The Impact of PCAOB Reports Containing Audit Deficiencies on Non-U.S. Audit Firms: Initial Evidence

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. A12-A25 ◽  
Author(s):  
HakJoon Song ◽  
Zhongxia (Shelly) Ye
Keyword(s):  
Professional Staff ◽  
Compliance Costs ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditor Resignation ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
One Year ◽  
The Impact

SUMMARY The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) regularly conducts inspections of non-U.S. audit firms. Based on 243 PCAOB inspection reports of non-U.S. audit firms, published by the PCAOB between January 2006 and December 2011, we examine involuntary dismissals, voluntary resignations, and voluntary deregistration of inspected non-U.S. audit firms following PCAOB reports containing audit deficiencies. Our results show that 24 out of 1,604 clients of non-U.S. audit firms have dismissed their auditors within one year following the disclosure of audit deficiencies in PCAOB reports, and that only four of these 24 clients appointed successor auditors with clean PCAOB reports. Also, we find only four auditor resignation cases from the 1,604 clients of non-U.S. audit firms within one year after they received a PCAOB report containing audit deficiencies. Finally, 22 non-U.S. audit firms voluntarily ceased to be registered with the PCAOB either during the inspection process or after they received PCAOB reports containing audit deficiencies. Compared to registered non-U.S. audit firms, these deregistered non-U.S. audit firms have relatively fewer resources (e.g., fewer partners and professional staff, smaller offices) and, thus, may not be able to bear compliance costs (e.g., costs associated with preparation for inspections) associated with PCAOB inspections. This study provides insights regarding the impact of PCAOB international inspections.

The Impact of the PCAOB Triennial Inspection Process on Inspection Year and Non-Inspection Year Audits

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
William L Buslepp
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
The Public ◽  
Learned Behavior ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
One Year ◽  
The Impact

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspects auditors with fewer than 100 publicly held clients, once every three years (i.e., triennial inspection). In doing so, the PCAOB may inspect any audit engagement within the three-year window, including audits completed only months earlier ("inspection year" audits) and audits with at least a one-year, if not two-year lag ("non-inspection year" audits). We theorize the triennial inspection process affects audit quality levels, whereby auditors impose higher (lower) audit quality during inspection years (non-inspection years). We find clients of triennially inspected auditors have significantly lower levels of accruals during inspection years. Further, this change can be attributed to additional audit effort expended during inspection years. Finally, we find some evidence this is a learned behavior developed after the initial round of inspections. Our evidence suggests auditors opportunistically increase (decrease) audit quality during inspection (non-inspection) years in response to the triennial inspection process.

The Impact of the PCAOB Individual Engagement Inspection Process—Preliminary Evidence

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 53-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Aobdia
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Preliminary Evidence ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
Wide Issue ◽  
The Impact

ABSTRACT This study investigates the impact on auditors' and clients' activities of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections of individual engagements. I find that both auditors and clients react to a Part I Finding, which identifies audit deficiencies on their inspected engagements. Audit firm effort increases on inspected engagements and non-inspected engagements of offices or partners that receive a Part I Finding, suggesting direct, as well as spillover, effects of the PCAOB inspections. The client is also more likely to switch auditors. However, auditor effort and financial reporting quality subsequently decline for inspected engagements that did not receive a Part I Finding. In these cases, clients are less likely to switch auditors. Additional analyses show that the auditor reaction depends on whether the auditor is an industry specialist, the client reaction depends on the size of the auditor, and effects on financial reporting quality depend on whether the deficiency is a firm-wide issue. Overall, these results suggest that both audit firms and clients care about the PCAOB individual engagement inspection process and, in several instances, gravitate toward the level set by the Part I Finding bar. JEL Classifications: M42; M48.

The Impact of PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5, the PCAOB Inspection Regime, and the Great Recession on Audit Fees and Audit Quality

2020 ◽  
pp. 0148558X2098220
Author(s):  
Elizabeth S. Johnson ◽  
Kenneth J. Reichelt ◽  
Jared S. Soileau
Keyword(s):  
Great Recession ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Great Recession ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Audit Approach ◽  
The Impact

We investigate the coinciding effects of the implementation of Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5), the change in the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) inspection regime, and the Great Recession on the audit fees and audit quality of accelerated filers. AS5 took effect in November 2007 and promulgated a top-down, risk-based audit approach to SOX 404(b) audits of accelerated filers. Concurrently, the PCAOB adopted a stricter approach to its inspections of audit firms, which encouraged them to improve audit quality and reduce audit fees. Moreover, the Great Recession pressured audit firms to reduce fees. We find that, following the three events, audit fees decreased and quality increased for accelerated filers. We also find that audit fees and audit quality increased for non-accelerated filers, although these filers were not directly affected by AS5.

Hiring Auditors with a Part II Quality Control Report: An Opportunity for Increased Earnings Management or Lower Audit Fees?

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
Jared Eutsler ◽  
D. Kip Holderness ◽  
Megan M. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
General Demand ◽  
Systemic Quality

ABSTRACT The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Part II inspection reports, which disclose systemic quality control issues that auditors fail to remediate, signal poor audit quality for triennially inspected audit firms. Auditors that receive a Part II inspection report typically experience a decrease in clients, which demonstrates a general demand for audit quality. However, some companies hire auditors that receive Part II inspection reports. We examine potential reasons for hiring these audit firms. We find that relative to companies that switch to auditors without Part II reports, companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports have higher discretionary accruals in the first fiscal year after the switch, which indicates lower audit quality and a heightened risk for future fraud. We find no difference in audit fees. Our results suggest that PCAOB Part II inspection reports may signal low-quality auditors to companies that desire low-quality audits. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

PCAOB International Inspections and Audit Quality

2016 ◽  
Vol 92 (5) ◽  
pp. 143-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jagan Krishnan ◽  
Jayanthi Krishnan ◽  
Hakjoon Song
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Value Relevance ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Accounting Numbers ◽  
Abnormal Accruals ◽  
Relevance Measure ◽  
The Impact ◽  
First Time

ABSTRACT We investigate the impact of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) first-time inspections of foreign accounting firms by examining abnormal accruals around the inspection year, and the value relevance of accounting numbers around the inspection report date, for their U.S. cross-listed clients. We document lower abnormal accruals in the post-inspection period, and greater value relevance of accounting numbers in the post-report period for clients of the inspected auditors, compared with non-cross-listed clients or clients of non-inspected auditors within the inspected countries. Comparisons of the PCAOB's joint inspections with PCAOB stand-alone inspections indicate that while both experience lower post-inspection abnormal accruals, the former benefit more than the latter. The value relevance measure, in contrast, shows greater increases for the PCAOB stand-alone inspections than for joint inspections. Comparing the inspection effects for auditors with and without deficiency reports, we find no systematic differences for accruals or for value relevance.

scholarly journals Will agriculture beat the odds against Covid-19? The Covid-19 outbreak and its effect on agricultural supply in Turkey.

New Medit ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Online Survey ◽  
Food Prices ◽  
Food Sector ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Third ◽  
Food Shortages ◽  
The Government ◽  
Food Imports ◽  
One Year ◽  
The Impact

"The new coronavirus (Covid-19), which spread almost the entire world, adversely affected many sectors, both internationally and 30 locally. Households’ panic purchase have rocketed the demand for some food items in the early days. Besides, food safety 31 concerns have increased. This research aimed to uncover how the public perceived the impact of Covid-19 on the agriculture and 32 food sector. The online survey was conducted, and the data from 428 participants were analysed using the SPSS (v.23) program. 33 The third of respondents (30.8%) believed the outbreak would last between six months to one year, during which time food 34 shortages will occur (32.5%). While 27.4% of the respondents reported that they stockpiled food, 44.8% reported that if the 35 outbreak continued, they would stock up on food. Participants were concerned that if planting cannot be done, food shortages will 36 occur (74.6%), basic foodstuffs cannot be produced (67.8%), food imports (69.4%) and exports (74.6%) will be adversely 37 affected by the outbreak. The research found that if farming disturbed, food prices would increase (82.3%) and the government 38 should include agriculture-supporting measures (85%) in its economic measures."

scholarly journals Comments by the Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association on PCAOB Release No. 2015-004, Supplemental Request for Comment: Rules to Require Disclosure of Certain Audit Participants on a New PCAOB Form

2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. C1-C10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus M. Doxey ◽  
Marshall A. Geiger ◽  
Karl E. Hackenbrack ◽  
Sarah E. Stein
Keyword(s):  
Data Availability ◽  
The Public ◽  
Related Information ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditing Standards ◽  
New Form

SUMMARY On June 30, 2015 the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued a supplemental request for comment on its 2013 reproposal to require auditors to disclose in the auditor's report the name of the engagement partner and information about certain other participants in the audit. The supplemental request solicited public comments on an alternative to disclosure of this information in the auditor's report, namely that audit firms report (1) the name of the engagement partner, and (2) the names, locations, and extent of participation of other audit participants in a new form (Form AP) to be filed with the PCAOB within 30 days of the date the auditor's report is first included in a document filed with the SEC. The comment period ended on August 31, 2015. This commentary summarizes the participating committee members' views on the alternatives presented in the supplemental request for comment. Data Availability: The exposure drafts of the proposed and reproposed rules, the supplemental request for comment, and related information are available at: http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Pages/Docket029.aspx

scholarly journals Auditor Fees and Going-Concern Reporting Decisions on Bankrupt Companies: Additional Evidence

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. A13-A27 ◽  
Author(s):  
William J. Read
Keyword(s):  
Audit Fees ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Failure ◽  
The Public ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Reporting Decisions ◽  
Auditor Fees

SUMMARY The recent growth in non-audit services (NAS) at the major audit firms has the attention of auditing regulators. On several occasions recently, board members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) have indicated that the rise in NAS may place auditor independence at risk (Harris 2014; Tysiac 2014). Impaired independence can result in audit failure, which includes situations when auditors fail to issue going-concern (GC) audit opinions to soon-to-be bankrupt companies. In this paper, I examine the association between the propensity of auditors to issue GC opinions and NAS fees (and audit fees) to 203 bankrupt companies during 2002–2013. In analysis, I find no significant relation between GC decisions and NAS fees and audit fees. My results may interest U.S. regulators, who recently expressed concerns about the threat to auditor independence from the spike in NAS at the major firms. Data Availability: Publicly available from sources identified in the paper.

Do Entry Barriers to the Public Company Audit Market Deter Low Quality Audit Firms?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Kitto ◽  
Phillip T. Lamoreaux ◽  
Devin Williams
Keyword(s):  
Entry Barriers ◽  
Quality Audit ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company

A Decade after Sarbanes-Oxley: The Need for Ongoing Vigilance, Monitoring, and Research

2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 917-930 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeanette M. Franzel
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Warning Signs ◽  
Regulatory Regime ◽  
Government Accountability ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Audit Independence

SYNOPSIS After more than a decade since passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), it is appropriate and necessary to ask questions about the present state of audit quality and evaluate the impact and effectiveness of PCAOB's oversight programs. Written from the viewpoint of a current PCAOB Board member and former Managing Director of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), this paper discusses the warning signs of serious auditing problems in the years preceding the Act, and the role that the GAO played in analyzing those risks and calling for greater oversight of the accounting profession's auditing public companies. We must be vigilant and continually examine the activities of the auditing profession and the regulatory regime to ensure that audit independence and audit quality remain front and center to ensure investor protection and safeguard the public interest. Academic researchers play a key role in this system of vigilance. This paper provides views on many areas within the auditing profession that would benefit from further research and analysis, as well as opportunities for research that could be useful to the PCAOB as it considers current and future regulatory priorities.

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