The Impact of the PCAOB Triennial Inspection Process on Inspection Year and Non-Inspection Year Audits

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
William L Buslepp
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
The Public ◽  
Learned Behavior ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
One Year ◽  
The Impact

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspects auditors with fewer than 100 publicly held clients, once every three years (i.e., triennial inspection). In doing so, the PCAOB may inspect any audit engagement within the three-year window, including audits completed only months earlier ("inspection year" audits) and audits with at least a one-year, if not two-year lag ("non-inspection year" audits). We theorize the triennial inspection process affects audit quality levels, whereby auditors impose higher (lower) audit quality during inspection years (non-inspection years). We find clients of triennially inspected auditors have significantly lower levels of accruals during inspection years. Further, this change can be attributed to additional audit effort expended during inspection years. Finally, we find some evidence this is a learned behavior developed after the initial round of inspections. Our evidence suggests auditors opportunistically increase (decrease) audit quality during inspection (non-inspection) years in response to the triennial inspection process.

The Impact of PCAOB Reports Containing Audit Deficiencies on Non-U.S. Audit Firms: Initial Evidence

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. A12-A25 ◽  
Author(s):  
HakJoon Song ◽  
Zhongxia (Shelly) Ye
Keyword(s):  
Professional Staff ◽  
Compliance Costs ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditor Resignation ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
One Year ◽  
The Impact

SUMMARY The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) regularly conducts inspections of non-U.S. audit firms. Based on 243 PCAOB inspection reports of non-U.S. audit firms, published by the PCAOB between January 2006 and December 2011, we examine involuntary dismissals, voluntary resignations, and voluntary deregistration of inspected non-U.S. audit firms following PCAOB reports containing audit deficiencies. Our results show that 24 out of 1,604 clients of non-U.S. audit firms have dismissed their auditors within one year following the disclosure of audit deficiencies in PCAOB reports, and that only four of these 24 clients appointed successor auditors with clean PCAOB reports. Also, we find only four auditor resignation cases from the 1,604 clients of non-U.S. audit firms within one year after they received a PCAOB report containing audit deficiencies. Finally, 22 non-U.S. audit firms voluntarily ceased to be registered with the PCAOB either during the inspection process or after they received PCAOB reports containing audit deficiencies. Compared to registered non-U.S. audit firms, these deregistered non-U.S. audit firms have relatively fewer resources (e.g., fewer partners and professional staff, smaller offices) and, thus, may not be able to bear compliance costs (e.g., costs associated with preparation for inspections) associated with PCAOB inspections. This study provides insights regarding the impact of PCAOB international inspections.

PCAOB International Inspections and Audit Quality

2016 ◽  
Vol 92 (5) ◽  
pp. 143-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jagan Krishnan ◽  
Jayanthi Krishnan ◽  
Hakjoon Song
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Value Relevance ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Accounting Numbers ◽  
Abnormal Accruals ◽  
Relevance Measure ◽  
The Impact ◽  
First Time

ABSTRACT We investigate the impact of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) first-time inspections of foreign accounting firms by examining abnormal accruals around the inspection year, and the value relevance of accounting numbers around the inspection report date, for their U.S. cross-listed clients. We document lower abnormal accruals in the post-inspection period, and greater value relevance of accounting numbers in the post-report period for clients of the inspected auditors, compared with non-cross-listed clients or clients of non-inspected auditors within the inspected countries. Comparisons of the PCAOB's joint inspections with PCAOB stand-alone inspections indicate that while both experience lower post-inspection abnormal accruals, the former benefit more than the latter. The value relevance measure, in contrast, shows greater increases for the PCAOB stand-alone inspections than for joint inspections. Comparing the inspection effects for auditors with and without deficiency reports, we find no systematic differences for accruals or for value relevance.

A Decade after Sarbanes-Oxley: The Need for Ongoing Vigilance, Monitoring, and Research

2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 917-930 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeanette M. Franzel
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Warning Signs ◽  
Regulatory Regime ◽  
Government Accountability ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Audit Independence

SYNOPSIS After more than a decade since passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), it is appropriate and necessary to ask questions about the present state of audit quality and evaluate the impact and effectiveness of PCAOB's oversight programs. Written from the viewpoint of a current PCAOB Board member and former Managing Director of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), this paper discusses the warning signs of serious auditing problems in the years preceding the Act, and the role that the GAO played in analyzing those risks and calling for greater oversight of the accounting profession's auditing public companies. We must be vigilant and continually examine the activities of the auditing profession and the regulatory regime to ensure that audit independence and audit quality remain front and center to ensure investor protection and safeguard the public interest. Academic researchers play a key role in this system of vigilance. This paper provides views on many areas within the auditing profession that would benefit from further research and analysis, as well as opportunities for research that could be useful to the PCAOB as it considers current and future regulatory priorities.

Using Evidential Reasoning Technology to Enhance the Audit Quality Assurance Inspection Process

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodore J. Mock ◽  
Srinivasan C. Ragothaman ◽  
Rajendra P. Srivastava
Keyword(s):  
Quality Assurance ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Emerging Technology ◽  
Evidential Reasoning ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditor Judgments ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
Computer Services

ABSTRACT This paper considers the use of an emerging technology based on formal evidential reasoning to help audit quality assurers conduct higher-quality inspections of audit engagements. Although the ideas should be relevant to the inspection process in general, we focus on PCAOB stated objectives and procedures and, as an illustration, the inspection of Satyam Computer Services Limited. To enhance audit quality assurance (AQA), we propose and illustrate a portion of a prototype technology that uses formal evidential reasoning to help assess audit quality. The use of a formal evidential reasoning model and a structured process should provide better documented and more precise, consistent, and rigorous AQA assessments of risk, of the sufficiency and competency of audit evidence collected, and of various auditor judgments. The potential of this technology is illustrated by evaluating the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) inspection of Satyam Computer Services Limited, in particular the assessment of the risk of financial statement misstatement due to either unintentional or intentional misstatements. The illustration suggests that the proposed technology is likely to facilitate an enhanced inspection of audit quality. By implication, we assert that use of such technology will result in other enhancements to AQA.

The Impact of PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5 on Audit Fees and Audit Quality

2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-511 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dechun Wang ◽  
Jian Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Test Sample ◽  
Large Sample ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Company ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Jel Classifications

SYNOPSIS We investigate the impact of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) on audit fees and audit quality. AS5 supersedes Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2), and became effective for audits for accelerated filers for fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2007. Using a large sample of accelerated filers subject to AS5, we find evidence that audit fees decrease upon the adoption of AS5. More importantly, even though AS5 adoption reduces audit fees for our test sample, we find no evidence of a decrease in audit quality. In summary, we document evidence that AS5 improves the efficiency of internal control audits. JEL Classifications: M41.

The Impact of PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5, the PCAOB Inspection Regime, and the Great Recession on Audit Fees and Audit Quality

2020 ◽  
pp. 0148558X2098220
Author(s):  
Elizabeth S. Johnson ◽  
Kenneth J. Reichelt ◽  
Jared S. Soileau
Keyword(s):  
Great Recession ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Great Recession ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Audit Approach ◽  
The Impact

We investigate the coinciding effects of the implementation of Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5), the change in the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) inspection regime, and the Great Recession on the audit fees and audit quality of accelerated filers. AS5 took effect in November 2007 and promulgated a top-down, risk-based audit approach to SOX 404(b) audits of accelerated filers. Concurrently, the PCAOB adopted a stricter approach to its inspections of audit firms, which encouraged them to improve audit quality and reduce audit fees. Moreover, the Great Recession pressured audit firms to reduce fees. We find that, following the three events, audit fees decreased and quality increased for accelerated filers. We also find that audit fees and audit quality increased for non-accelerated filers, although these filers were not directly affected by AS5.

Hiring Auditors with a Part II Quality Control Report: An Opportunity for Increased Earnings Management or Lower Audit Fees?

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
Jared Eutsler ◽  
D. Kip Holderness ◽  
Megan M. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
General Demand ◽  
Systemic Quality

ABSTRACT The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Part II inspection reports, which disclose systemic quality control issues that auditors fail to remediate, signal poor audit quality for triennially inspected audit firms. Auditors that receive a Part II inspection report typically experience a decrease in clients, which demonstrates a general demand for audit quality. However, some companies hire auditors that receive Part II inspection reports. We examine potential reasons for hiring these audit firms. We find that relative to companies that switch to auditors without Part II reports, companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports have higher discretionary accruals in the first fiscal year after the switch, which indicates lower audit quality and a heightened risk for future fraud. We find no difference in audit fees. Our results suggest that PCAOB Part II inspection reports may signal low-quality auditors to companies that desire low-quality audits. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

The Impact of Management Alumni Affiliation and Persuasion Tactics on Auditors' Internal Control Judgments

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sudip Bhattacharjee ◽  
J. Owen Brown
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Social Identity Theory ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Revolving Door ◽  
Auditor Judgment ◽  
Professional Skepticism ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
External Auditor ◽  
One Year ◽  
The Impact

ABSTRACT Concerns over “revolving door” practices of companies hiring directly from their external auditor led to a Sarbanes-Oxley Act provision mandating a one-year cooling-off period before such hires can occur. Yet little is known as to whether these alumni affiliations, still prevalent today, actually impair audit quality. Drawing on Social Identity Theory, we conduct an experiment to examine whether auditors experience heightened identification with an alumni-affiliated client manager and, if so, how this perceived relationship affects their professional skepticism in response to a management persuasion attempt. As predicted, absent the use of a management persuasion tactic, auditors identify more with an alumni-affiliated manager than a non-alumnus with equal professional experience, and this perceived social bond enhances the manager's influence. However, the use of a common persuasion tactic, while effective at influencing auditor judgment when used by an unaffiliated manager, “backfires” when used by an alumni-affiliated manager, leading to diminished persuasion and increased professional skepticism. Evidence suggests that auditors are better able to identify the inappropriateness of the persuasion attempt when the tactic is used by an alumni-affiliated manager.

Comments by the Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association on the PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 31: PCAOB Release No. 2010-005, Application of the “Failure to Supervise” Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Solicitation of Comment on Rulemaking Concepts

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. C11-C15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Brazel ◽  
James Bierstaker ◽  
Paul Caster ◽  
Brad Reed
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Exposure Period ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Accounting Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditing Standards ◽  
Supervision Practices

SUMMARY: Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB” or “Board”) issued a release to address, in two ways, issues relating to the responsibilities of a registered public accounting firm and its supervisory personnel with respect to supervision. First, the release reminds registered firms and associated persons of, and highlights the scope of, Section 105(c)(6) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Act”), which authorizes the Board to impose sanctions on registered public accounting firms and their supervisory personnel for failing to supervise reasonably an associated person who has violated certain laws, rules, or standards. Second, the release discusses and seeks comment on conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6) and, through increased accountability, lead to improved supervision practices and, consequently, improved audit quality. The PCAOB provided for a 91-day exposure period (from August 5, 2010, to November 3, 2010) for interested parties to examine and provide comments on the conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6). The Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association provided the comments in the letter below to the PCAOB on the PCAOB Release No. 2010-005, Application of the “Failure to Supervise” Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Solicitation of Comment on Rulemaking Concepts.

scholarly journals Audit Quality: Insights from the Academic Literature

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (Supplement 1) ◽  
pp. 385-421 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Robert Knechel ◽  
Gopal V. Krishnan ◽  
Mikhail Pevzner ◽  
Lori B. Shefchik ◽  
Uma K. Velury
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Future Research ◽  
The Public ◽  
Academic Literature ◽  
Public Company

SUMMARY This study presents a review of academic research on audit quality. We begin with a review of existing definitions of audit quality and describe general frameworks for establishing audit quality. Next, we summarize research on indicators of audit quality such as inputs, process, and outcomes. Finally, we offer some suggestions for future research. The study should be useful to academics interested in audit quality as well as to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and other regulators.

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