld, unless the claimant can establish a strong cause why the matter should be litigated elsewhere.

scholarly journals Thabo Meli Revisited: The Pernicious Effects of Result-Driven Decisions

2013 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-55
Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Arenson
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Limited Extent ◽  
Natural Consequence ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
The Public ◽  
Adversarial System ◽  
The Common

Despite the hackneyed expression that ‘judges should interpret the law and not make it’, the fact remains that there is some scope within the separation of powers doctrine for the courts to develop the common law incrementally. To this extent, the courts can effectively legislate, but only to this limited extent if they are to respect the separation of powers doctrine. On occasion, however, the courts have usurped the power entrusted to Parliament, and particularly so in instances where a strict application of the existing law would lead to results that offend their personal notions of what is fair and just. When this occurs, the natural consequence is that lawyers, academics and the public in general lose respect for both the judges involved as well as the adversarial system of criminal justice. In order to illustrate this point, attention will focus on the case of Thabo Meli v United Kingdom in which the Privy Council, mistakenly believing that it could not reach its desired outcome through a strict application of the common law rule of temporal coincidence, emasculated the rule beyond recognition in order to convict the accused. Moreover, the discussion to follow will demonstrate that not only was the court wrong in its belief that the case involved the doctrine of temporal coincidence, but the same result would have been achieved had the Council correctly identified the issue as one of legal causation and correctly applied the principles relating thereto.

The constitutional influence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the UK apex court: institutional proximity and jurisprudential divergence?

2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-302
Author(s):  
Roger Masterman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
Proportionality Test ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Relationship

It is often claimed that the constitutional role of the UK’s apex court is enriched as a result of the experiences of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as interpreter of constitutions within its overseas jurisdiction. This paper considers the relationship between the House of Lords/UK Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee and its effect on the importation of external influences into the UK’s legal system(s), further seeking to assess how far the jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee has influenced constitutional decision-making in the UK apex court. While ad hoc citation of Privy Council authorities in House of Lords/Supreme Court decisions is relatively commonplace, a post-1998 enthusiasm for reliance on Judicial Committee authority – relating to (i) a ‘generous and purposive’ approach to constitutional interpretation and (ii) supporting the developing domestic test for proportionality – quickly faded. Both areas are illustrative of a diminishing reliance on Judicial Committee authority, but reveal divergent approaches to constitutional borrowing as the UK apex court has incrementally mapped the contours of an autochthonous constitutionalism while simultaneously recognising the trans-jurisdictional qualities of the proportionality test.

Proprietary Rights and Insolvency

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Calnan
Keyword(s):  
First Principles ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Reference Source ◽  
Property Law ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Current State ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This book explains how a creditor of an insolvent debtor can take priority over other creditors by claiming a proprietary interest in assets held by the debtor, and concentrates on the circumstances in which proprietary interests are created by operation of law or are implied from the arrangements between the parties. This is a subject of particular importance and difficulty in common law systems because of the changeable nature of equitable proprietary interests, and this book provides a clear and structured explanation of the current state of the law, with detailed reference to case law from England and Wales as well as Commonwealth jurisprudence, and suggests how it might be clarified and simplified by returning to first principles. The new edition considers a number of important developments which pertain to proprietary rights and insolvency. It evaluates the key decision of the Supreme Court in FHR European Ventures v Cedar Capital Partners. Although this has settled the question of whether constructive trusts extend to bribes, it has raised more general issues regarding the approach of the courts to the imposition of proprietary remedies, which the book explores. It also covers recent Privy Council and Court of Appeal decisions concerning constructive notice (Credit Agricole v Papadimitrou, Central Bank of Ecuador v Conticorp, and SFO v Lexi), as well as interesting issues concerning the new status of intangibles (Armstrong v Winnington) and the status of the anti-deprivation rule (Belmont Park v BNY). Proprietary Rights and Insolvency is a lucid and practical reference source on insolvency and property law.

Everybody out

1999 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-499
Author(s):  
J.R. Spencer
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Press ◽  
Sexual Impotence ◽  
The Media

THE common law tradition strongly favours witnesses giving evidence in public. In the leading case of Scott v. Scott [1913] A.C. 417, the House of Lords ruled that at common law, even embarrassing evidence about sexual impotence in a nullity suit must be so given. Public justice is said to be essential to make sure that judges behave themselves and that witnesses tell the truth. For these two purely altruistic reasons, it is always staunchly defended by the media. In consequence, almost every statute passed to enable the judge to clear the court exempts the representatives of the press.

Damages in Equity—A Study of Lord Cairns' Act

1975 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 224-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Jolowicz
Keyword(s):  
Present Status ◽  
Common Law ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Court Of Appeal

When, if ever, may a court award damages to a plaintiff whose case sounds only in equity, not in law? In Hooper v. Rogers an award of damages in respect of a nuisance which had not yet resulted in any relevant damage was upheld by the Court of Appeal. In Wrotham Park Estate Co. Ltd. v. Parkside Homes Ltd. Brightman J. awarded substantial damages for breach of a restrictive covenant to the successors in title of the covenantee against the successors in title of the covenantor. In Wroth v. Tyler damages for the non-performance of a contract for the sale of a house were assessed by reference to the value of the house at the date of the hearing, not the date of breach. In none of these cases could the decisions have been justified on common law principles alone and all are in fact founded upon the Chancery Amendment Act 1858, commonly known as Lord Cairns' Act. Yet in Redland Bricks Ltd. v. Morris, while the Court of Appeal considered that an elaborate discussion of that Act was necessary and, indeed, differed in opinion as to the result of its application to the circumstances of the case, the House of Lords, through Lord Upjohn, dismissed the matter briefly and categorically with the observation that Lord Cairns' Act had nothing whatever to do with the principles of law applicable to the case. The time seems ripe for an examination of the meaning and present status of the Act.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document