Influence Activities and Favoritism in Subjective Performance Evaluation: Evidence from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises

2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (5) ◽  
pp. 1555-1588 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fei Du ◽  
Guliang Tang ◽  
S. Mark Young
Keyword(s):  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Chief Financial Officers ◽  
Political Connection ◽  
Geographic Proximity ◽  
Evaluation Scores ◽  
Confidentiality Agreement ◽  
Subjective Performance Evaluation ◽  
Chinese State ◽  
Influence Activities

ABSTRACT This study addresses the two-way process in which a subordinate and a superior engage in influence activities (bottom-up) and favoritism (top-down) in subjective Performance Evaluation. The research context is the Chinese government's evaluation of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of China (SASAC). We analyze archival records of the government's evaluation scores, score adjustments, and evaluation ratings given to 63 SOEs between 2005 and 2007. These analyses are also interpreted based on insights gained from in-depth field interviews with SASAC officials and chief financial officers (CFOs) of SOEs. Results indicate that the political connection of SOE CFOs, the geographic proximity of SOE headquarters to the SASAC central office, and political rank of the firm affect the SASAC's evaluations. Data Availability: Data used in this study cannot be made public due to a confidentiality agreement.

The Determinants and Performance Effects of Managers' Performance Evaluation Biases

2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (5) ◽  
pp. 1549-1575 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jasmijn C Bol
Keyword(s):  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Employee Motivation ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Perceived Fairness ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Confidentiality Agreement ◽  
Leniency Bias ◽  
Performance Effects ◽  
Employee Incentives ◽  
And Performance

ABSTRACT This study examines the determinants and performance effects of centrality bias and leniency bias. The results show that managers respond to their own incentives and preferences when subjectively evaluating performance. Specifically, information-gathering costs and strong employee-manager relationships positively affect centrality bias and leniency bias. The findings also indicate that performance evaluation biases affect not only current performance ratings, but also future employee incentives. Inconsistent with predictions based on the agency perspective, the results show that managers' performance evaluation biases are not necessarily detrimental to compensation contracting. Although centrality bias negatively affects performance improvement, the evidence does not reveal a significant negative relation between leniency bias and performance. Rather, leniency bias is positively associated with future performance, which is consistent with the behavioral argument that bias can improve perceived fairness and, in turn, employee motivation. Data Availability: Data used in this study cannot be made public due to a confidentiality agreement with the participating firm.

Performance Target Revisions in Incentive Contracts: Do Information and Trust Reduce Ratcheting and the Ratchet Effect?

2015 ◽  
Vol 90 (5) ◽  
pp. 1755-1778 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jasmijn C. Bol ◽  
Jeremy B. Lill
Keyword(s):  
Structural Changes ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Performance Information ◽  
Ratchet Effect ◽  
Past Performance ◽  
Performance Targets ◽  
Positive Performance ◽  
Confidentiality Agreement ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Performance Target

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine a setting where principals use past performance to annually revise performance targets, but do not fully incorporate the past performance information in their target revisions. We argue that this situation is driven by some principals and agents having an implicit agreement where the principal “allows” the agent to receive economic rents from positive performance-target deviations that are the result of superior effort or transitory gains by not revising targets upward, while the agent “accepts” target revisions by not restricting output when these revisions are the result of structural changes in the operation's true economic capacity. Although both the principal and the agent can benefit from an implicit agreement, we argue that for the implicit agreement to be maintainable, the principal either needs information on the cause of the performance-target deviation or there needs to be trust between the principal and the agent. Using archival data across multiple years and independent bank units, we find a pattern of ratchet attenuation and output restriction that is consistent with the existence of implicit agreements for those principal-agent dyads where information asymmetry is sufficiently reduced or mutual trust exists. Data Availability: Data used in this study cannot be made public due to a confidentiality agreement with the participating firm.

Logistics Costs Behavior and Management in the Auto Industry

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 389-408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcela M. Porporato
Keyword(s):  
Real Life ◽  
Systems Design ◽  
Management Control ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Bottom Line ◽  
Related Data ◽  
Profitability Analysis ◽  
Confidentiality Agreement ◽  
Cost Behavior

ABSTRACT This case, based on a real-life situation of how logistics costs function in daily operations, aims to provide students with the opportunity to understand how logistics costs are calculated and how the inter-organizational nature of these costs affects the profitability of two companies. The case hinges on understanding cost behavior (fixed and variable) and on management control systems design. Although logistics costs represent a small fraction of total costs in manufacturing companies, they can negatively affect the bottom line if left unattended. Students are presented with data relating to a three-year project in the automotive industry that shows that the project has been experiencing a sustained increase in costs that has eroded its profit margin. While it appears that logistics costs are the problem, it cannot be verified until the contracts are studied. In addition, the financial- and contract-related data provided are sufficient to extend the profitability analysis to the provider of logistics services. This case is suitable for management accounting courses at the master's or advanced undergraduate level; it has been tested and well received by students who want to gain a greater understanding of logistics costs—their nature, behavior, possible containment strategies, and inter-organizational effects. Data Availability: Some of the data are from public sources, but the logistics contracts and cost schedules are private; the confidentiality agreement with the two companies requires masking certain details and modifying the numeric data.

The Impact of Client and Misstatement Characteristics on the Disposition of Proposed Audit Adjustments

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Joe ◽  
Arnold Wright, and ◽  
Sally Wright
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Confidentiality Agreement ◽  
Financial Scandals ◽  
The Impact

SUMMARY We present evidence on the resolution of proposed audit adjustments during a unique time period, immediately following several U.S. financial scandals and surrounding calls for reforms in auditing and financial reporting, which culminated in the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). During this period, auditors and their clients faced increased scrutiny from investors and regulators. In addition, auditors had to contend with changed incentives, a new external regulator (i.e., the PCAOB), and upcoming annual PCAOB inspections. We extend prior studies by considering a broader range of factors potentially impacting the resolution of proposed adjustments, including the effect of client tenure, strength of internal controls, and repeat adjustments. Data on 458 proposed adjustments are obtained from the working papers of a sample of 163 audit engagements conducted during 2002 by a Big 4 firm. We find that 24.2 percent of proposed adjustments were subsequently waived. The results indicate audit adjustments are more likely to be waived for clients with whom the audit firm has had a longer relationship, although the pattern does not reflect favoring such clients. We also find that adjustments are more likely to be waived for repeat adjustments. Data Availability: Due to a confidentiality agreement with the participating audit firm the data are proprietary.

An Empirical Analysis of Employee Responses to Bonuses and Penalties

2020 ◽  
Vol 95 (6) ◽  
pp. 395-412 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wim A. Van der Stede ◽  
Anne Wu ◽  
Steve Yu-Ching Wu
Keyword(s):  
Employee Turnover ◽  
Selection Effect ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Confidentiality Agreement ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Bonuses And Penalties ◽  
Employee Responses ◽  
Chip Manufacturer

ABSTRACT We examine how employees respond to bonuses and penalties using a proprietary dataset from an electronic chip manufacturer in China. First, we examine the relative effects of bonuses and penalties and observe a stronger effect on subsequent effort and performance for penalties than for bonuses. Second, we find that the marginal sensitivity of penalties diminishes faster than that of bonuses, indicating that the marginal effect of a bonus may eventually exceed that of a penalty as their value increases. Third, we find an undesirable selection effect of penalties: penalties increase employee turnover, especially for skillful and high-quality workers. These results may help inform our understanding of the observed limited use of penalties in practice due to their bounded effectiveness and possible unintended consequences. Data Availability: The confidentiality agreement with the company that provided data for this study precludes the dissemination of detailed data without the company's consent.

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