Auditor Communications with the Audit Committee and the Board of Directors: Policy Recommendations and Opportunities for Future Research

2007 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Cohen ◽  
Lisa Milici Gaynor ◽  
Ganesh Krishnamoorthy ◽  
Arnold M. Wright
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Academic Community ◽  
Communication Process ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Future Research

To contribute to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) project on auditor communications with audit committees and boards of directors, we present in this paper a review of relevant academic literature. We also identify promising future research opportunities for the academic community. We specifically focus on how the communication process may affect overall financial reporting quality, internal controls, control environments, and external auditors' performance, as well as matters that potentially impact financial reporting and should interest the PCAOB (e.g., in the area of management discussion and analysis). We specifically link the findings from academic research to the discussion questions posed by the PCAOB in its 2004 briefing paper. Several potential implications of the findings should also interest standard-setters and regulators addressing issues related to corporate governance and financial reporting quality.

Academic Research on Communications Among External Auditors, the Audit Committee, and the Board: Implications and Recommendations for Practice

2008 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. A1-A8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Cohen ◽  
Lisa Milici Gaynor ◽  
Ganesh Krishnamoorthy ◽  
Arnold M. Wright
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Research Findings ◽  
Recommendations For Practice

SUMMARY: This article provides a summary of the academic research findings on the attributes of effective audit committees and potential threats to financial reporting quality that should lead to heightened auditor and audit committee sensitivity. The practice implications of this research are then discussed in terms of appropriate communications among auditors, audit committees, and boards of directors.

Did the 1999 NYSE and NASDAQ Listing Standard Changes on Audit Committee Composition Benefit Investors?

2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (6) ◽  
pp. 187-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seil Kim ◽  
April Klein
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Difference In Differences ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Independent Audit

ABSTRACT In December 1999, the SEC instituted a new listing standard for NYSE and NASDAQ firms. Listed firms were now required to maintain fully independent audit committees with at least three members. In July 2002, the U.S. Congress legislated these standards through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Our research question is whether all investors benefited from the 1999 new rule. Using both an event study and a difference-in-differences methodology, we find no evidence of higher market value or better financial reporting quality resulting from this rule.

scholarly journals An Investigation on the Audit Committees Effectiveness: The Case for GLCs in Malaysia

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nurul Nazlia Jamil ◽  
Sherliza Puat Nelson
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Monitoring Mechanism ◽  
The Impact

Financial reporting quality has been under scrutiny especially after the collapse of major companies. The main objective of this study is to investigate the audit committee’s effectiveness on the financial reporting quality among the Malaysian GLCs following the transformation program. In particular, the study examined the impact of audit committee characteristics (independence, size, frequency of meeting and financial expertise) on earnings management in periods prior to and following the transformation program (2003-2009). As of 31 December 2010, there were 33 public-listed companies categorized as Government-Linked Companies (GLC Transformation Policy, 2010) and there were 20 firms that have complete data that resulted in the total number of firm-year observations to 120 for six years (years 2003-2009).  Results show that the magnitude of earnings management as proxy of financial reporting quality is influenced by the audit committee independence. Agency theory was applied to explain audit committee, as a monitoring mechanism as well as reducing agency costs via gaining competitive advantage in knowledge, skills, and expertise towards financial reporting quality. The study is important as it provides additional knowledge about the impact of audit committees effectiveness on reducing the earnings management, and assist practitioners, policymakers and regulators such as Malaysian Institute of Accountants, Securities Commission and government to determine ways to enhance audit committees effectiveness and improve the financial reporting of GLCs, as well as improving the quality of the accounting profession.     

Audit committee ownership and audit report lag: evidence from Australia

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-125
Author(s):  
Md. Borhan Uddin Bhuiyan ◽  
Mabel D’Costa
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Report ◽  
Content Type ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Using Data

Purpose This paper aims to examine whether audit committee ownership affects audit report lag. Independent audit committees are responsible for overseeing the financial reporting process, to ensure that financial statements are both credible and released to external stakeholders in a timely manner. To date, however, the extent to which audit committee ownership strengthens or compromises member independence, and hence, influences audit report lag, has remained unexplored. Design/methodology/approach This paper hypothesizes that audit committee ownership is associated with audit report lag. Further, the author hypothesize that both the financial reporting quality and the going concern opinions of a firm mediate the effect of audit committee ownership on audit report lag. Findings Using data from Australian listed companies, the author find that audit committee ownership increases audit report lag. The author further document that financial reporting quality and modified audit opinions rendered by external auditors mediate this positive relationship. The results are robust to endogeneity concerns emanating from firms’ deliberate decisions to grant shares to the audit committee members. Originality/value The study contributes to both the audit report timeliness and the corporate governance literatures, by documenting an adverse effect of audit committee ownership.

Legal Expertise on Corporate Audit Committees and Financial Reporting Quality

2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (6) ◽  
pp. 2099-2130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jayanthi Krishnan ◽  
Yuan Wen ◽  
Wanli Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Legal Expertise

ABSTRACT Recent trends in corporate board composition indicate an increase in the appointment of directors with legal expertise. Using two financial reporting quality measures, accruals quality and discretionary accruals, we find—for a sample of Russell 1000 firms in 2003 and 2005—that the presence (and proportion) of directors with legal backgrounds on the audit committee is associated with higher financial reporting quality. These results obtain after controlling for accounting expertise on audit committees. Also, supplementary tests indicate a positive association between changes in legal expertise and changes in financial reporting quality, suggesting that legal expertise serves as a monitor rather than as a signal of financial reporting quality. Further, the two forms of expertise interact —i.e., the presence of directors with both forms of expertise enhances financial reporting quality, beyond the contribution of the individual forms of expertise. Additional tests suggest that the positive effects of legal expertise are greater in the post-SOX period compared with a pre-SOX year.

scholarly journals The Triangle Defense for Financial Reporting Quality: The Interplay between Internal Auditing, the Audit Committee, and the External Auditor

Wahana ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-130
Author(s):  
Djoko Susanto
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Working Relationships ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
External Auditor

The internal audit function, audit committee, and external auditor are three crucial stakeholders of corporate governance that safeguard the quality of financial reporting. In this article, I discuss the interrelationships between these monitoring mechanisms. I also provide insights about what we have learned from academic research about the working relationships between these three governance entities. This article should be of interest to academic researchers as well as to corporate stakeholders, which include management, investors, regulators, and Dewan Komisaris members. Future researchers can make use of this article as they contribute more work in areas related to auditing, monitoring and corporate governance, and financial reporting quality. Insights from this article can also guide corporate stakeholders to assess the effectiveness of the internal audit, audit committee, and external auditors in their organizations.

Busyness, Expertise, and Financial Reporting Quality of Audit Committee Chairs and Financial Experts

2014 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul N. Tanyi ◽  
David B. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Committee Chairman ◽  
Committee Chair ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Reporting Process

SUMMARY We investigate how the number of audit committee chair positions and other audit committee financial expertise positions held by the audit committee chairman and the audit committee financial experts affects their ability to oversee a company's financial reporting process. We argue that these two audit committee roles are vital to the functioning of the audit committee and that their over commitment affects audit committee oversight and the firm's financial reporting quality. We observe a significant negative association between financial reporting quality and the number of audit committee chair positions and other audit committee financial expertise positions held by the audit committee chairman. We also find a significant negative association between financial reporting quality and the number of audit committee chair positions and other audit committee financial expertise positions held by audit committee financial experts. Firms with busy audit committee chairs or busy financial experts have significantly higher levels of abnormal accruals, and are more likely to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, which is consistent with the busyness hypothesis. This adverse effect, nonetheless, does not extend to nonaudit committee chairs and nonaudit committee financial experts. We interpret these results to indicate that the busyness of the audit committee chair and financial expert weakens the monitoring and oversight role that audit committees play in the financial reporting process.

Board and audit committee effectiveness in the post-ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations era

2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (10) ◽  
pp. 1137-1151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maryam Safari
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Aggregate Effect

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the corporate governance literature by examining the aggregate effect of board and audit committee characteristics on earnings management practices, particularly in the period following the introduction of the second edition of the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations. Design/methodology/approach This paper begins by embarking on an extensive review of extant empirical research on boards of directors and audit committees. Then, the paper reports on the use of a quantitative analysis approach to specify the relationship between board and audit committee characteristics (introduced by the ASX Corporate Governance Council) and the level of absolute discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. Findings The findings suggest that greater compliance with board and audit committee principles is linked to lower earnings management, indicating that deliberate structuring of boards and audit committees is an effective approach for enhancing a firm’s financial reporting quality and providing support for the efficacy of the second edition of principles and recommendations related to boards and audit committees suggested by the ASX Corporate Governance Council. Practical implications This study significantly extends the literature and has notable implications for financial reporting regulators, as the findings regarding the monitoring role of boards and audit committees should be beneficial for future revisions of corporate governance principles and recommendations. Originality/value This study focuses on the aggregate effect of board characteristics recommended by the Australian Corporate Governance Council on earnings management practices, and the results support the effectiveness of the board and audit committee characteristics recommended by the ASX Corporate Governance Council. New directions for future improvements to the principles and recommendations are identified.

Cultural Diversity of Audit Committees and Firms’ Financial Reporting Quality

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Felix ◽  
Mikhail Pevzner ◽  
Mengxin Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Diversity ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Culturally Diverse ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Accounting ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Complex Environments ◽  
Lower Likelihood

We examine the effect of audit committees’ cultural diversity, as measured through ancestral cultural diversity of audit committee members, on firms’ financial reporting quality. We find that audit committee cultural diversity is associated with a lower likelihood of financial accounting restatements. Our results are driven by firms operating in more complex environments, which suggests that audit committee cultural diversity may be particularly important when the firm is inherently complex. We also find that cultural diversity is associated with a lower likelihood of restatements for companies with more powerful CEOs, suggesting that more culturally diverse audit committees are more effective in restraining CEO accounting opportunism. Additionally, we document that audit committee cultural diversity is associated with an array of other measures of higher reporting quality. Our study thus highlights the importance of cultural diversity in audit committee effectiveness.

Evaluating Financial Reporting Quality: The Effects of Financial Expertise vs. Financial Literacy

2002 ◽  
Vol 77 (s-1) ◽  
pp. 139-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda McDaniel ◽  
Roger D. Martin ◽  
Laureen A. Maines
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Financial Literacy ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Business Press ◽  
Financial Expertise

Audit committees evaluate financial reporting quality as part of their corporate oversight responsibilities. Given this responsibility, the national stock exchanges now require all audit committee members to be financially literate and at least one member to have financial expertise. In light of recent debates over this requirement, we provide evidence on how experts and literates differ in their evaluations of financial reporting quality. Results suggest that experts' evaluations of financial reporting quality are more strongly associated with their assessments of characteristics underlying reporting quality (e.g., relevance) espoused in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2's framework than literates' evaluations. Additionally, literates are more likely than experts to identify concerns about reporting treatments for business activities that are prominent in the business press or are distinguished by their nonrecurring nature, while experts are more likely to raise concerns about reporting treatments for less prominent, recurring activities. This same pattern occurs in the ratings of the quality of the reporting treatments for specific financial statement items with respect to elements underlying reporting quality (e.g., neutrality); literates (experts) assess the quality elements for the reporting treatments of prominent and nonrecurring items (less prominent and recurring items) comparatively lower than experts (literates). These results suggest that including financial experts on audit committees is likely to change the structure and focus of audit committee discussions about financial reporting quality, and may affect the committee's overall assessment of the quality of a company's financial reports.

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