International Heritage Interventions as No Substitute for Capable State Party Heritage Institutions:

2022 ◽  
pp. 169-180
Author(s):  
Joanne Dingwall McCafferty
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Andrew Wolman

Abstract The International Criminal Court (ICC) can exercise jurisdiction over nationals of states parties. However, it has never been clear whether the Court will automatically recognize a nationality that has been conferred by a state party under its domestic law, nor what criteria it would use to evaluate that nationality should it not be automatically accepted. In December 2019, the Office of the Prosecutor made its first formal pronouncement on the question, finding that the ICC does not have jurisdiction over North Koreans, despite their being South Korean nationals under South Korean law, because North Koreans are not able to exercise their rights as South Koreans until accepted as such by application, and on occasion their applications might be refused. In this article, I reject the Prosecutor’s analysis as misguided. I also reject the other main approaches to nationality recognition suggested by scholars, namely a ‘genuine link’ requirement, a deferral to municipal law, and a deferral to municipal law except where a conferral of nationality violates international law. Instead, I propose a functional approach that would respect municipal conferral of nationality unless that conferral unreasonably interferes with the sovereign interests of a non-state party.


Author(s):  
Stuart Casey-Maslen ◽  
Tobias Vestner

Abstract Since the adoption of the UN Charter, states have concluded numerous international disarmament treaties. What are their core features, and are there any trends in their design? This article discusses the five global disarmament treaties, namely the 1971 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention, the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It first considers how a broad set of prohibitions of activities with respect to specific weapons has evolved over time. Then, it analyses the treaties’ implementation and compliance support mechanisms as well as their procedural aspects regarding entry into force and withdrawal. This article finds that a pattern has developed over the last two decades to outlaw all and any use of weapons by disarmament treaty, without first instituting a prohibition on their use under international humanitarian law (IHL). It also finds that reporting obligations, meetings of States Parties and treaty-related institutions are generally created, either directly by treaty or by subsequent state party decisions. Finally, there is a tendency to make the treaty’s entry into force easier, and the withdrawal more difficult. It is argued that these trends arise from states’ attempt to establish more easily disarmament treaties, design more robust disarmament treaties and more effectively protect civilians. The article concludes by reflecting whether these trends form the basis of a new branch of international law—international disarmament law—and discusses them in the context of emerging weapons and technologies.


1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 889-900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Schwebel

When the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice was drafted by an Advisory Committee of Jurists in 1920, a paramount question was, should a judge of the nationality of a State party to the case sit?The sensitivity of the issue was encapsulated by a report of a committee of the Court in 1927 on the occasion of a revision of the Rules of Court. It observed that: “In the attempt to establish international courts of justice, the fundamental problem always has been, and probably always will be, that of the representation of the litigants in the constitution of the tribunal. Of all influences to which men are subject, none is more powerful, more pervasive, or more subtle, than the tie of allegiance that binds them to the land of their homes and kindred and to the great sources of the honours and preferments for which they are so ready to spend their fortunes and to risk their lives. This fact, known to all the world, the [Court's] Statute frankly recognises and deals with.”1


1981 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wil D. Verwey

On December 11, 1979, Anthony C. E. Quainton, Director of the U.S. State Department’s Office for Combatting Terrorism, responded to an inquiry about the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, in particular its Article 12, by stating that the Convention “does not provide a loophole for members of national liberation movements or anyone else and does not supply a means by which any State Party to the Hostages Convention can escape the prosecute or extradite requirement.”


Author(s):  
Mohammad Hadi Zakerhossein

Abstract Rule 44 of the icc Rules of Procedure and Evidence stipulates that non-state parties to the Rome Statute may accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in Article 5 of relevance to the situation by lodging a declaration under Article 12(3) of the Statute. The ending phrase of this provision gives rise to the speculation that a non-member state has a power to accept the Court’s jurisdiction in a partial way, namely over a specific situation. To examine this feasibility, the present article will: (i) explain the functions of the Article 12(3) mechanism; (ii) discuss the possibility of making a situational acceptance; and (iii) contemplate the meaning of the concept of situation. This article suggests that a non-state party can exclusively accept the Court’s jurisdiction over a specific situation, and that is a concrete crisis within a territory.


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