scholarly journals Comments by the Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association on the Securities and Exchange Commission Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. C16-C27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eileen Taylor ◽  
James Bierstaker ◽  
Joseph Brazel

SUMMARY: Recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) proposed rules and forms to implement Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), entitled Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection, and sought comment thereon. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, enacted on July 21, 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”), established a whistleblower program that requires the Commission to pay an award, under regulations prescribed by the Commission and subject to certain limitations, to eligible whistleblowers who voluntarily provide the Commission with original information about a violation of the federal securities laws that leads to the successful enforcement of a covered judicial or administrative action, or a related action. Dodd-Frank also prohibits retaliation by employers against individuals that provide the Commission with information about potential securities violations. Comments were requested by the Commission and could be submitted on or before December 17, 2010. The Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association provided the comments in the letter below to the Commission on the Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

2013 ◽  
pp. 147-158
Author(s):  
V. Kulakova

We study the reform of financial regulation initiated by the Dodd—Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Major factors impeding Obama’s financial and economic policy are explored, including institutional difficulties, party warfare, lobbyism, and systemic inconsistencies of international financial regulation. We also examine challenges that are being faced by economic and political sciences due to the changes in financial regulation and also assess the level of radicality of the financial reform.


Author(s):  
Alan N. Rechtschaffen

Prior to the 2007 financial crisis, financial regulation was compartmentalized along lines of segmented financial instruments. With the exception of the regulation of swaps as described in chapter 14, post-crisis regulatory reform maintains this bifurcation of regulation along product lines between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The SEC and the CFTC have begun to issue rules establishing a coordinated approach to regulating certain derivatives under the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (widely known as the Dodd-Frank Act) in particular as they relate to swaps. This chapter discusses the jurisdiction of the SEC, what constitutes a security, sellers’ representations, consequences of securities, hedge funds, and derivatives regulation.


Author(s):  
Alan N. Rechtschaffen

Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke classified derivatives as a “vulnerability” of the financial system that led to the financial crisis. He explained that derivatives concentrated risk within particular financial institutions and markets without sufficient regulatory oversight. The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—Dodd-Frank—constituted a seismic shift in the regulation of financial institutions and markets in a massive effort to address regulatory shortcomings in derivatives markets. This chapter discusses the Dodd-Frank regulatory regime. Topics covered include the Dodd-Frank and derivatives trading; jurisdiction and registration; clearing, exchange, capital and margin, and reporting requirements; analysis of the provisions of Dodd-Frank on derivatives trading; rationale behind the exemptions and exclusions; the Lincoln Rule; Futures Commission Merchants; and criticisms of Dodd-Frank's derivatives trading provisions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-130
Author(s):  
Hugo S. W. Farmer

            Recently, a circuit split has arisen with regard to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The circuit split concerns the question of what it takes for an individual to qualify as a “whistleblower” under the terms of the statute. This circuit split is surprising, as the Dodd- Frank Act purports to answer this question itself by providing a definition of this term, a definition which the Fifth Circuit has treated as being conclusive. Nonetheless, the Second and the Ninth Circuits have held that with respect to some, but not all, of the Dodd-Frank Act, this statutory “whistleblower” definition does not apply. Shortly, the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to resolve the matter when it hears an appeal of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Somers v. Digital Realty Trust Inc. This article provides three broad reasons why the Supreme Court should reject the Second and Ninth Circuits’ interpretations. First, the interpretation endorsed by the Second and Ninth Circuits is the result of a flawed exercise in statutory interpretation that incorrectly applies principles recently set down by the Supreme Court in King v. Burwell, and Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA. Secondly, while the Second and Ninth Circuits rejected the Fifth Circuits’ interpretation on the basis that it withholds the protection of the Dodd-Frank Act from auditors and attorneys, the Second and Ninth Circuits’ preferred interpretations also fail to protect auditors and attorneys. Finally, the policy reasons in favor of extending the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower protections to auditors and attorneys are insufficiently strong to warrant departing from the natural meaning of the statutory language at issue.   


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariel Mok

Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act gives the government the Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”) to seek the liquidation of failing financial companies with the appointment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“the FDIC”) as receiver. When applied to securities broker-dealers, the OLA calls into question the incorporation of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”) that provides for the orderly liquidation of an insolvent broker-dealer under the oversight of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“the SIPC”). The result is a conflict of control between the FDIC and the SIPC in the event of an OLA broker-dealer liquidation and investor uncertainty regarding the incorporation of SIPA protections for customer property. Problematically, the OLA and its implementing rules leave the FDIC with discretion to modify SIPA protections for customer property.


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