External Auditors' Involvement in the Internal Audit Function's Work Plan and Subsequent Reliance Before and After a Negative Audit Discovery

2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 159-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byron J. Pike ◽  
Lawrence Chui ◽  
Kasey A. Martin ◽  
Renee M. Olvera
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Professional Standards ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Internal Auditors ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Internal Audit Function ◽  
Anchoring Bias ◽  
Before And After

SUMMARY To reduce redundancies and increase efficiency in the evaluation of internal controls (PCAOB 2007, 402–403), professional standards encourage coordination between external auditors and their clients' internal audit function (IAF). Recent surveys of internal auditors find that a component of this coordination is external auditors' involvement in developing the IAF's audit plans. Nevertheless, it is not known how such involvement affects external auditors' reliance on the internal control test work of the IAF, either before or after a negative audit discovery. Based on an experiment with 107 experienced auditors, we find that external auditors involved in the development of the IAF's audit plan perceive the IAF as more objective and that both objectivity and involvement contribute to these auditors' placing more reliance on the IAF as compared to external auditors with no involvement. This initial reliance results in the involved auditors' proposing reductions to the audit budget and re-performing less of the IAF's work. Consistent with an anchoring bias, we find that involvement leads to external auditors' continuing to place greater reliance on the IAF's work, even after they become aware of a negative audit discovery that should not have occurred had the client's controls been effective. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors on request.

The Effect of Frequency and Automation of Internal Control Testing on External Auditor Reliance on the Internal Audit Function

2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maia J. Farkas ◽  
Rina M. Hirsch
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Work Performance ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Internal Audit Function ◽  
Remediation Strategies ◽  
Low Degree ◽  
External Auditor ◽  
Manual Testing

ABSTRACT Failure of the internal audit function (IAF) to detect a significant deficiency in internal controls is a significant shortcoming in the IAF's work performance. This shortcoming in the IAF's work performance reduces external auditors' willingness to rely on the IAF's work. Using a two-stage experiment, we investigate how the implementation of three different internal control testing remediation strategies (akin to CCM, ACL, and periodic manual testing), which vary in their automation and frequency, affect external auditors' perceptions of IAF strength and planned reliance on the IAF's work. We find that automated remediation strategies fully remediate external auditors' perceptions of poor IAF work performance and low degree of reliance on the IAF, whereas manual remediation strategies result in only partial remediation. Counterintuitively, less frequent remediation strategies are more effective at improving perceptions of poor IAF work performance and low levels of reliance on the IAF, relative to continuous remediation strategies.

scholarly journals An Examination Of Underreporting Of Time And Premature Signoffs By Internal Auditors

2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Qianhua (Q) Ling ◽  
Michael D. Akers
Keyword(s):  
Internal Audit ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Professional Skepticism ◽  
Internal Auditors ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Considerable Research ◽  
Internal Audit Function ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Audit Team ◽  
The Impact

The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) heightened the importance of internal controls and accordingly, a key control - the internal audit function.  Consequently, management and external auditors have both increased their reliance on internal auditors’ work.  While there has been considerable research regarding the impact of the underreporting of time and premature sign-offs on the external audit, there has only been one study that has examined the impact of these two items on the internal auditors’ work.  Such research is dated (1994) and prior to the passage of SOX.  We surveyed members of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) in the Midwest to examine their behavior and perceptions regarding these two items.  The respondents in our study believe the underreporting of time is unethical and is supported by their reporting of all time worked, even if such time exceeded the budget.  Our findings also show that the respondents feel premature sign-offs are unethical and result primarily from lack of professional skepticism and inadequate training.  Increasing training in audit areas and improving communications within the audit team are possible solutions to reduce premature sign-offs.  Premature sign-offs are more likely to occur in operational audits and to a lesser degree in financial audits and compliance audits. 

The Effect of Using the Internal Audit Function as a Management Training Ground on the External Auditor's Reliance Decision

2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (6) ◽  
pp. 2131-2154 ◽  
Author(s):  
William F. Messier ◽  
J. Kenneth Reynolds ◽  
Chad A. Simon ◽  
David A. Wood
Keyword(s):  
Internal Audit ◽  
Management Training ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
External Audit ◽  
Internal Auditors ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Internal Audit Function ◽  
Management Positions ◽  
The Many

ABSTRACT This study examines how using the internal audit function (IAF) as a management training ground (MTG) affects external audit fees and the external auditors' perceptions of the IAF. Over half of all companies that have an IAF specifically hire internal auditors with the purpose of rotating them into management positions (or cycle current employees into the IAF for a short stint before promoting them into management positions). Using archival data, we find that external auditors charge higher fees to companies that use the IAF as a MTG. Using an experiment, we provide evidence as to why fees are higher. Specifically, we find that external auditors perceive internal auditors employed in an IAF used as a MTG to be less objective but not less competent than internal auditors employed in an IAF not used as a MTG. These results have important implications for the many companies that use their IAF as a MTG. Data Availability: Contact the authors. Data provided by the Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation are subject to restrictions.

Effects of reporting relationship and type of internal control deficiency on internal auditors’ internal control evaluations

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 318-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey Gramling ◽  
Arnold Schneider
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Material Weakness ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Internal Auditors ◽  
Tone At The Top ◽  
Internal Audit Function ◽  
Professional Guidance

Purpose This paper aims to explore whether an internal auditor’s evaluation of internal control deficiencies are influenced by the party with primary influence over the internal audit function and by the type of internal control deficiency. Design/methodology/approach A behavioral experiment is conducted with internal auditors as participants in a 2 × 2 between-subjects factorial design. Findings Results indicate that internal auditors are less likely to evaluate a pervasive control deficiency related to “tone at the top” as a material weakness than a process-specific control deficiency. Furthermore, internal auditors are somewhat less likely to evaluate a process-specific internal control deficiency as a material weakness when management has primary influence over the internal audit function than when the audit committee has primary influence. It is also found that the best practice of internal audit oversight (i.e., primary oversight of internal auditors by the audit committee) may lead to potential internal under-reporting of instances where the audit committee represents a material weakness in internal control. Research limitations/implications Limitations of this research include lack of economic consequences (e.g. future pay and job loss) associated with the internal control decisions made by the participants; less concise information provided to the participants than would generally be available to them; and lack of generalizability of the findings beyond the specific company setting and internal control scenario portrayed in the case materials. Practical implications Not evaluating a pervasive control deficiency related to “tone at the top” as a material weakness seems to not fully align with relevant professional guidance and can possibly result in inaccurate internal information about the quality of internal controls. Furthermore, having an internal auditor’s evaluation of a process-specific internal control deficiency influenced by the party with primary influence over the internal audit function would not appear to align with relevant professional guidance. Finally, primary oversight by the audit committee of the internal auditors may lead to potential internal under-reporting of instances where the audit committee represents a material weakness in internal controls and, thus, possible communication of inaccurate internal control information. Originality/value This study is the first to address whether the party with primary influence over the internal audit function influences an internal auditor’s evaluation of internal control deficiencies.

The Role of Accounting Mechanisms for Corporate Governance in Reducing Creative Accounting Practices in Telecommunications Sector Companies in Riyadh City: An Empirical Study: دور الآليات المحاسبية لحوكمة الشركات في الحد من ممارسات المحاسبة الإبداعية في شركات قطاع الاتصالات بمدينة الرياض: دراسة ميدانية

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (15) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lamis Jameel Banasser, Maha Faisal Alsayegh
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Internal Auditors ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Riyadh City ◽  
Creative Accounting ◽  
Telecommunications Sector

The study aimed to identify the role of accounting mechanisms for corporate governance in reducing creative accounting practices in telecommunications sector companies in Riyadh city. A descriptive analytical approach was followed to conduct the field study. Sample of the study consisted of members of the audit committee, internal auditors, accountants from the surveyed telecommunications’ sector companies, and the external auditors in the audit offices that specialized on auditing the examined sample of companies. Questionnaire was used as a data collection method. Results showed that activating the role of accounting mechanisms for corporate governance can greatly contribute in limiting creative accounting practices. As they are controlling mechanisms that capable of protecting companies, shareholders and stakeholders from any manipulation or misleading information in the financial statements. Further, internal audit plays a major role in limiting creative accounting practices by examining and evaluating the effectiveness of the internal control system. Furthermore, the independence and competence of the external auditor and his commitment to the rules of conduct and ethics of the profession contribute greatly in limiting creative accounting practices in the examined companies. The study recommended the necessity of holding specialized training courses for members of audit committees, internal auditors and external auditors on methods of detecting creative accounting practices to combat and reduce them.

scholarly journals Does Internal Audit Function Quality Deter Management Misconduct?

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (2) ◽  
pp. 495-527 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew S. Ege
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Regulatory Requirements ◽  
Difference In Differences ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Internal Audit Function ◽  
Auditor Quality ◽  
External Auditor

ABSTRACT Standard-setters believe high-quality internal audit functions (IAFs) serve as a key resource to audit committees for monitoring senior management. However, regulators do not enforce IAF quality or require disclosures relating to IAF quality, which is in stark contrast to regulatory requirements placed on boards, audit committees, and external auditors. Using proprietary data, I find that a composite measure of IAF quality is negatively associated with the likelihood of management misconduct even after controlling for board, audit committee, and external auditor quality. This result is robust to a variety of other specifications, including controlling for internal control quality and separate estimation during the pre- and post-SOX time periods. A difference-in-differences analysis indicates that misconduct firms have low IAF quality and competence during misconduct years and improve IAF quality and competence in the post-misconduct years. These findings suggest that regulators, audit committees, and other stakeholders should consider ways to improve IAF quality.

The Effects of Employer and Client Identification on Internal and External Auditors' Evaluations of Internal Control Deficiencies

2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chad M. Stefaniak ◽  
Richard W. Houston ◽  
Robert M. Cornell
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Internal Auditor ◽  
Internal Auditors ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Audit Efficiency ◽  
Public Company ◽  
External Auditor ◽  
Internal Control Deficiencies

SUMMARY The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) encourages external auditors to rely on internal auditors to increase the efficiency of lower-risk internal control evaluations (PCAOB 2007). We use post-SOX experimental data to compare the levels and effects of employer (client) identification on the control evaluations of internal (external) auditors. First, we find that internal auditors perceive a greater level of identification with the evaluated firm than do external auditors. We also find some evidence that, ceteris paribus, internal auditors are less lenient than external auditors when evaluating internal control deficiencies (i.e., tend to support management's preferred position to a lesser extent). Further, while we support Bamber and Iyer's (2007) results by finding that higher levels of external auditor client identification are associated with more lenient control evaluations, we demonstrate an opposite effect for internal auditors—higher levels of internal auditor employer identification are associated with less lenient control evaluations. Our results are important because we are the first to capture the relative levels of identification between internal and external auditors, as well as the first to compare directly internal and external auditor leniency, both of which are important in light of AS5. That is, we provide initial evidence that external auditors' increased reliance on internal auditors' work, while increasing audit efficiency, also could improve audit quality by resulting in less lenient internal control evaluations, due, at least in part, to the effects of employer and client identification. Data Availability: Contact the first author.

Attracting Applicants for In-House and Outsourced Internal Audit Positions: Views from External Auditors

2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey D. Bartlett ◽  
Joleen Kremin ◽  
K. Kelli Saunders ◽  
David A. Wood
Keyword(s):  
Critical Role ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Job Applicants ◽  
Internal Auditing ◽  
Internal Auditors ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Internal Audit Function ◽  
Career Option ◽  
Negative Perceptions ◽  
Survey Results

SYNOPSIS While the internal audit function (IAF) plays a critical role in organizations, it faces challenges in finding sufficient numbers of high-quality job applicants to fill its ranks. The results of two experiments suggest that practicing external auditors are twice as likely to apply for positions that are labeled as accounting positions rather than either in-house or outsourced internal audit positions. The results also suggest that external auditors have negative perceptions of the profession and work environment of internal auditors—especially in-house internal auditors relative to outsourced internal auditors—and are more likely to recommend that mediocre rather than top students apply to work in internal auditing. We also provide survey results from experienced external auditors about aspects of internal auditing that may be improved to make it a more attractive career option. Taken together, the results suggest internal auditing faces significant hiring challenges, but also offer ways to mitigate these challenges.

Serving Two Masters: The Association between Audit Committee Internal Audit Oversight and Internal Audit Activities

2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
Susan Parker ◽  
Gary F. Peters
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
Composite Measure ◽  
Internal Auditors ◽  
Internal Audit Function ◽  
Fortune 1000 ◽  
Budgetary Control

SYNOPSIS: In this paper, we investigate the association between the audit committee’s oversight of the internal audit function (IAF) and the nature of IAF activities. The importance of internal controls and of the roles of both the audit committee and the internal audit function in monitoring control activities have grown in recent years. Despite the importance of these topics, relatively little regulatory or best practices guidance addresses the distribution of IAF activities and amount of audit committee involvement with the IAF. We hypothesize that when the balance of oversight over the IAF lies with the audit committee (vis-a`-vis management), the committee will steer the IAF toward a more internal-controls-oriented focus. Our hypothesis is based on the existing practice guidance in this area and the relative incentives of management and the audit committee. To test our hypothesis, we survey 134 chief internal auditors from Fortune 1000 firms regarding the amount of internal audit resources allocated across internal audit activities in fiscal year 2005. We then construct a composite measure of audit committee oversight contingent on the relative control that the audit committee has over IAF vis-a`-vis management. Our composite measure is derived from three key facets of the audit committee/internal audit relationship: reporting duties, termination rights, and budgetary control. Consistent with our hypothesis, we document a strong, positive association between our audit committee oversight variable and the amount of IAF budget allocated to internal-controls-based activities.

scholarly journals The Effects of Interaction between Internal Auditor and Audit Committee on Fraud Detection in Malaysia

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4.38) ◽  
pp. 1338
Author(s):  
Sunita Lylia Hamdan ◽  
Nahariah Jaffar ◽  
Ruzanna Ab Razak
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Specific Interaction ◽  
Fraud Detection ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Internal Auditing ◽  
Internal Auditor ◽  
Internal Auditors ◽  
External Auditors

This study aims to examine the effect of interaction between internal auditor and audit committee on fraud detection in Malaysia.  Specific interaction is firstly; audit committee approving the appointment of chief audit executive, the evaluation of chief audit executive, the dismissal of chief audit executive, the internal audit budget and the internal audit plan or program.  Secondly, audit committee’s involvement in reviewing internal auditor’s work specifically; providing input for the internal audit plan, reviewing the results of internal auditing related to financial reporting, reviewing the results of internal auditing related to internal control, reviewing the results of internal auditing related to compliance with laws and regulation, reviewing the internal audit involvement in management responses to internal audit suggestions, reviewing the difficulties or scope restrictions encountered by internal auditors and reviewing the coordination between internal auditors and external auditors.  Survey questionnaires were mailed to internal auditors attached to 782 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia’s main market. The results of this study suggest that involvement of audit committee in approving chief audit executives’ matters is insignificant on internal auditors’ contribution to fraud detection.  However, audit committee’s involvement in reviewing internal auditors’ work significantly influence the internal auditors’ contribution in fraud detection.       

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document