Regulation Fair Disclosure, Analyst Following, and Analyst Forecast Dispersion
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This paper presents preliminary evidence of the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on the quantity and quality of firm-specific information released to the market by comparing analyst forecast data from pre-FD to post-FD time periods. By prohibiting selective disclosure of material information to privileged individuals, the Securities and Exchange Commission intends to provide a level playing field to all investors. However, opponents argue that FD has a negative impact by decreasing the quantity and quality of publicly available information. Consistent with this argument, we document a decrease in analyst following and an increase in forecast dispersion following the passage of FD.
2014 ◽
Vol 46
(3)
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pp. 519-541
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2012 ◽
Vol 47
(2)
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pp. 273-297
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2021 ◽
pp. 253-270
2006 ◽
Vol 14
(2)
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pp. 192-209
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2007 ◽
Vol 31
(1)
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pp. 87-98
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