A Summary of Research on External Auditor Reliance on the Internal Audit Function

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (Supplement 1) ◽  
pp. 251-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles W. Bame-Aldred ◽  
Duane M. Brandon ◽  
William F. Messier ◽  
Larry E. Rittenberg ◽  
Chad M. Stefaniak

SUMMARY Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) allows external auditors (EAs) to rely on the internal audit function (IAF) when the internal audit activities meet certain criteria and the EAs would find efficiencies in relying on their work (PCAOB 2007). This paper reviews the extant literature on the EAs' reliance on IAF, identifies gaps in the literature, and proposes a series of research questions aimed at closing these gaps. We focus our review on research pertaining to how environmental factors and IAF-specific factors influence initial EAs' reliance decisions, the nature and extent of EAs' reliance on IAF, and the observable outcomes as a result of EAs' reliance decisions. Our review finds that the environment in which EAs must make a reliance decision is complex—involving several factors that must be considered simultaneously. Moreover, an evolving set of auditing standards introduces several necessary intermediary judgments that the EAs must process before, and during, reliance on the IAF. In addition, our review indicates that we continue to know very little about how, and to what extent, EAs are currently evaluating IAF's quality factors. Similarly, while we find that the nature and extent of EAs' reliance on IAF is influenced by account risk, inherent risk, and IAF sourcing, how the EAs choose task environments (e.g., revenue recognition versus payroll), and the types of tests to be relied upon within these task environments, is not completely understood. Finally, we find that there is a paucity of research concerning the effects of EAs' reliance on IAF in terms of external audit quality.

2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maia J. Farkas ◽  
Rina M. Hirsch

ABSTRACT Failure of the internal audit function (IAF) to detect a significant deficiency in internal controls is a significant shortcoming in the IAF's work performance. This shortcoming in the IAF's work performance reduces external auditors' willingness to rely on the IAF's work. Using a two-stage experiment, we investigate how the implementation of three different internal control testing remediation strategies (akin to CCM, ACL, and periodic manual testing), which vary in their automation and frequency, affect external auditors' perceptions of IAF strength and planned reliance on the IAF's work. We find that automated remediation strategies fully remediate external auditors' perceptions of poor IAF work performance and low degree of reliance on the IAF, whereas manual remediation strategies result in only partial remediation. Counterintuitively, less frequent remediation strategies are more effective at improving perceptions of poor IAF work performance and low levels of reliance on the IAF, relative to continuous remediation strategies.


2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (2) ◽  
pp. 495-527 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew S. Ege

ABSTRACT Standard-setters believe high-quality internal audit functions (IAFs) serve as a key resource to audit committees for monitoring senior management. However, regulators do not enforce IAF quality or require disclosures relating to IAF quality, which is in stark contrast to regulatory requirements placed on boards, audit committees, and external auditors. Using proprietary data, I find that a composite measure of IAF quality is negatively associated with the likelihood of management misconduct even after controlling for board, audit committee, and external auditor quality. This result is robust to a variety of other specifications, including controlling for internal control quality and separate estimation during the pre- and post-SOX time periods. A difference-in-differences analysis indicates that misconduct firms have low IAF quality and competence during misconduct years and improve IAF quality and competence in the post-misconduct years. These findings suggest that regulators, audit committees, and other stakeholders should consider ways to improve IAF quality.


2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chad M. Stefaniak ◽  
Richard W. Houston ◽  
Robert M. Cornell

SUMMARY The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) encourages external auditors to rely on internal auditors to increase the efficiency of lower-risk internal control evaluations (PCAOB 2007). We use post-SOX experimental data to compare the levels and effects of employer (client) identification on the control evaluations of internal (external) auditors. First, we find that internal auditors perceive a greater level of identification with the evaluated firm than do external auditors. We also find some evidence that, ceteris paribus, internal auditors are less lenient than external auditors when evaluating internal control deficiencies (i.e., tend to support management's preferred position to a lesser extent). Further, while we support Bamber and Iyer's (2007) results by finding that higher levels of external auditor client identification are associated with more lenient control evaluations, we demonstrate an opposite effect for internal auditors—higher levels of internal auditor employer identification are associated with less lenient control evaluations. Our results are important because we are the first to capture the relative levels of identification between internal and external auditors, as well as the first to compare directly internal and external auditor leniency, both of which are important in light of AS5. That is, we provide initial evidence that external auditors' increased reliance on internal auditors' work, while increasing audit efficiency, also could improve audit quality by resulting in less lenient internal control evaluations, due, at least in part, to the effects of employer and client identification. Data Availability: Contact the first author.


2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 40-49
Author(s):  
Arumugam Seetharaman ◽  
M. Krishna Moorthy ◽  
A.S. Saravanan

Internal audit which is an integral part of any organization has long been overlooked. In fact, most organizations look at internal audit as a routine function in an organization. However, in the recent years, internal audit has taken a front seat for many organizations. Others are also looking at various options such as outsourcing of the internal audit function of their organizations. However, where outsourcing is concerned, one important issue arises, which is the independence of the external auditor to perform the internal audit function. This paper takes a look at the various aspects of the internal audit process as well as the impact and independence of external auditors who perform internal audit.


2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 3-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
Susan Parker ◽  
Gary F. Peters

SUMMARY Professional standards guide external auditors to consider the effect of the client's internal audit work and opportunities to utilize the direct assistance of the internal audit function when planning and conducting audits. We examine the effect of internal audit assistance on external audit timeliness via the extent of external audit delay. We hypothesize and find that internal audit assistance is negatively associated with external audit delay. We also document moderating relationships between internal audit assistance and other internal audit environment characteristics, such as the extent of internal control reliance, coordination with the external auditor, and the investment in internal audit quality. Overall, our findings have implications for firms and external auditors who are evaluating the role and use of internal audit functions. Namely, our findings suggest that internal audit assistance may not only result in audit cost savings, but also in greater audit efficiencies. These findings are particularly germane given the challenges faced by external auditors in the form of greater audit requirements, shorter regulatory filing deadlines, resource constraints, and audit fee pressures.


2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 159-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byron J. Pike ◽  
Lawrence Chui ◽  
Kasey A. Martin ◽  
Renee M. Olvera

SUMMARY To reduce redundancies and increase efficiency in the evaluation of internal controls (PCAOB 2007, 402–403), professional standards encourage coordination between external auditors and their clients' internal audit function (IAF). Recent surveys of internal auditors find that a component of this coordination is external auditors' involvement in developing the IAF's audit plans. Nevertheless, it is not known how such involvement affects external auditors' reliance on the internal control test work of the IAF, either before or after a negative audit discovery. Based on an experiment with 107 experienced auditors, we find that external auditors involved in the development of the IAF's audit plan perceive the IAF as more objective and that both objectivity and involvement contribute to these auditors' placing more reliance on the IAF as compared to external auditors with no involvement. This initial reliance results in the involved auditors' proposing reductions to the audit budget and re-performing less of the IAF's work. Consistent with an anchoring bias, we find that involvement leads to external auditors' continuing to place greater reliance on the IAF's work, even after they become aware of a negative audit discovery that should not have occurred had the client's controls been effective. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors on request.


2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 222-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard G. Brody ◽  
Christine M. Haynes ◽  
Craig G. White

Purpose – This research aims to explore whether recent audit reforms have improved auditor objectivity when performing non-audit services. Design/methodology/approach – In two separate experiments, the authors tested whether external and internal auditors' inventory obsolescence judgments are influenced by their client's (or company's) role as the buyer or seller in an acquisition setting. Findings – External auditors assessed the likelihood of inventory obsolescence objectively, regardless of their consulting role in the acquisition setting. Internal auditors assessed the likelihood of inventory obsolescence as higher when consulting for the buyer than when consulting for the seller, consistent with the supposition that the buyer would prefer to write-down inventory and negotiate a lower purchase price, whereas the seller would prefer the inventory not be written down. Practical implications – From a regulatory perspective, external auditors may be relying too much on the work of internal auditors if internal auditors' lack of objectivity as consultants extends to their assurance role. Originality/value – This paper extends prior research in the area of internal and external auditor objectivity and is the first paper to include both subject groups in the same experiment. It also addresses the current policy issues that may have a significant effect on audit quality and auditor liability.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 261-267
Author(s):  
Fatmir Mehmeti

Abstract Many scholars have shown that failure in leading big companies as well as the latest financial crises have led the auditing market to perceive traditional auditing more as a legal requirement rather than as a value added for the company. There are others that do not completely agree to this, but they all accept that the auditing as a profession should accept changes which will affect the value added for the company from auditing. Nowadays the companies are required more accountability rather that it was required before, perversely only financial reports were reported by the companies. Auditing is a process which confirms the statement provided by the company management regarding the information in financial statements that are real and accurate. Auditing has to be based on evidences and logical concept for better understanding. For companies that operate in the market, it is important to provide financial information that is consistent, reliable and complete for all users of the financial statements (banks, potential shareholders and the international community). In daily practice of entities we have two kinds audit, the internal and external audits. Usually, these are interlinked and complementary, with the ultimate aim that the (overall) audit is more effective and the reports that will emerge are fully arguable and meaningful. The internal audit has an important role which is to increase the effectiveness of internal control in private or public company. Internal audit has the responsibility of informing the management of the institution of deficiencies or weaknesses in the internal control system. External auditors are the fist line of the front for companies liadership. They play a key role in verifying the financial information provided to shareholders. External auditors inspect the financial statements prepared by the entity and provide assurance and independent opinion if these statements represent a true and fair view of the entity's condition for the year under review.


Author(s):  
Mária Bordáné Rabóczki

A cikk a belső ellenőrzésnek a hatékony társaságirányításhoz való hozzájárulását és ennek a versenyképességre gyakorolt hatását vizsgálja. A belső ellenőrzés és a társaságirányítás kölcsönös összefüggésben áll egymással. Nemcsak a belső ellenőrzés hat a társaságirányításra, hanem a releváns társaságirányítási struktúrák, emberi kapcsolatok és magatartásformák jelentős hatást gyakorolnak a belső ellenőrzés színvonalára és hatékonyságára. A cikk ezért különös figyelmet szentel a belső ellenőröknek az igazgatósággal, az auditbizottsággal/felügyelőbizottsággal, a menedzsmenttel és a könyvvizsgálóval való kapcsolatainak vizsgálatára. Rávilágít a belső ellenőrzés legfőbb funkciójára, amely objektív bizonyosságot nyújt az igazgatóság és a felső vezetők számára a kockázatok azonosítására, kezelésére és elfogadható szintre történő csökkentésére szolgáló kontrollfolyamatok megfelelőségéről és hatékonyságáról. A bemutatott belső ellenőrzési modell azt a szemléletet közvetíti, hogy a belső ellenőrzés által nyújtott objektív bizonyosság megszerzése nemcsak a jogszabályoknak vagy az ajánlásoknak való megfelelés, hanem a társaságok versenyképessége szempontjából is kiemelkedő jelentőségű. _________ The purpose of this paper is to consider the contribution of internal audit to the sound corporate governance and the impact of that on the competitiveness of the companies. There is a mutual dependency between internal audit and corporate governance. Not only the internal audit has impact on the corporate governance but the relevant governance structures, relationships and behaviour influence the level and effectiveness of the internal audit. Therefore the present paper is highly concerned with the internal auditors` relationships with the board, audit committee/supervisory board, senior management and the external auditor. It highlights the internal audit function, that provides objective assurance to the board and senior management about the adequacy and effectiveness of the processes by which risks are identified, managed, controlled and mitigated to acceptable levels. The internal audit model demonstrated represents an approach, according to that getting objective assurance provided by internal audit is important not only to be in line with laws and recommendations but to facilitate the corporate competitiveness.


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