US public auditing reforms may follow 2020

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Public ◽  
Securities Law ◽  
Budget Proposal ◽  
Public Company

Subject US public accounting oversight and proposed reforms. Significance Earlier this month, President Donald Trump released his budget proposal for the 2021 fiscal year. Among the proposals is merging the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) into the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) beginning in 2022. The move would further weaken US securities law and the accounting framework, which has steadily eroded in recent years. Impacts Shifting oversight over audit quality to the SEC would greatly reduce resources available for this function. House Democrats will be reluctant to give Trump legislative victories before November. Under Trump, the SEC will further shrink its enforcement activities; this process began before he became president.

Hiring Auditors with a Part II Quality Control Report: An Opportunity for Increased Earnings Management or Lower Audit Fees?

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
Jared Eutsler ◽  
D. Kip Holderness ◽  
Megan M. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
General Demand ◽  
Systemic Quality

ABSTRACT The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Part II inspection reports, which disclose systemic quality control issues that auditors fail to remediate, signal poor audit quality for triennially inspected audit firms. Auditors that receive a Part II inspection report typically experience a decrease in clients, which demonstrates a general demand for audit quality. However, some companies hire auditors that receive Part II inspection reports. We examine potential reasons for hiring these audit firms. We find that relative to companies that switch to auditors without Part II reports, companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports have higher discretionary accruals in the first fiscal year after the switch, which indicates lower audit quality and a heightened risk for future fraud. We find no difference in audit fees. Our results suggest that PCAOB Part II inspection reports may signal low-quality auditors to companies that desire low-quality audits. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Comments by the Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association on the PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 31: PCAOB Release No. 2010-005, Application of the “Failure to Supervise” Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Solicitation of Comment on Rulemaking Concepts

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. C11-C15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Brazel ◽  
James Bierstaker ◽  
Paul Caster ◽  
Brad Reed
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Exposure Period ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Accounting Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditing Standards ◽  
Supervision Practices

SUMMARY: Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB” or “Board”) issued a release to address, in two ways, issues relating to the responsibilities of a registered public accounting firm and its supervisory personnel with respect to supervision. First, the release reminds registered firms and associated persons of, and highlights the scope of, Section 105(c)(6) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Act”), which authorizes the Board to impose sanctions on registered public accounting firms and their supervisory personnel for failing to supervise reasonably an associated person who has violated certain laws, rules, or standards. Second, the release discusses and seeks comment on conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6) and, through increased accountability, lead to improved supervision practices and, consequently, improved audit quality. The PCAOB provided for a 91-day exposure period (from August 5, 2010, to November 3, 2010) for interested parties to examine and provide comments on the conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6). The Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association provided the comments in the letter below to the PCAOB on the PCAOB Release No. 2010-005, Application of the “Failure to Supervise” Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Solicitation of Comment on Rulemaking Concepts.

scholarly journals Auditing Issues with Chinese Reverse Merger Companies Traded in the United States

2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 76
Author(s):  
Frederic M. Stiner ◽  
Susan A. Lynn
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
The United States ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
The Public ◽  
Reverse Mergers ◽  
Public Company

Recently there have been two issues related to Chinese companies seeking capital in the United States.   The first issue is frauds that have been perpetrated by companies using reverse mergers in order to go public.   The second issue is fraud in continuing audit engagements when there has been reliance by an American audit firm on a foreign accountant’s audit work.  There is also conflict between the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) demanding to inspect audit workpapers for companies in China and the Chinese government’s refusal to let the PCAOB see these workpapers.   These issues relate to characteristics of the practice of accounting and auditing in China that threaten auditor independence and audit quality. The paper discusses: (1) issues involving reverse mergers and the response of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to these issues, (2) issues involving reliance on the work of foreign Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) and the response of the PCAOB to these issues, (3) issues involving conflicts between U.S.  regulatory agencies and the Chinese government over access to audit-related documents, and (4) suggestions for future research.

Does Part II of the PCAOB inspection report provide new information to the market?

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (8/9) ◽  
pp. 715-735 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Buslepp ◽  
R. Jared DeLisle ◽  
Lisa Victoravich
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
New Information ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Public Signal ◽  
New Evidence

Purpose Part II of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection report is released only when firms fail to remediate quality control criticisms and is intended to be a public signal of audit quality. The purpose of this paper is to reexamine whether audit clients react to the release of Part II of the PCAOB inspection report as a signal of audit quality. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a difference-in-difference regression model to examine the association between the release of Part II of the PCAOB inspection report and an audit firm’s change in market share. A sensitivity analysis is also performed to determine whether the main findings are robust to the timing of the release of the report and type of quality control criticism included in Part II of the inspection report. Findings After controlling for the prior year’s changes in market share, the authors find no evidence that clients react to the public release of Part II of the report. In the second part of the study, they examine when clients become aware of the contents of the Part II report prior to its release. Firms with audit performance criticisms experience a decrease in market share following the release of Part I. Firms with firm management criticisms experience a significant decrease in market share following the remediation period and before the public release of Part II. Practical implications The results suggest that Part II of the PCAOB inspection report does not provide new information to the market. Clients appear to be aware of the information contained in Part II of the PCAOB inspection report prior to its release. The authors believe that the delay in releasing the Part II report may create an information imbalance, and the PCAOB may want to consider ways to improve the timeliness of the information. Originality/value This study questions the generalizability of prior research which finds that Part II of the inspection report provides new information that is valued by the public company audit market as a signal of audit quality. The findings provide new evidence that the contents of Part II and the firm’s ability to remediate the quality control concerns are known to audit clients prior to the public release.

The impact of Big 4 consulting on audit reporting lag and restatements

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele D. Meckfessel ◽  
Drew Sellers
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Practice Size ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Public Company ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose This paper responds to concerns raised by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and scholars over the rapid growth of Big 4 consulting practices. This paper aims to explores the question: Does the regrowth of sizable consulting practices by the Big 4 influence audit reporting lag and restatement rates? Design/methodology/approach A population of the SEC-registered US audit clients of the Big 4 was used in this study. Longitudinal data on Big 4 audit clients from 2000 through 2009 were analyzed to determine the impact of consulting practice size on the clients’ audit reporting lag and restatement rate. Findings This paper finds that consulting practice size has a positive and statistically significant influence on audit reporting lag and restatement rate. The results are robust to alternative specifications of the sample and controlling for the level of non-audit services provided to audit clients. Practical implications The findings contribute to the discussion of the scope-of-services issue. They provide empirical support for Zeff’s (2003) and Wyatt’s (2004) intuition that the loss of Big 4 professional focus – not simply conflicts of interests – is a major factor affecting the audit quality. Originality/value The uniqueness of this paper is in how it counts restatements. Each year this paper counts that annual financial statements are restated as opposed to each disclosure of a restatement. This paper’s contribution is to examine the association between the regrowth of Big 4 accounting firm consulting practices with audit reporting lag and restatements.

PENGARUH INDEPENDENSI AUDITOR DAN KOMPETENSI AUDITOR TERHADAP KUALITAS AUDIT DENGAN TEKANAN KLIEN SEBAGAI VARIABEL MODERASI

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-390
Author(s):  
Prayogi Gunawan ◽  
Abriandi Abriandi
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Ideal Condition ◽  
Certified Public Accountants ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Accounting Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Questionnaire Form ◽  
Client Pressure ◽  
Survey Approach

This study aims to test whether client pressure can moderate the influence of auditor’s independence and auditor’s competence on audit quality. This study used a survey approach with questionnaire form which filled by 80 auditors who work at the Public Accounting Firm of North Jakarta listed at the Indonesian Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Regression analysis was used to test the hypothesis. The result of the research shows that if the auditor has high independence and competence, then audit quality will be higher also. Based on testing of a pure moderator, client pressure is able to moderate and strengthen each influence of auditor’s independence and auditor’s competence on audit quality. This suggests that this study produces an ideal condition in which client pressure makes the auditor more independent and competent to the job. Keywords: Auditor’s independence, Auditor’s competence, Audit quality, Client pressure

The big leap: a story of the public accounting firm that wanted to become a cooperative

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stéphane Jaumier
Keyword(s):  
Actor Network Theory ◽  
Certified Public Accountants ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Accounting Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Accounting Research ◽  
Translation Stage ◽  
Public Accountants ◽  
Worker Cooperative

Purpose – While a comparative study of the literature on accounting as a profession and on cooperatives reveals important differences in the values embodied by certified public accountants and by cooperators, the purpose of this study is to explore whether such differences lead to an insurmountable incompatibility or may possibly be mitigated and eventually overcome. Design/methodology/approach – The study focuses on a French public accounting firm’s project to become a worker cooperative. Drawing on methodological insights from actor–network theory (ANT), the study analyses a situation in which the certified public accountants try to convince some cooperators of the merits of their project. Findings – The case studied suggests that accounting as a profession and cooperatives are irreconcilable. It not only confirms that some of their contrasting features (identified in the literature) are indeed too difficult to overcome but also reveals a new, unforeseen source of tension between certified public accountants and cooperators. Research limitations/implications – The study calls for further research into the so-far-overlooked relationships between accounting as a profession and cooperatives. It also proposes to extend the usage of ANT in accounting research to the study of accounting as a profession. Originality/value – While ANT-inspired accounting research has to date shown a dominant interest in successful translation processes, the present study looks at an unsuccessful translation stage.

The Impact of the PCAOB Triennial Inspection Process on Inspection Year and Non-Inspection Year Audits

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
William L Buslepp
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
The Public ◽  
Learned Behavior ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
One Year ◽  
The Impact

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspects auditors with fewer than 100 publicly held clients, once every three years (i.e., triennial inspection). In doing so, the PCAOB may inspect any audit engagement within the three-year window, including audits completed only months earlier ("inspection year" audits) and audits with at least a one-year, if not two-year lag ("non-inspection year" audits). We theorize the triennial inspection process affects audit quality levels, whereby auditors impose higher (lower) audit quality during inspection years (non-inspection years). We find clients of triennially inspected auditors have significantly lower levels of accruals during inspection years. Further, this change can be attributed to additional audit effort expended during inspection years. Finally, we find some evidence this is a learned behavior developed after the initial round of inspections. Our evidence suggests auditors opportunistically increase (decrease) audit quality during inspection (non-inspection) years in response to the triennial inspection process.

PENGARUH KOMPETENSI, PENGALAMAN, PROFESIONALISME DAN ETIKA AUDITOR TERHADAP KUALITAS AUDIT PADA KAP KOTA MAKASSAR

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-21
Author(s):  
Patima Patima
Keyword(s):  
Work Experience ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Quality Research ◽  
Accounting Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Social

This research conducted with the aim of (1) Knowing and anlyzing the influence ofcompetencies on audit quality, (2) knowing and anlyzing the influence of work experience on auditquality, (3) knowing and analyzing the influence profesionalism on audit quality, (4) knowing andanalyzing the influence of auditor ethics on audit quality. Research uses primary data through asurvey of auditors working in the Public Accounting Firm of the Makassar city, amounting to 36people. The study was conducted for theree months from january to march 2019 Data was analyzedusing the Statistical Package for the Social Scienes (SPSS).The results of the study show that (1)Competance has a positive and significant effect on audit quality, (2) Experience has a positive andsignificant effect on audit quality, (3) Profesionalism has a positive and significant effect on auditquality, (4) Auditors’ ethics have no effect on audit quality.

PCAOB International Inspections and Audit Quality

2016 ◽  
Vol 92 (5) ◽  
pp. 143-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jagan Krishnan ◽  
Jayanthi Krishnan ◽  
Hakjoon Song
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Value Relevance ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Accounting Numbers ◽  
Abnormal Accruals ◽  
Relevance Measure ◽  
The Impact ◽  
First Time

ABSTRACT We investigate the impact of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) first-time inspections of foreign accounting firms by examining abnormal accruals around the inspection year, and the value relevance of accounting numbers around the inspection report date, for their U.S. cross-listed clients. We document lower abnormal accruals in the post-inspection period, and greater value relevance of accounting numbers in the post-report period for clients of the inspected auditors, compared with non-cross-listed clients or clients of non-inspected auditors within the inspected countries. Comparisons of the PCAOB's joint inspections with PCAOB stand-alone inspections indicate that while both experience lower post-inspection abnormal accruals, the former benefit more than the latter. The value relevance measure, in contrast, shows greater increases for the PCAOB stand-alone inspections than for joint inspections. Comparing the inspection effects for auditors with and without deficiency reports, we find no systematic differences for accruals or for value relevance.

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