The Big 4 Audit Report: Should the Public Perceive It as a Label of Quality?

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross D. Fuerman ◽  
Michael Kraten
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Model Specification ◽  
Audit Failure ◽  
The Public ◽  
Cpa Firms ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditor Litigation

ABSTRACT: There has been little research comparing the relative performance of the Big 4 CPA firms. Users of audited financial statements often practically have no other CPA firms to choose from for auditing services in the large public company auditing services market and thus desire more of this information. In 1,017 financial reporting lawsuits against Big 5 auditees filed from 1999 through 2004, the auditor litigation outcomes are used to proxy for the likelihood of audit failure and thus for audit quality. Control variables significant in prior empirical work were used in polytomous regression and in logistic regression. Ernst & Young has comparatively better auditor litigation outcomes, which proxy for a lower likelihood of audit failure and a stronger level of audit quality. The Ernst & Young results are robust; they are insensitive to the use of ten different model specifications. There is also evidence suggesting that PricewaterhouseCoopers may be a comparatively high quality auditor, but these latter results are sensitive to the model specification. Clearly, the null hypothesis of consistency in audit quality among the Big 4 CPA firms is rejected.

scholarly journals An Account Analysis Of PCAOB Inspection Reports For Triennially-Inspected Audit Firms

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Landis ◽  
Scott I. Jerris ◽  
Mike Braswell
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Business Combinations ◽  
Client Engagement ◽  
Audit Failure ◽  
Business Transactions ◽  
Cpa Firms ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Primary Type

Since 2005, the PCAOB (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) has been issuing inspection reports for triennially-inspected audit firms as part of its overall mission to improve audit quality. This study analyzes the findings in the PCAOB inspection reports by classifying the audit deficiencies cited in the reports by area of deficiency and type of audit failure. CPA firms can utilize these findings in their efforts to reduce client engagement audit risk. The results indicate that the overall number of cited deficiencies is declining each year, revenue and asset accounts are the most frequently cited accounts, business combinations and equity transactions are the most cited transactions, and insufficient testing or documentation is the primary type of audit failure. We also document that most departures from GAAP occur in the accounting for business transactions or in liability accounts.

Does Audit Firm Tenure Matter to Audit Committee Members? Evidence from an Accounting Dispute

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janice E. Rummell ◽  
F. Todd DeZoort ◽  
Dana R. Hermanson
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Committee Member ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Analyst Expectations ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Management Experience ◽  
Support Relation

SYNOPSIS This study examines the effects of Big 4 audit firm tenure on audit committee member support for the auditor in an auditor/management dispute over a subjective accounting issue. One hundred eighteen U.S. public company audit committee members participated in an experiment with audit firm tenure (short/long) manipulated randomly between subjects. The results indicate that participants in the long audit firm tenure group provide more support for the auditor in the dispute than participants in the short tenure group. Audit committee support for the auditor is positively related to audit committee member experience and CPA status, as well as perceived management pressure to meet analyst expectations, but negatively related to perceived management experience in financial reporting. Finally, audit committee members' perceptions of audit firm reliability (i.e., credibility and dependability) mediate the audit firm tenure-auditor support relation. Overall, our results suggest enhanced audit committee support for longer-tenured auditors.

Does Recent Academic Research Support Changes to Audit Reporting Standards?

2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Bédard ◽  
Paul Coram ◽  
Reza Espahbodi ◽  
Theodore J. Mock
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Research Support ◽  
The Public ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Information Gap ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Reporting Process

SYNOPSIS The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), and the U.K. Financial Reporting Council (FRC) have proposed or approved standards that significantly change the independent auditor's report. These initiatives require the auditor to make additional disclosures intended to close the information gap; that is, the gap between the information users desire and the information available through the audited financial statements, other corporate disclosures, and the auditor's report. They are also intended to improve the relevancy of the auditor's report. We augment prior academic research by providing standard setters with an updated synthesis of relevant research. More importantly, we provide an assessment of whether the changes are likely to close the information gap, which is important to financial market participants and other stakeholders in the audit reporting process. Also, we identify areas where there seems to be a lack of sufficient research. These results are of interest to all stakeholders in the audit reporting process, as the changes to the auditor's report are fundamental. Additionally, our summaries of research on the auditor's report highlight where there is limited research or inconsistent results, which will help academics identify important opportunities for future research.

Financial Reporting, Auditing, Analyst Scrutiny, and Investment Efficiency

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Chan ◽  
Nanqin Liu
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Audit Failure ◽  
Economic Framework ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante

This paper presents an economic framework to study strategic interactions along the analyst-auditor-owner disciplinary chain, in which the auditor examines the financial reports prepared by the owner, and the analyst uncovers financial misreporting as well as audit failure. We find that although analyst scrutiny ex post detects misreporting, it ex ante aggravates the owner's misreporting behavior and further impairs financial statement reliability if the legal penalties for the auditor and the owner are small. We also show how the effects of a regulation depend on its target's disciplinarian(s). Specifically, (i) although enhancing the auditor's legal liability always increases audit quality and financial statement reliability, it decreases investment efficiency if and only if the analyst is highly independent; and (ii) increasing the owner's misreporting penalty decreases investment efficiency if and only if either of (but not both) the regulations on the auditor and the analyst is strict.

The impact of audit quality on earnings management and cost of equity capital: evidence from a developing market

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Le ◽  
Paula Hearn Moore
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This study aims to examine the effects of audit quality on earnings management and cost of equity capital (COE) considering the impact of two owner types: government ownership and foreign ownership. Design/methodology/approach The study uses a panel data set of 236 Vietnamese firms covering the period 2007 to 2017. Because the two main dependent variables of the COE capital and the absolute value of discretionary accruals receive fractional values between zero and one, the paper uses the generalised linear model (GLM) with a logit link and the binomial family in regression analyses. The paper uses numerous audit quality measures, including hiring Big 4 auditors or the industry-leading Big 4 auditor, changing from non-Big 4 auditors to Big 4 auditors or the industry-leading Big 4 auditor, and the length of Big 4 auditor tenure. Big 4 companies include KPMG, Deloitte, EY and PwC, whereas the non-big 4 are the other audit companies. Findings The study finds a negative relationship between audit quality and both the COE capital and income-increasing discretionary accruals. The effects of audit quality on discretionary accruals and the COE capital depend on the ownership levels of two important shareholders: the government and foreign investors. Foreign ownership is negatively associated with discretionary accruals; however, the effect is more pronounced in the sub-sample of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the firms where the government owns 50% or more equity, than in the sub-sample of Non-SOEs. Originality/value To the best of the knowledge, no prior similar study exists that used the GLM with a logit link and the binomial family regression. Global investors may be interested in understanding how unique institutional settings and capital markets of each country impact the financial reporting quality and cost of capital. Further, policymakers of developing markets may have incentives to improve the quality of financial reporting and reduce the cost of capital which should result in attracting more foreign investments.

The Impact of the PCAOB Triennial Inspection Process on Inspection Year and Non-Inspection Year Audits

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
William L Buslepp
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
The Public ◽  
Learned Behavior ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
One Year ◽  
The Impact

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspects auditors with fewer than 100 publicly held clients, once every three years (i.e., triennial inspection). In doing so, the PCAOB may inspect any audit engagement within the three-year window, including audits completed only months earlier ("inspection year" audits) and audits with at least a one-year, if not two-year lag ("non-inspection year" audits). We theorize the triennial inspection process affects audit quality levels, whereby auditors impose higher (lower) audit quality during inspection years (non-inspection years). We find clients of triennially inspected auditors have significantly lower levels of accruals during inspection years. Further, this change can be attributed to additional audit effort expended during inspection years. Finally, we find some evidence this is a learned behavior developed after the initial round of inspections. Our evidence suggests auditors opportunistically increase (decrease) audit quality during inspection (non-inspection) years in response to the triennial inspection process.

Hiring Auditors with a Part II Quality Control Report: An Opportunity for Increased Earnings Management or Lower Audit Fees?

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
Jared Eutsler ◽  
D. Kip Holderness ◽  
Megan M. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
General Demand ◽  
Systemic Quality

ABSTRACT The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Part II inspection reports, which disclose systemic quality control issues that auditors fail to remediate, signal poor audit quality for triennially inspected audit firms. Auditors that receive a Part II inspection report typically experience a decrease in clients, which demonstrates a general demand for audit quality. However, some companies hire auditors that receive Part II inspection reports. We examine potential reasons for hiring these audit firms. We find that relative to companies that switch to auditors without Part II reports, companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports have higher discretionary accruals in the first fiscal year after the switch, which indicates lower audit quality and a heightened risk for future fraud. We find no difference in audit fees. Our results suggest that PCAOB Part II inspection reports may signal low-quality auditors to companies that desire low-quality audits. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Comments by the Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association on the PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 31: PCAOB Release No. 2010-005, Application of the “Failure to Supervise” Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Solicitation of Comment on Rulemaking Concepts

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. C11-C15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Brazel ◽  
James Bierstaker ◽  
Paul Caster ◽  
Brad Reed
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Exposure Period ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Accounting Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditing Standards ◽  
Supervision Practices

SUMMARY: Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB” or “Board”) issued a release to address, in two ways, issues relating to the responsibilities of a registered public accounting firm and its supervisory personnel with respect to supervision. First, the release reminds registered firms and associated persons of, and highlights the scope of, Section 105(c)(6) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Act”), which authorizes the Board to impose sanctions on registered public accounting firms and their supervisory personnel for failing to supervise reasonably an associated person who has violated certain laws, rules, or standards. Second, the release discusses and seeks comment on conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6) and, through increased accountability, lead to improved supervision practices and, consequently, improved audit quality. The PCAOB provided for a 91-day exposure period (from August 5, 2010, to November 3, 2010) for interested parties to examine and provide comments on the conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6). The Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association provided the comments in the letter below to the PCAOB on the PCAOB Release No. 2010-005, Application of the “Failure to Supervise” Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Solicitation of Comment on Rulemaking Concepts.

scholarly journals Integration of Internal Control and Financial Statement Audits: Are Two Audits Better than One?

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori Shefchik Bhaskar ◽  
Joseph H. Schroeder ◽  
Marcy L. Shepardson
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Auditor Judgment ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Better Than

ABSTRACT The quality of financial statement (FS) audits integrated with audits of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) depends upon the quality of ICFR information used in, and its integration into, FS audits. Recent research and PCAOB inspections find auditors underreport existing ICFR weaknesses and perform insufficient testing to address identified risks, suggesting integrated audits—in which substantial ICFR testing is required—may result in lower FS audit quality than FS-only audits. We compare a 2007–2013 sample of small U.S. public company firm-years receiving integrated audits (accelerated filers) to firm-years receiving FS-only audits (non-accelerated filers) and find integrated audits are associated with higher likelihood of material misstatements and discretionary accruals, consistent with lower FS audit quality. We also find evidence of (1) auditor judgment-based integration issues, and (2) low-quality ICFR audits harming FS audit quality. Overall, results suggest an important potential consequence of integrated audits is lower FS audit quality. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.

PCAOB International Inspections and Audit Quality

2016 ◽  
Vol 92 (5) ◽  
pp. 143-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jagan Krishnan ◽  
Jayanthi Krishnan ◽  
Hakjoon Song
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Value Relevance ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Accounting Numbers ◽  
Abnormal Accruals ◽  
Relevance Measure ◽  
The Impact ◽  
First Time

ABSTRACT We investigate the impact of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) first-time inspections of foreign accounting firms by examining abnormal accruals around the inspection year, and the value relevance of accounting numbers around the inspection report date, for their U.S. cross-listed clients. We document lower abnormal accruals in the post-inspection period, and greater value relevance of accounting numbers in the post-report period for clients of the inspected auditors, compared with non-cross-listed clients or clients of non-inspected auditors within the inspected countries. Comparisons of the PCAOB's joint inspections with PCAOB stand-alone inspections indicate that while both experience lower post-inspection abnormal accruals, the former benefit more than the latter. The value relevance measure, in contrast, shows greater increases for the PCAOB stand-alone inspections than for joint inspections. Comparing the inspection effects for auditors with and without deficiency reports, we find no systematic differences for accruals or for value relevance.

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