Further Evidence on the Effect of Regulation on the Exit of Small Auditors from the Audit Market and Resulting Audit Quality

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 95-115
Author(s):  
Neil L. Fargher ◽  
Alicia Jiang ◽  
Yangxin Yu

SUMMARY Following the introduction of SOX in 2002 and the introduction of PCAOB inspections starting from 2003, DeFond and Lennox (2011) found that a large number of small auditors exited the SEC client audit market during the 2002–2004 period and that these exiting auditors were of lower quality relative to non-exiting auditors. This paper seeks to verify whether SOX and the introduction of PCAOB inspections improved audit quality through incentivizing small auditors providing lower audit quality to exit the market. Using client discretionary accruals and the likelihood of the clients restating financial statements as proxies for audit quality, we do not find that the small auditors that exited the market for SEC client audits were of lower quality than successor small audit firms that did not exit the market. JEL Classifications: G18; L51. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 167-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Soo Young Kwon ◽  
Youngdeok Lim ◽  
Roger Simnett

SUMMARY: Using a unique setting in which mandatory audit firm rotation was required from 2006–2010, and in which both audit fees and audit hours were disclosed (South Korea), this study provides empirical evidence of the economic impact of this policy initiative on audit quality, and the associated implications for audit fees. This study compares both pre- and post-policy implementation and, after the implementation of the policy, mandatory long-tenure versus voluntary short-tenure rotation situations. Where audit firms were mandatorily rotated post-policy, we observe that audit quality (measured as abnormal discretionary accruals) did not significantly change compared with pre-2006 long-tenure audit situations and voluntary post-rotation situations. Audit fees in the post-regulation period for mandatorily rotated engagements are significantly larger than in the pre-regulation period, but are discounted compared to audit fees for post-regulation continuing engagements. We also find that the observed increase in audit fees and audit hours in the post-regulation period extends beyond situations where the audit firm was mandatorily rotated, suggesting that the introduction of mandatory audit firm rotation had a much broader impact than the specific instances of mandatory rotation. Data Availability: Most of the financial data used in the present study are available from the KIS Value Database. The data for audit hours and fees were drawn from statements of operating results filed with the Financial Supervisory Services (FSS) in Korea.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
Jared Eutsler ◽  
D. Kip Holderness ◽  
Megan M. Jones

ABSTRACT The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Part II inspection reports, which disclose systemic quality control issues that auditors fail to remediate, signal poor audit quality for triennially inspected audit firms. Auditors that receive a Part II inspection report typically experience a decrease in clients, which demonstrates a general demand for audit quality. However, some companies hire auditors that receive Part II inspection reports. We examine potential reasons for hiring these audit firms. We find that relative to companies that switch to auditors without Part II reports, companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports have higher discretionary accruals in the first fiscal year after the switch, which indicates lower audit quality and a heightened risk for future fraud. We find no difference in audit fees. Our results suggest that PCAOB Part II inspection reports may signal low-quality auditors to companies that desire low-quality audits. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.


2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 249-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart D. Taylor

SUMMARY This paper investigates the implied assumption, made in many audit fee determination studies, that, within a given audit firm, all partners produce a statistically identical level of audit quality and earn a statistically identical level of audit fees. This is referred to as the “homogeneity assumption.” However, this is contradicted by the individual auditor behavioral literature, which shows that different individual auditor characteristics can have an impact on audit quality. Given the fact that audit partners differ in their quality, this paper hypothesizes that different audit partners will be able to earn differing levels of fees. This hypothesis is tested by estimating an audit fee model using data from 822 Australian publicly listed companies for the year 2005. Australia is an ideal audit market for this research, as the disclosure of the name of the audit engagement partner in the audit report is mandatory. The empirical results indicate that individual audit partners earn individual audit fee premiums (or discounts) that are not explainable by the audit firms of which they are members. Data Availability: All data have been extracted from publicly available sources.


2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 17-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen D. Blay ◽  
Eric S. Gooden ◽  
Mark J. Mellon ◽  
Douglas E. Stevens

SUMMARY After considering a proposal to require the engagement partner's signature on the audit report (PCAOB 2009), the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board chose instead to only require the disclosure of the engagement partner's name (PCAOB 2015). We make predictions regarding the effects of the two proposed requirements using insights from social norm theory, and test those predictions using an experimental audit market setting found in the literature. We find that both requirements reduce misreporting when compared to a control setting with neither requirement present. We also document that the signature requirement generates an incremental reduction in misreporting when added to the disclosure requirement. Finally, we provide evidence that these effects are driven by participants with higher sensitivity to social norms. This theory and evidence supports the new identity disclosure requirement at the PCAOB and helps explain the existence of signature requirements in many non-U.S. countries. Data Availability: Experimental data are available from the authors upon request.


2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 197-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Daniel Eshleman ◽  
Peng Guo

SUMMARY: Recent research suggests that Big 4 auditors do not provide higher audit quality than other auditors, after controlling for the endogenous choice of auditor. We re-examine this issue using the incidence of accounting restatements as a measure of audit quality. Using a propensity-score matching procedure similar to that used by recent research to control for clients' endogenous choice of auditor, we find that clients of Big 4 audit firms are less likely to subsequently issue an accounting restatement than are clients of other auditors. In additional tests, we find weak evidence that clients of Big 4 auditors are less likely to issue accounting restatements than are clients of Mid-tier auditors (Grant Thornton and BDO Seidman). Taken together, the evidence suggests that Big 4 auditors do perform higher quality audits. JEL Classifications: M41, M42 Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.


2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 113-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer J. Gaver ◽  
Steven Utke

ABSTRACT We argue that the association between auditor industry specialization and audit quality depends on how long the auditor has been a specialist. We measure audit quality using absolute discretionary accruals, income-increasing discretionary accruals, and book-tax differences. Our results, based on a sample of Big 4 audit clients from 2003–2015, indicate that auditors who have only recently gained the specialist designation produce a level of audit quality that does not surpass that produced by non-specialist auditors, and is generally lower than the audit quality produced by seasoned specialists. We estimate that the seasoning process takes two to three years. In contrast to prior research that finds no effect of specialization after propensity score matching, we find that seasoned specialists generally produce higher-quality audits than other auditors even after matching. This suggests that the audit quality effect associated with seasoned industry specialist auditors is not due to differences in client characteristics. JEL Classifications: M42. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the text.


2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 33-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian T. Carver ◽  
Carl W. Hollingsworth ◽  
Jonathan D. Stanley

SUMMARY This study examines whether recent auditor downgrade activity is associated with subsequent changes in clients' discretionary accruals. The market for audit services has undergone dramatic change in recent years, resulting in a substantial increase in the number of clients realigning to smaller auditors. This shift in the audit market raises concern about the potential adverse effects of clients moving away from larger, and perhaps more effective, auditors. Consistent with this concern, our analysis of auditor switches occurring between 2003 and 2005 indicates that downgrade clients reported a significant increase in signed discretionary accruals over the two years following the switch. In contrast, we find no significant change in discretionary accruals for a control sample of lateral switches. However, between-sample comparisons fail to provide consistent evidence that the two groups reported accrual changes differently following the auditor switch. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources identified in the text.


2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (6) ◽  
pp. 550-577 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne-Mie Reheul ◽  
Tom Van Caneghem ◽  
Machteld Van den Bogaerd ◽  
Sandra Verbruggen

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the association between individual auditor characteristics (gender, experience and sector expertise) and audit opinions in Belgian non-profit organizations (NPOs). The purpose is to identify auditor characteristics that imply a better assurance of financial statement (FS) quality. FS quality is essential to enhance financial accountability toward the resource providers of NPOs and the public at large. Design/methodology/approach Multinomial regressions are conducted on a data set of Belgian NPOs. Propensity score matching is used to control for potential self-selection bias. Findings Auditors with sector expertise are found to provide better assurance than their non-sector-expert counterparts. The former are more likely to disclose FS errors and uncertainties in their audit report. Originality/value This study contributes to the auditing literature by focusing on an understudied audit market, namely, the non-profit audit market. The number of non-profit studies that investigate determinant of audit quality is very scarce, and none of them explores the determinants of audit opinions. Moreover, these studies ignore individual auditor characteristics as determinants of audit quality. The findings of this study provide meaningful information for several actors in the NP field and for audit firms.


2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 113-141
Author(s):  
Michael L. Ettredge ◽  
Matthew G. Sherwood ◽  
Lili Sun

SUMMARY We propose a new audit supplier competition construct, the Office-Client Balance (OCB), which consists of the relative abundance of competing audit offices and audit clients in a metropolitan (metro) area. From this construct, we derive a metro level audit competition proxy reflecting surpluses or shortfalls of total metro audit office numbers relative to the national metro OCB norm: the OCB_TOT. Consistent with the predictions of Porter's Five Forces theory, we find that OCB_TOT is associated with lower fees, more auditor turnover, and more (less) office exits (entrances) in metro audit markets. These findings validate OCB_TOT as a proxy for audit market competition. Our results indicate that greater metro level competition among auditors (more positive OCB_TOT) is associated with higher audit quality, proxied by fewer financial statement misstatements. Several additional analyses suggest that OCB_TOT is useful in explaining clients' choices of local (versus remote) audit offices and Big 4 (versus non-Big 4) offices. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources. JEL Classifications: G18; L10; M42.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Draeger ◽  
Don Herrmann ◽  
Bradley P. Lawson

ABSTRACT We examine the impact of Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) on audit quality. Prior research suggests a reallocation of resources toward higher-risk clients with no overall change in audit quality associated with the adoption of AS5. However, using financial restatements as our proxy for audit quality, we find the likelihood that financial statements are subsequently restated decreases in the AS5 period. These results are robust to several additional analyses. In addition to testing the occurrence of a restatement event, our results indicate that the duration of the restated period decreases during the AS5 period. Consistent with the objectives of AS5, we also find that the improvements in audit quality associated with AS5 are greater for complex firms than non-complex firms. Overall, using financial restatements as our proxy for audit quality, our results suggest that audit quality improves following the issuance of AS5. JEL Classifications: M41 Data Availability: The data used in this paper are publicly available from the sources indicated in the text.


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