Hiring Auditors with a Part II Quality Control Report: An Opportunity for Increased Earnings Management or Lower Audit Fees?

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
Jared Eutsler ◽  
D. Kip Holderness ◽  
Megan M. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
General Demand ◽  
Systemic Quality

ABSTRACT The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Part II inspection reports, which disclose systemic quality control issues that auditors fail to remediate, signal poor audit quality for triennially inspected audit firms. Auditors that receive a Part II inspection report typically experience a decrease in clients, which demonstrates a general demand for audit quality. However, some companies hire auditors that receive Part II inspection reports. We examine potential reasons for hiring these audit firms. We find that relative to companies that switch to auditors without Part II reports, companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports have higher discretionary accruals in the first fiscal year after the switch, which indicates lower audit quality and a heightened risk for future fraud. We find no difference in audit fees. Our results suggest that PCAOB Part II inspection reports may signal low-quality auditors to companies that desire low-quality audits. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

scholarly journals Auditor Fees and Going-Concern Reporting Decisions on Bankrupt Companies: Additional Evidence

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. A13-A27 ◽  
Author(s):  
William J. Read
Keyword(s):  
Audit Fees ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Failure ◽  
The Public ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Reporting Decisions ◽  
Auditor Fees

SUMMARY The recent growth in non-audit services (NAS) at the major audit firms has the attention of auditing regulators. On several occasions recently, board members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) have indicated that the rise in NAS may place auditor independence at risk (Harris 2014; Tysiac 2014). Impaired independence can result in audit failure, which includes situations when auditors fail to issue going-concern (GC) audit opinions to soon-to-be bankrupt companies. In this paper, I examine the association between the propensity of auditors to issue GC opinions and NAS fees (and audit fees) to 203 bankrupt companies during 2002–2013. In analysis, I find no significant relation between GC decisions and NAS fees and audit fees. My results may interest U.S. regulators, who recently expressed concerns about the threat to auditor independence from the spike in NAS at the major firms. Data Availability: Publicly available from sources identified in the paper.

The Economic Consequences of Audit Firms’ Quality Control System Deficiencies

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (7) ◽  
pp. 2883-2905 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Aobdia
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Negative Influence ◽  
Economic Consequences ◽  
Data Set ◽  
The Public ◽  
Tone At The Top ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company

This study seeks to determine the role of audit firms’ quality control (QC) system deficiencies, as measured by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection program, on audit quality and profitability. Using a unique data set of firmwide QC deficiencies identified by the PCAOB during its inspections of audit firms, I find a negative association between QC deficiencies, mainly performance related, and audit quality. Furthermore, audits conducted by larger audit firms with more organization-level deficiencies appear less profitable, evidenced by more hours worked on the engagements, leading to lower fees per hour. These results appear to be partly explained by deficiencies in the tone at the top (a proxy for culture) and the audit methodology. Further evidence suggests that a lack of remediation of QC system deficiencies has a negative influence on audit quality. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.

The Impact of PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5, the PCAOB Inspection Regime, and the Great Recession on Audit Fees and Audit Quality

2020 ◽  
pp. 0148558X2098220
Author(s):  
Elizabeth S. Johnson ◽  
Kenneth J. Reichelt ◽  
Jared S. Soileau
Keyword(s):  
Great Recession ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Great Recession ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Audit Approach ◽  
The Impact

We investigate the coinciding effects of the implementation of Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5), the change in the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) inspection regime, and the Great Recession on the audit fees and audit quality of accelerated filers. AS5 took effect in November 2007 and promulgated a top-down, risk-based audit approach to SOX 404(b) audits of accelerated filers. Concurrently, the PCAOB adopted a stricter approach to its inspections of audit firms, which encouraged them to improve audit quality and reduce audit fees. Moreover, the Great Recession pressured audit firms to reduce fees. We find that, following the three events, audit fees decreased and quality increased for accelerated filers. We also find that audit fees and audit quality increased for non-accelerated filers, although these filers were not directly affected by AS5.

Does Audit Fee Homogeneity Exist? Premiums and Discounts Attributable to Individual Partners

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 249-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart D. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Homogeneity Assumption ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Made In

SUMMARY This paper investigates the implied assumption, made in many audit fee determination studies, that, within a given audit firm, all partners produce a statistically identical level of audit quality and earn a statistically identical level of audit fees. This is referred to as the “homogeneity assumption.” However, this is contradicted by the individual auditor behavioral literature, which shows that different individual auditor characteristics can have an impact on audit quality. Given the fact that audit partners differ in their quality, this paper hypothesizes that different audit partners will be able to earn differing levels of fees. This hypothesis is tested by estimating an audit fee model using data from 822 Australian publicly listed companies for the year 2005. Australia is an ideal audit market for this research, as the disclosure of the name of the audit engagement partner in the audit report is mandatory. The empirical results indicate that individual audit partners earn individual audit fee premiums (or discounts) that are not explainable by the audit firms of which they are members. Data Availability: All data have been extracted from publicly available sources.

scholarly journals The Effect of an Auditor Identity Disclosure Requirement on Audit Quality: An Experimental Examination Incorporating the Incremental Effect of a Signature Requirement

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 17-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen D. Blay ◽  
Eric S. Gooden ◽  
Mark J. Mellon ◽  
Douglas E. Stevens
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Incremental Effect ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Identity Disclosure ◽  
Disclosure Requirement ◽  
Higher Sensitivity

SUMMARY After considering a proposal to require the engagement partner's signature on the audit report (PCAOB 2009), the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board chose instead to only require the disclosure of the engagement partner's name (PCAOB 2015). We make predictions regarding the effects of the two proposed requirements using insights from social norm theory, and test those predictions using an experimental audit market setting found in the literature. We find that both requirements reduce misreporting when compared to a control setting with neither requirement present. We also document that the signature requirement generates an incremental reduction in misreporting when added to the disclosure requirement. Finally, we provide evidence that these effects are driven by participants with higher sensitivity to social norms. This theory and evidence supports the new identity disclosure requirement at the PCAOB and helps explain the existence of signature requirements in many non-U.S. countries. Data Availability: Experimental data are available from the authors upon request.

scholarly journals Comments of the Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association on the Concept Release, Potential Approach to Revisions to PCAOB Quality Control Standards

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. C1-C12
Author(s):  
Veena Looknanan Brown ◽  
Dana R. Hermanson ◽  
Julia L. Higgs ◽  
J. Gregory Jenkins ◽  
Christine Nolder ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Quality Management ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Related Services ◽  
Potential Approach ◽  
Roles And Responsibilities ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Control Concept ◽  
Release Potential

SUMMARY On December 17, 2019, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the Board or PCAOB) issued a request for comment on its Concept Release, Potential Approach to Revisions to PCAOB Quality Control Standards. The Board is considering revising its Quality Controls (QC) standards to focus firms on improving their QC systems. To reduce the compliance burden, the Board is considering aligning its QC standards with those of the proposed International Standard on Quality Management 1, Quality Management for Firms That Perform Audits or Reviews of Financial Statements, or Other Assurance or Related Services Engagements (proposed ISQM 1). The comment period ended March 16, 2020. This commentary summarizes the participating committee members' views on selected questions on three aspects of a QC system presented in the Concept Release: Resources (Questions 31, 32, 34, 36, 37), The Monitoring and Remediation Process (Questions 45, 46, 47), and Roles and Responsibilities of Individuals (Question 52). Data Availability: The Concept Release, Potential Approach to Revisions to PCAOB Quality Control Standards, including questions for respondents, is available at: https://pcaobus.org/Rulemaking/Docket046/2019-003-Quality-Control-Concept-Release.pdf.

US public auditing reforms may follow 2020

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Public ◽  
Securities Law ◽  
Budget Proposal ◽  
Public Company

Subject US public accounting oversight and proposed reforms. Significance Earlier this month, President Donald Trump released his budget proposal for the 2021 fiscal year. Among the proposals is merging the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) into the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) beginning in 2022. The move would further weaken US securities law and the accounting framework, which has steadily eroded in recent years. Impacts Shifting oversight over audit quality to the SEC would greatly reduce resources available for this function. House Democrats will be reluctant to give Trump legislative victories before November. Under Trump, the SEC will further shrink its enforcement activities; this process began before he became president.

The effect of changing fiscal year-ends on audit fees and audit quality

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-382
Author(s):  
Angel Arturo Pacheco Paredes ◽  
Clark Wheatley
Keyword(s):  
Design Methodology ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose This study aims to extend recent research analyzing the effect of auditor busyness on audit quality. Specifically, this study explores the effect on audit quality of a change of fiscal year-end to or from an audit firm’s busy period. Design/methodology/approach Empirical archival. Findings When firms change their fiscal year-end to a period when the auditor is less busy, client firms are rewarded with lower audit fees and auditors are rewarded with a reduction in required effort. This study finds no difference in the level of audit quality after a change in fiscal year-end. Practical implications There are significant implications for audit firms as they may gain cost advantages by successfully promoting off-season fiscal year-ends, and reduce the negative effect on employees associated with “busy season” stress. Similarly, client firms may find that audit costs are reduced when they adopt a less “busy” fiscal year-end. Social implications These results have policy implications for regulators because regulators often dictate the fiscal year-end for certain industries or traded securities. Such dictates may thus introduce inefficiencies into the market for audit services. Originality/value These results should guide regulators in their decisions to dictate fiscal year-ends and firms in their choice of reporting periods.

scholarly journals Comments by the Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association on PCAOB Release No. 2015-004, Supplemental Request for Comment: Rules to Require Disclosure of Certain Audit Participants on a New PCAOB Form

2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. C1-C10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus M. Doxey ◽  
Marshall A. Geiger ◽  
Karl E. Hackenbrack ◽  
Sarah E. Stein
Keyword(s):  
Data Availability ◽  
The Public ◽  
Related Information ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditing Standards ◽  
New Form

SUMMARY On June 30, 2015 the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued a supplemental request for comment on its 2013 reproposal to require auditors to disclose in the auditor's report the name of the engagement partner and information about certain other participants in the audit. The supplemental request solicited public comments on an alternative to disclosure of this information in the auditor's report, namely that audit firms report (1) the name of the engagement partner, and (2) the names, locations, and extent of participation of other audit participants in a new form (Form AP) to be filed with the PCAOB within 30 days of the date the auditor's report is first included in a document filed with the SEC. The comment period ended on August 31, 2015. This commentary summarizes the participating committee members' views on the alternatives presented in the supplemental request for comment. Data Availability: The exposure drafts of the proposed and reproposed rules, the supplemental request for comment, and related information are available at: http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Pages/Docket029.aspx

Further Evidence on the Effect of Regulation on the Exit of Small Auditors from the Audit Market and Resulting Audit Quality

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 95-115
Author(s):  
Neil L. Fargher ◽  
Alicia Jiang ◽  
Yangxin Yu
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY Following the introduction of SOX in 2002 and the introduction of PCAOB inspections starting from 2003, DeFond and Lennox (2011) found that a large number of small auditors exited the SEC client audit market during the 2002–2004 period and that these exiting auditors were of lower quality relative to non-exiting auditors. This paper seeks to verify whether SOX and the introduction of PCAOB inspections improved audit quality through incentivizing small auditors providing lower audit quality to exit the market. Using client discretionary accruals and the likelihood of the clients restating financial statements as proxies for audit quality, we do not find that the small auditors that exited the market for SEC client audits were of lower quality than successor small audit firms that did not exit the market. JEL Classifications: G18; L51. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

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