The Iraq Crisis and the Future of the Western Alliance

Author(s):  
Marc Trachtenberg

This chapter considers the various issues raised in the run-up to the Iraq War. It asks: How much of a problem would the development of a mass destruction capability by a regime like that of Iraq in 2002 have actually posed? Wouldn't the development of an Iraqi nuclear capability have led to mutual deterrence and thus to a relatively stable strategic relationship? To the extent that an Iraqi capability of this sort would have posed serious problems, couldn't the Iraqis have been prevented permanently from developing such forces through nonmilitary means? Couldn't an inspection regime have done the trick? And if the control regime wasn't up to the job, would it be legitimate for a country to act essentially on its own, without first getting explicit U.N. Security Council authorization? Was unilateral action impermissible under international law, and is a country that dealt with the problem in that way to be branded a law-breaker?

1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 497-511
Author(s):  
Guido den Dekker ◽  
Ramses A. Wessel

The effects of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait are felt strongly up to the present day. On numerous occasions, the inspection teams of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) have encountered serious problems and opposition by the Iraqi government when verifying the non-production of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Among the many legal questions raised by the Iraqi-Kuwait war's aftermath, a fundamental issue is whether – in the absence of an explicit Security Council decision – compliance by Iraq with its obligations may be enforced by military means. In this article, this question is addressed by examining whether military enforcement action can be based on Security Council resolutions adopted earlier in the course of the conflict, especially Resolutions 678 (1990), in which the Council authorised the use of ‘all necessary means’, and 1154 (1998), in which the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ between the UN and Iraq was endorsed. It is argued that without a further mandate from the Security Council, military enforcement of arms control in Iraq under the present circumstances is prohibited by international law.


2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Johnstone

Critiques of decision making in international organizations are often framed in terms of the democratic deficit. Leveled against the United Nations Security Council, the charge has become more pointed in light of recent quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial acts—most notably the adoption of Resolutions 1373 and 1540 on the financing of terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, respectively, and the Resolution 1267 sanctions regime, which targets individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism. With the first two resolutions, the Security Council imposed general obligations on all states for an indefinite period; with the third, it set up a sanctions committee that has courtlike powers to identify and freeze the assets of individuals, groups, and corporations. Despite broad sympathy among the UN membership for collective counterterrorist action in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, a degree of skepticism accompanied these initiatives from the start and grew with the diplomatic debacle surrounding the war in Iraq. Some critics asked whether an “imperial” Security Council had become an instrument for the imposition of “hegemonic international law.” The Council has moved to address these concerns, but they remain serious enough that the regimes established under Resolutions 1267, 1373, and 1540 are at risk of collapsing.


2014 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
IDO OREN ◽  
TY SOLOMON

AbstractWe seek to reinvigorate and clarify the Copenhagen School's insight that ‘security’ is not ‘a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance [‘security’] itself is the act’. We conceptualise the utterances of securitising actors as consisting not in arguments so much as in repetitive spouting of ambiguous phrases (WMD, rogue states, ethnic cleansing). We further propose that audience acceptance consists not in persuasion so much as in joining the securitising actors in a ritualised chanting of the securitising phrase. Rather than being performed to, the audience participates in the performance in the manner in which a crowd at a rock concert sings along with the artists. We illustrate our argument with a discussion of how the ritualised chanting of the phrase ‘weapons of mass destruction’ during the run-up to the Iraq War ultimately produced the grave Iraqi threat that it purportedly described.


Author(s):  
Ashley Deeks

This chapter examines one of the most contentious issues in the jus ad bellum: whether and when international law permits a state to use force unilaterally before it suffers an armed attack. More specifically, it considers whether pre-emption needs to be tamed. The discussion begins by sorting through the terminology used by states and scholars with respect to acts of self-defence in advance of an attack, with particular reference to three different terms: anticipatory self-defence, pre-emptive self-defence, and preventive self-defence. The chapter then outlines the basic positions in the historical debate about the legality of such self-defence before turning to three geopolitical and technological factors that put pressure on the doctrine of pre-attack self-defence: weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and cyber attacks. Finally, it evaluates the future of pre-emption, with emphasis on changes in the timing of a state’s right to use force in self-defence.


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