An Empirical Analysis of Employee Responses to Bonuses and Penalties

2020 ◽  
Vol 95 (6) ◽  
pp. 395-412 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wim A. Van der Stede ◽  
Anne Wu ◽  
Steve Yu-Ching Wu
Keyword(s):  
Employee Turnover ◽  
Selection Effect ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Confidentiality Agreement ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Bonuses And Penalties ◽  
Employee Responses ◽  
Chip Manufacturer

ABSTRACT We examine how employees respond to bonuses and penalties using a proprietary dataset from an electronic chip manufacturer in China. First, we examine the relative effects of bonuses and penalties and observe a stronger effect on subsequent effort and performance for penalties than for bonuses. Second, we find that the marginal sensitivity of penalties diminishes faster than that of bonuses, indicating that the marginal effect of a bonus may eventually exceed that of a penalty as their value increases. Third, we find an undesirable selection effect of penalties: penalties increase employee turnover, especially for skillful and high-quality workers. These results may help inform our understanding of the observed limited use of penalties in practice due to their bounded effectiveness and possible unintended consequences. Data Availability: The confidentiality agreement with the company that provided data for this study precludes the dissemination of detailed data without the company's consent.

The Determinants and Performance Effects of Managers' Performance Evaluation Biases

2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (5) ◽  
pp. 1549-1575 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jasmijn C Bol
Keyword(s):  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Employee Motivation ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Perceived Fairness ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Confidentiality Agreement ◽  
Leniency Bias ◽  
Performance Effects ◽  
Employee Incentives ◽  
And Performance

ABSTRACT This study examines the determinants and performance effects of centrality bias and leniency bias. The results show that managers respond to their own incentives and preferences when subjectively evaluating performance. Specifically, information-gathering costs and strong employee-manager relationships positively affect centrality bias and leniency bias. The findings also indicate that performance evaluation biases affect not only current performance ratings, but also future employee incentives. Inconsistent with predictions based on the agency perspective, the results show that managers' performance evaluation biases are not necessarily detrimental to compensation contracting. Although centrality bias negatively affects performance improvement, the evidence does not reveal a significant negative relation between leniency bias and performance. Rather, leniency bias is positively associated with future performance, which is consistent with the behavioral argument that bias can improve perceived fairness and, in turn, employee motivation. Data Availability: Data used in this study cannot be made public due to a confidentiality agreement with the participating firm.

Performance Target Revisions in Incentive Contracts: Do Information and Trust Reduce Ratcheting and the Ratchet Effect?

2015 ◽  
Vol 90 (5) ◽  
pp. 1755-1778 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jasmijn C. Bol ◽  
Jeremy B. Lill
Keyword(s):  
Structural Changes ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Performance Information ◽  
Ratchet Effect ◽  
Past Performance ◽  
Performance Targets ◽  
Positive Performance ◽  
Confidentiality Agreement ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Performance Target

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine a setting where principals use past performance to annually revise performance targets, but do not fully incorporate the past performance information in their target revisions. We argue that this situation is driven by some principals and agents having an implicit agreement where the principal “allows” the agent to receive economic rents from positive performance-target deviations that are the result of superior effort or transitory gains by not revising targets upward, while the agent “accepts” target revisions by not restricting output when these revisions are the result of structural changes in the operation's true economic capacity. Although both the principal and the agent can benefit from an implicit agreement, we argue that for the implicit agreement to be maintainable, the principal either needs information on the cause of the performance-target deviation or there needs to be trust between the principal and the agent. Using archival data across multiple years and independent bank units, we find a pattern of ratchet attenuation and output restriction that is consistent with the existence of implicit agreements for those principal-agent dyads where information asymmetry is sufficiently reduced or mutual trust exists. Data Availability: Data used in this study cannot be made public due to a confidentiality agreement with the participating firm.

Retroactive Tax Legislation, Reported Earnings, and Investors' Responses to Earnings “Surprises”: Evidence from R&D Credit Extensions

2016 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Bratten ◽  
David S. Hulse
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Substantial Part ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Financial Reporting Standards ◽  
Average Decrease ◽  
Tax Legislation ◽  
Reported Earnings

ABSTRACT When Congress retroactively extends a temporary tax rule, the effect on earnings is complex because financial reporting standards require firms to apply the integral method using enacted tax law to determine quarterly income tax expense. We model this effect and examine earnings announcements following retroactive extensions of the federal R&D tax credit to test how investors incorporate the effect into stock prices. We find that investors respond when earnings are announced, even though the effect could have been determined several weeks earlier. We also show that in recent years, the effects of retroactive extensions of the credit are a substantial part of the average decrease in effective tax rates (ETRs) from the third to fourth quarter for calendar-year firms. Our results have implications for investors and researchers examining earnings and ETRs around retroactive extensions of temporary tax rules and suggest that congressional delays and GAAP interact to produce unintended consequences. JEL Classifications: M41; M48; G14; H25. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from the sources identified in the text.

Logistics Costs Behavior and Management in the Auto Industry

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 389-408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcela M. Porporato
Keyword(s):  
Real Life ◽  
Systems Design ◽  
Management Control ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Bottom Line ◽  
Related Data ◽  
Profitability Analysis ◽  
Confidentiality Agreement ◽  
Cost Behavior

ABSTRACT This case, based on a real-life situation of how logistics costs function in daily operations, aims to provide students with the opportunity to understand how logistics costs are calculated and how the inter-organizational nature of these costs affects the profitability of two companies. The case hinges on understanding cost behavior (fixed and variable) and on management control systems design. Although logistics costs represent a small fraction of total costs in manufacturing companies, they can negatively affect the bottom line if left unattended. Students are presented with data relating to a three-year project in the automotive industry that shows that the project has been experiencing a sustained increase in costs that has eroded its profit margin. While it appears that logistics costs are the problem, it cannot be verified until the contracts are studied. In addition, the financial- and contract-related data provided are sufficient to extend the profitability analysis to the provider of logistics services. This case is suitable for management accounting courses at the master's or advanced undergraduate level; it has been tested and well received by students who want to gain a greater understanding of logistics costs—their nature, behavior, possible containment strategies, and inter-organizational effects. Data Availability: Some of the data are from public sources, but the logistics contracts and cost schedules are private; the confidentiality agreement with the two companies requires masking certain details and modifying the numeric data.

The Impact of Client and Misstatement Characteristics on the Disposition of Proposed Audit Adjustments

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Joe ◽  
Arnold Wright, and ◽  
Sally Wright
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Confidentiality Agreement ◽  
Financial Scandals ◽  
The Impact

SUMMARY We present evidence on the resolution of proposed audit adjustments during a unique time period, immediately following several U.S. financial scandals and surrounding calls for reforms in auditing and financial reporting, which culminated in the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). During this period, auditors and their clients faced increased scrutiny from investors and regulators. In addition, auditors had to contend with changed incentives, a new external regulator (i.e., the PCAOB), and upcoming annual PCAOB inspections. We extend prior studies by considering a broader range of factors potentially impacting the resolution of proposed adjustments, including the effect of client tenure, strength of internal controls, and repeat adjustments. Data on 458 proposed adjustments are obtained from the working papers of a sample of 163 audit engagements conducted during 2002 by a Big 4 firm. We find that 24.2 percent of proposed adjustments were subsequently waived. The results indicate audit adjustments are more likely to be waived for clients with whom the audit firm has had a longer relationship, although the pattern does not reflect favoring such clients. We also find that adjustments are more likely to be waived for repeat adjustments. Data Availability: Due to a confidentiality agreement with the participating audit firm the data are proprietary.

scholarly journals Quality assessment of linked Canadian clinical administrative hospital and vital statistics death data

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy Rodrigues ◽  
Maureen Kelly ◽  
Tobi Henderson
Keyword(s):  
Assessment Tool ◽  
Vital Statistics ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Supplementary Information ◽  
Five Dimensions ◽  
Tracking Process ◽  
Data Assessment ◽  
Hospital Deaths ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Discharge From Hospital

IntroductionThree Canadian clinical-administrative hospital databases were linked to the Canadian Vital Statistics Death Database (CVSD) to provide information about patients who died following discharge from hospital as well as supplementary information about patients that died in-hospital. Quality was assessed using a guided approach and through feedback from initial users. Objectives and ApproachThe linked datasets were created to develop and validate health care indicators and performance measures and perform outcome analyses. It is therefore imperative to evaluate the data’s fitness for use. Quality was assessed by calculating coverage of deaths for all linked contributors, creating a profile of the linked dataset and analyzing issues that were identified by users. These analyses were guided by an existing Data Source Assessment Tool, which provides a set of criteria that allow for assessment across five dimensions of quality, thus allowing for appropriate determination of a given set of data’s fitness for use. ResultsDeterministic linkage of the datasets resulted in linkage rates that ranged from 66.9% to 90.9% depending on the dataset or data year. Linkage rates also varied by Canadian jurisdictions and patient cohort. Variables had good data availability with rates of 95% or higher. Initial users identified a significant number of duplicate records that were flagged to and corrected by the data supplier. 1.4\% of acute hospital deaths had discrepancies in the death date captured in the two linked sources; the vast majority had a difference of only one day. A user group and issue tracking process were created to share information about the linked data and guarantee that issues are triaged to the appropriate party and allow for timely follow up with the data supplier. Conclusion/ImplicationsDocumentation provided by the data supplier was vital to understanding the linkage methodology and its impact on linkage rates. A guided data assessment ensured that strengths and limitations were identified and shared to support appropriate use. Feedback to the data supplier is supporting ongoing improvements to the linkage methodology.

Firm Equity Investment Decisions and U.S. GAAP and IFRS Consolidation Control Guidelines: An Empirical Analysis

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allison K. Beck ◽  
Bruce K. Behn ◽  
Andrea Lionzo ◽  
Francesca Rossignoli
Keyword(s):  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Investment Behavior ◽  
Strategic Investment ◽  
Equity Investment ◽  
Bright Line ◽  
Accounting Scandals ◽  
Control Concept ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT It is asserted in the literature that rules-based accounting standards leave room for transaction structuring and that numerous accounting scandals have been linked to companies structuring transactions to avoid bright-line rules. Prior research suggests that bright-line accounting standards motivated companies to avoid the equity method or consolidation accounting by keeping their equity ownership percentages below the key thresholds of 20 percent and 50 percent. However, in recent years, much has changed regarding U.S. GAAP and IFRS principles, especially in terms of the guidelines surrounding business combinations and the concept of control. Now, given the similarity of the U.S. GAAP and IFRS equity investment accounting standards and their more recent emphasis on the control concept, one would not expect either U.S. GAAP or IFRS firms to engage in transaction-structuring behavior, holding concentrated ownership percentages at, or right below, 50 percent. Our study extends prior research by investigating whether this phenomenon (of investment percentages being concentrated right at 50 percent or just below) exists in today's FASB and IASB reporting environments and if so, why? Using ownership data from 2004–2008, we investigate whether firms engage in strategic investment behavior in the vicinity of the 50 percent ownership threshold within the U.S. GAAP and IFRS reporting environments. Interestingly, our univariate results indicate that despite a shift in the accounting standards to a more principles-based definition of control, U.S. GAAP-compliant and IFRS-compliant companies continue to behave in a manner indicative of purposeful transaction structuring around the 50 percent threshold, as evidenced by an unusually heavy concentration of investment at or below 50 percent. This finding could mean that U.S. GAAP- and IFRS-compliant companies (and their auditors) are continuing to anchor to the old bright-line guidance regarding consolidation accounting. We supplement our univariate tests with a regression analysis to examine potential incentives that could explain this investment behavior. We find that leverage has a significant positive marginal effect—increased leverage is associated with a greater likelihood of choosing to keep the investment level at or below 50 percent. Data Availability: The ownership data for this study were obtained from the Bureau van Dijk OSIRIS Ownership database. Data will be made available in accordance with the American Accounting Association's data integrity policy.

Unintended Consequences of Lowering Disclosure Thresholds

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 301-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsten Fanning ◽  
Christopher P. Agoglia ◽  
M. David Piercey
Keyword(s):  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Perceptions Of Risk ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Low Threshold ◽  
Low Probability ◽  
Plausible Reason ◽  
Overall Risk

ABSTRACT In recent years, regulators have considered several initiatives to lower the threshold for disclosing risks to investors. We examine two ways in which disclosing more risks can actually lower investors' perceptions of risk. Utilizing an experiment, we find evidence of two unintended consequences on different types of investors. First, we demonstrate that the addition of low-probability risks to a disclosure can dilute (rather than add to) more probable losses, leading certain investors to lower their perceptions of overall risk. Second, since lowering the threshold changes the overall composition of the disclosure by adding low-probability losses, firms could adopt a tactic of minimization that characterizes the entire disclosure as unimportant, presenting the lowest risks most saliently, using compliance with the low threshold as a plausible reason for giving a lengthy disclosure of generally unimportant risks. Our findings suggest that such a tactic can be persuasive. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

Behavioral Work Outcomes of a Strategic Performance Measurement System-Based Incentive Plan

2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurie L. Burney ◽  
Sally K. Widener
Keyword(s):  
Performance Measurement ◽  
Psychological Contract ◽  
Self Efficacy ◽  
Employee Performance ◽  
Critical Dimension ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Performance Measurement System ◽  
Strategic Performance ◽  
Confidentiality Agreement ◽  
Incentive Plan

ABSTRACT: Strategic performance measurement systems (SPMS) that translate a firm's strategy to its employees are increasingly used. We examine whether the extent to which an SPMS is coupled with strategy affects employee performance indirectly through motivational characteristics including perceived self-efficacy and perceived psychological contract. Using data from 242 employees, we find evidence that the extent to which an SPMS is tightly coupled with strategy affects employee performance through perceived self-efficacy and perceived psychological contract. Self-efficacy is a critical dimension of intrinsic motivation. Thus, an implication of our findings is that tightly coupling an SPMS-based incentive plan with strategy facilitates internalized motivated behaviors. We also find that our hypothesized results hold across varying levels of two types of employee climate. However, the workforce's age and education levels serve as boundary conditions since we find that the relation between self-efficacy and employee performance holds only for the older, less-educated employees. Data Availability: Data used in this study cannot be made public due to a confidentiality agreement with the participating firm.

The Effect of Performance-Based Incentive Contracts on System 1 and System 2 Processing in Affective Decision Contexts: fMRI and Behavioral Evidence

2014 ◽  
Vol 89 (6) ◽  
pp. 1979-2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne M. Farrell ◽  
Joshua O. Goh ◽  
Brian J. White
Keyword(s):  
Brain Activity ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Emotional Reactions ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
System 2 ◽  
Fixed Wage ◽  
Behavioral Evidence ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Performance Based Contracts ◽  
System 1

ABSTRACT Managers may rely on emotional reactions to a setting to the detriment of economic considerations (“System 1 processing”), resulting in decisions that are costly for firms. While economic theory prescribes performance-based incentives to align goals and induce effort, psychology theory suggests that the salience of emotions is difficult to overcome without also inducing more deliberate consideration of both emotional and economic factors (“System 2 processing”). We link these perspectives by investigating whether performance-based incentives mitigate the costly influence of emotion by inducing more System 2 processing. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging and traditional experiments, we investigate managers' brain activity and choices under fixed wage and performance-based contracts. Under both, brain regions associated with System 1 processing are more active when emotion is present. Relative to fixed wage contracts, performance-based contracts induce System 2 processing in emotional contexts beyond that observed absent emotion, and decrease the proportion of economically costly choices. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

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