Empirical Implications:

Author(s):  
Kim Uittenhove ◽  
Patrick Lemaire

In two experiments, we tested the hypothesis that strategy performance on a given trial is influenced by the difficulty of the strategy executed on the immediately preceding trial, an effect that we call strategy sequential difficulty effect. Participants’ task was to provide approximate sums to two-digit addition problems by using cued rounding strategies. Results showed that performance was poorer after a difficult strategy than after an easy strategy. Our results have important theoretical and empirical implications for computational models of strategy choices and for furthering our understanding of strategic variations in arithmetic as well as in human cognition in general.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sharon Alvarez ◽  
Jay B. Barney ◽  
Russ McBride ◽  
Robert Wuebker

2021 ◽  
pp. 073112142110286
Author(s):  
Alexander B. Kinney ◽  
Nicholas J. Rowland

This is an article that draws on the institutional work literature about provisional institutions. To date, nearly every U.S. sector has been impacted by COVID-19. To sustain their core missions, highly institutionalized organizations such as universities have had to rethink foundational structures and policies. Using a historical ethnographic approach to investigate records from faculty senate deliberations at “Rural State University” (RSU), the authors examine the implementation of a temporary grading policy to supplement traditional, qualitative grades spring 2020 during the outbreak. The authors find that RSU implemented a temporary, supplemental grading policy as a provisional institution to momentarily supersede traditional grading as a means to—as soon as possible—return to it. This finding contrasts with the common understanding that provisional institutions operate primarily as a temporary solution to a social problem that leads to more stable and enduring, ostensibly nonprovisional institutions. The temporary grading policy, the authors argue, constitutes a “late-stage” provisional institution and, with this new lens, subsequently characterize the more commonplace understanding of provisional institutions as “early-stage.” This contribution has theoretical implications for studies of institutions and empirical implications for research on shared governance and disruption in higher education.


Author(s):  
Jude C. Hays

Abstract A prominent line of research on electoral systems and income redistribution argues that proportional representation (PR) leads to tax-and-transfer policies that benefit the poor at the expense of the rich. This is because PR produces encompassing center-left coalitions that protect the poor and middle classes. Yet countries with PR electoral systems tend to rely heavily on consumption taxes and tax profits lightly, both of which are inconsistent with this expectation. Both policies are regressive and seem to benefit the rich at the expense of the poor. This article argues that PR electoral institutions, when combined with trichotomous multipartism, are not as hostile to the rich as commonly believed, and that it is important to understand how electoral and party systems interact with labor market institutions in order to explain the puzzling pattern of taxation that is observed. The author develops a theoretical model and evaluates its empirical implications for a world in which production has become multinational.


2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 453-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Krehbiel

Krishna and Morgan propose “amendments” to two of Gilligan and Krehbiel’s theoretical studies of legislative signaling. The new results for homogeneous committees do not significantly change the empirical expectations of prior works, but the results for heterogeneous committees contradict earlier claims. This note gives primary attention to heterogeneous committees and compares and contrasts the new and old equilibria and their empirical implications. The notion of signaling is somewhat nebulous in all such games but seems distinctly less plausible in the key Krishna-Morgan proposition than in previous legislative signaling games. Furthermore, the empirical literature on choice of rules—specifically, the finding of a positive relationship between committee heterogeneity and restrictive rules—is inconsistent with the Krishna-Morgan analysis but consistent with Gilligan-Krehbiel analyses, even though the former is informationally efficient and the latter are not.


M n gement ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Bandeira-De-Mello ◽  
Pervez N. Ghauri ◽  
Ulrike Mayrhofer ◽  
Pierre-Xavier Meschi

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 171-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas A Weber

We show that the Hicksian welfare measures of compensating variation and equivalent variation coincide if one of them is evaluated at a compensated income. The measures are nondecreasing in income if the varied attribute and income are complementary, and indirect utility is concave in income. Income monotonicity implies the normative endowment effect, where the equivalent variation exceeds the compensating variation. We provide sufficient conditions for the normative endowment effect and discuss empirical implications. In the global absence of a strict (anti-) endowment effect, both Hicksian welfare measures must be independent of income and the indirect utility function additively separable in income. (JEL D11, D63)


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