Who Really Performs the Audit? Examining the Effects of Voluntary Disclosure of the Use of Other Auditors on Investors' Perceptions of Audit Quality

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Kristina C. Demek ◽  
Steven E. Kaplan ◽  
Amanda Winn
Keyword(s):  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Mandatory Disclosure ◽  
Audit Report ◽  
Joint Effects ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Company

SUMMARY Under Rule 29, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) requires principal auditors to disclose the extent of use of other auditors on an audit engagement. This mandatory disclosure occurs on Form AP, available on the PCAOB's website. Principal auditors may voluntarily disclose this same information in an appendix to the audit report. We experimentally examine how the joint effects of the principal auditor's extent of use of other auditors and their use of voluntary disclosure influence investors' perceptions of audit quality. Results indicate that investors perceive audit quality to be lowest when principal auditors use other auditors to a greater extent and only file the mandatory disclosure. We find voluntary disclosure in the audit report attenuates the perceived effect of using other auditors. Additionally, after a restatement, investors place no additional blame or liability on principal auditors that use other auditors to a greater extent or choose voluntary disclosure.

The Impact of the PCAOB Triennial Inspection Process on Inspection Year and Non-Inspection Year Audits

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
William L Buslepp
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
The Public ◽  
Learned Behavior ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
One Year ◽  
The Impact

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspects auditors with fewer than 100 publicly held clients, once every three years (i.e., triennial inspection). In doing so, the PCAOB may inspect any audit engagement within the three-year window, including audits completed only months earlier ("inspection year" audits) and audits with at least a one-year, if not two-year lag ("non-inspection year" audits). We theorize the triennial inspection process affects audit quality levels, whereby auditors impose higher (lower) audit quality during inspection years (non-inspection years). We find clients of triennially inspected auditors have significantly lower levels of accruals during inspection years. Further, this change can be attributed to additional audit effort expended during inspection years. Finally, we find some evidence this is a learned behavior developed after the initial round of inspections. Our evidence suggests auditors opportunistically increase (decrease) audit quality during inspection (non-inspection) years in response to the triennial inspection process.

Hiring Auditors with a Part II Quality Control Report: An Opportunity for Increased Earnings Management or Lower Audit Fees?

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
Jared Eutsler ◽  
D. Kip Holderness ◽  
Megan M. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
General Demand ◽  
Systemic Quality

ABSTRACT The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Part II inspection reports, which disclose systemic quality control issues that auditors fail to remediate, signal poor audit quality for triennially inspected audit firms. Auditors that receive a Part II inspection report typically experience a decrease in clients, which demonstrates a general demand for audit quality. However, some companies hire auditors that receive Part II inspection reports. We examine potential reasons for hiring these audit firms. We find that relative to companies that switch to auditors without Part II reports, companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports have higher discretionary accruals in the first fiscal year after the switch, which indicates lower audit quality and a heightened risk for future fraud. We find no difference in audit fees. Our results suggest that PCAOB Part II inspection reports may signal low-quality auditors to companies that desire low-quality audits. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Comments by the Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association on the PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 31: PCAOB Release No. 2010-005, Application of the “Failure to Supervise” Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Solicitation of Comment on Rulemaking Concepts

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. C11-C15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Brazel ◽  
James Bierstaker ◽  
Paul Caster ◽  
Brad Reed
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Exposure Period ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Accounting Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditing Standards ◽  
Supervision Practices

SUMMARY: Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB” or “Board”) issued a release to address, in two ways, issues relating to the responsibilities of a registered public accounting firm and its supervisory personnel with respect to supervision. First, the release reminds registered firms and associated persons of, and highlights the scope of, Section 105(c)(6) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Act”), which authorizes the Board to impose sanctions on registered public accounting firms and their supervisory personnel for failing to supervise reasonably an associated person who has violated certain laws, rules, or standards. Second, the release discusses and seeks comment on conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6) and, through increased accountability, lead to improved supervision practices and, consequently, improved audit quality. The PCAOB provided for a 91-day exposure period (from August 5, 2010, to November 3, 2010) for interested parties to examine and provide comments on the conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6). The Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association provided the comments in the letter below to the PCAOB on the PCAOB Release No. 2010-005, Application of the “Failure to Supervise” Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Solicitation of Comment on Rulemaking Concepts.

PCAOB International Inspections and Audit Quality

2016 ◽  
Vol 92 (5) ◽  
pp. 143-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jagan Krishnan ◽  
Jayanthi Krishnan ◽  
Hakjoon Song
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Value Relevance ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Accounting Numbers ◽  
Abnormal Accruals ◽  
Relevance Measure ◽  
The Impact ◽  
First Time

ABSTRACT We investigate the impact of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) first-time inspections of foreign accounting firms by examining abnormal accruals around the inspection year, and the value relevance of accounting numbers around the inspection report date, for their U.S. cross-listed clients. We document lower abnormal accruals in the post-inspection period, and greater value relevance of accounting numbers in the post-report period for clients of the inspected auditors, compared with non-cross-listed clients or clients of non-inspected auditors within the inspected countries. Comparisons of the PCAOB's joint inspections with PCAOB stand-alone inspections indicate that while both experience lower post-inspection abnormal accruals, the former benefit more than the latter. The value relevance measure, in contrast, shows greater increases for the PCAOB stand-alone inspections than for joint inspections. Comparing the inspection effects for auditors with and without deficiency reports, we find no systematic differences for accruals or for value relevance.

Response of a Subgroup of the PCAOB's Investor Advisory Group to the PCAOB's Concept Release Concerning Reports on Audited Financial Statements and Related Amendments to PCAOB Standards

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. C21-C50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelvin Blake ◽  
Joseph V. Carcello ◽  
Norman J. Harrison ◽  
Michael J. Head ◽  
Barbara E. Roper ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Financial Statements ◽  
Capital Allocation ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Advisory Group ◽  
Audit Report ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Risk Areas

SUMMARY Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) released a concept release concerning possible revisions to PCAOB standards related to reports on audited financial statements and related amendments to PCAOB standards. The comment letter below, written by a subgroup of the PCAOB's Investor Advisory Group, was recently submitted to the PCAOB in response to the Board's concept release. The subgroup believes that the four most important changes to the audit report would require the auditor to: (1) discuss the auditor's assessment of the estimates and judgments made by management in preparing the financial statements and how the auditor arrived at that assessment, (2) disclose areas of high financial statement and audit risk and how the auditor addressed these risk areas, (3) discuss unusual transactions, restatements, and other significant changes in the financial statements (including the notes), and (4) discuss the quality, not just the acceptability, of the issuer's accounting practices and policies. They further assert that the disclosure of this information will improve investors' ability to make informed buy/sell decisions, which should result in higher returns to investors and improved capital allocation within society.

scholarly journals Audit Quality: Insights from the Academic Literature

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (Supplement 1) ◽  
pp. 385-421 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Robert Knechel ◽  
Gopal V. Krishnan ◽  
Mikhail Pevzner ◽  
Lori B. Shefchik ◽  
Uma K. Velury
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Future Research ◽  
The Public ◽  
Academic Literature ◽  
Public Company

SUMMARY This study presents a review of academic research on audit quality. We begin with a review of existing definitions of audit quality and describe general frameworks for establishing audit quality. Next, we summarize research on indicators of audit quality such as inputs, process, and outcomes. Finally, we offer some suggestions for future research. The study should be useful to academics interested in audit quality as well as to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and other regulators.

scholarly journals The Effect of an Auditor Identity Disclosure Requirement on Audit Quality: An Experimental Examination Incorporating the Incremental Effect of a Signature Requirement

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 17-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen D. Blay ◽  
Eric S. Gooden ◽  
Mark J. Mellon ◽  
Douglas E. Stevens
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Incremental Effect ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Identity Disclosure ◽  
Disclosure Requirement ◽  
Higher Sensitivity

SUMMARY After considering a proposal to require the engagement partner's signature on the audit report (PCAOB 2009), the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board chose instead to only require the disclosure of the engagement partner's name (PCAOB 2015). We make predictions regarding the effects of the two proposed requirements using insights from social norm theory, and test those predictions using an experimental audit market setting found in the literature. We find that both requirements reduce misreporting when compared to a control setting with neither requirement present. We also document that the signature requirement generates an incremental reduction in misreporting when added to the disclosure requirement. Finally, we provide evidence that these effects are driven by participants with higher sensitivity to social norms. This theory and evidence supports the new identity disclosure requirement at the PCAOB and helps explain the existence of signature requirements in many non-U.S. countries. Data Availability: Experimental data are available from the authors upon request.

US public auditing reforms may follow 2020

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Public ◽  
Securities Law ◽  
Budget Proposal ◽  
Public Company

Subject US public accounting oversight and proposed reforms. Significance Earlier this month, President Donald Trump released his budget proposal for the 2021 fiscal year. Among the proposals is merging the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) into the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) beginning in 2022. The move would further weaken US securities law and the accounting framework, which has steadily eroded in recent years. Impacts Shifting oversight over audit quality to the SEC would greatly reduce resources available for this function. House Democrats will be reluctant to give Trump legislative victories before November. Under Trump, the SEC will further shrink its enforcement activities; this process began before he became president.

scholarly journals Comments by the Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association on the PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter 029: PCAOB Release No. 2011-007, Improving Transparency Through Disclosure of Engagement Partner and Certain Other Participants in Audits

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. C1-C6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith L. Jones ◽  
Jagadison K. Aier ◽  
Duane M. Brandon ◽  
Tina D. Carpenter ◽  
Paul Caster ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Exposure Period ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Report ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Comment ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Public Accounting Firms ◽  
Auditing Standards

SUMMARY In October 2011, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board) issued a release to solicit public comment on amendments to its standards that would improve the transparency of pubic company audits. The objective of the release was to solicit public comments on a proposed standard that would (1) require registered public accounting firms to disclose the name of the engagement partner in the audit report, (2) amend the Board's Annual Report Form to require registered firms to disclose the name of the engagement partner for each audit report already required to be reported on the form, and (3) require disclosure in the audit report of other independent public accounting firms and other persons that took part in the audit. The PCAOB provided for a 91-day exposure period (from October 11, 2011, to January 9, 2012) for interested parties to examine the release and provide comments. The Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association provided the comments in the letter below to the PCAOB on PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter 029: PCAOB Release No. 2011-007, Improving Transparency Through Disclosure of Engagement Partner and Certain Other Participants in Audits. Data Availability: Information about and access to the release is available at: http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket029/PCAOB_Release_2011-007.pdf

The Big 4 Audit Report: Should the Public Perceive It as a Label of Quality?

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross D. Fuerman ◽  
Michael Kraten
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Model Specification ◽  
Audit Failure ◽  
The Public ◽  
Cpa Firms ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditor Litigation

ABSTRACT: There has been little research comparing the relative performance of the Big 4 CPA firms. Users of audited financial statements often practically have no other CPA firms to choose from for auditing services in the large public company auditing services market and thus desire more of this information. In 1,017 financial reporting lawsuits against Big 5 auditees filed from 1999 through 2004, the auditor litigation outcomes are used to proxy for the likelihood of audit failure and thus for audit quality. Control variables significant in prior empirical work were used in polytomous regression and in logistic regression. Ernst & Young has comparatively better auditor litigation outcomes, which proxy for a lower likelihood of audit failure and a stronger level of audit quality. The Ernst & Young results are robust; they are insensitive to the use of ten different model specifications. There is also evidence suggesting that PricewaterhouseCoopers may be a comparatively high quality auditor, but these latter results are sensitive to the model specification. Clearly, the null hypothesis of consistency in audit quality among the Big 4 CPA firms is rejected.

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