Military Enforcement of Arms Control in Iraq

1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 497-511
Author(s):  
Guido den Dekker ◽  
Ramses A. Wessel
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Fundamental Issue ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
Legal Questions ◽  
Council Decision ◽  
The Many

The effects of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait are felt strongly up to the present day. On numerous occasions, the inspection teams of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) have encountered serious problems and opposition by the Iraqi government when verifying the non-production of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Among the many legal questions raised by the Iraqi-Kuwait war's aftermath, a fundamental issue is whether – in the absence of an explicit Security Council decision – compliance by Iraq with its obligations may be enforced by military means. In this article, this question is addressed by examining whether military enforcement action can be based on Security Council resolutions adopted earlier in the course of the conflict, especially Resolutions 678 (1990), in which the Council authorised the use of ‘all necessary means’, and 1154 (1998), in which the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ between the UN and Iraq was endorsed. It is argued that without a further mandate from the Security Council, military enforcement of arms control in Iraq under the present circumstances is prohibited by international law.

Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit

2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Johnstone
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Security Council ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Democratic Deficit ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Financing Of Terrorism ◽  
Set Up

Critiques of decision making in international organizations are often framed in terms of the democratic deficit. Leveled against the United Nations Security Council, the charge has become more pointed in light of recent quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial acts—most notably the adoption of Resolutions 1373 and 1540 on the financing of terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, respectively, and the Resolution 1267 sanctions regime, which targets individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism. With the first two resolutions, the Security Council imposed general obligations on all states for an indefinite period; with the third, it set up a sanctions committee that has courtlike powers to identify and freeze the assets of individuals, groups, and corporations. Despite broad sympathy among the UN membership for collective counterterrorist action in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, a degree of skepticism accompanied these initiatives from the start and grew with the diplomatic debacle surrounding the war in Iraq. Some critics asked whether an “imperial” Security Council had become an instrument for the imposition of “hegemonic international law.” The Council has moved to address these concerns, but they remain serious enough that the regimes established under Resolutions 1267, 1373, and 1540 are at risk of collapsing.

Efforts to Address Iraqi Compliance with UN Weapons Inspections

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 956-962 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean D. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
Medical Supplies ◽  
Ballistic Missiles ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
On Site Inspection

At the conclusion of the 1991 UN enforcement action against Iraq, the Security Council adopted a resolution setting the terms for a cease-fire. The resolution required, among other things, that Iraq “unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision,” of all chemical and biological weapons, all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, and associated materials and facilities. Further, the resolution provided for the creation of a UN special commission to carry out “on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities,” and ordered Iraq to yield such weapons to the commission for “destruction, removal or rendering harmless.” Similar requirements were imposed with respect to the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons. While maintaining the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the Security Council allowed exports to Iraq of foodstuffs and medical supplies (on the condition that a UN sanctions committee had been notified) and also other commodities (if approved by the same committee). The Security Council decided that the sanctions regime would be lifted, however, once Iraq complied with its obligations on the destruction and monitoring of weapons of mass destruction.

Debating Targeted Killing

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamar Meisels ◽  
Jeremy Waldron
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Moral Justification ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Targeted Killing ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Right

In this “for and against” book, Jeremy Waldron and Tamar Meisels defend competing positions on the legitimacy of targeted killing. The volume begins with a joint introduction, briefly setting out the terms of discussion, and presenting a short historical overview of the practice—i.e. what is targeted killing, and how has it been used in which conflicts and by whom. The debate opens with Meisels’ defense of targeted killing as a legitimate and desirable defensive anti-terrorism strategy, in keeping with both just war theory and international law. Meisels unreservedly defends the named killing of irregular combatants, most notably terrorists, during armed conflict. Additionally, she offers a possible moral justification for rare instances of assassination outside that framework, specifically with reference to recent cases of nuclear scientists developing weapons of mass destruction for the Iranian and Syrian governments. The debate continues with Waldron’s arguments focusing on the dangers and the inherent wrongness of governments’ having the right to maintain death lists—lists of named individuals who are to be hunted down and killed. Waldron notes the many differences between individualized targeting and ordinary combat, and he resists the attempt to assimilate targeted killing to killings in combat. Waldron also cautions us to consider carefully what a world of targeted killings will be like, the many abuses it is liable to, and why we should be very cautious, morally and strategically, in our thinking about it.

un Security Council vs. Weapons of Mass Destruction

2016 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-161
Author(s):  
Hans Blix
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Security Council ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Major Powers ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
The Cold War

International institutions given the task to maintain collective security and to seek disarmament need to build on cooperation between major powers. The authors of the un Charter vested great powers in the Security Council but a consensus between the five permanent great powers was required for use of the powers. This inevitably paralyzed the Council during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, the permanent members have remained unable jointly to pursue disarmament, but they have succeeded in several remarkable cases to reach consensus, notably on measures to prevent the further spread of weapons of mass destruction. The quick action to eliminate chemical weapons in Syria was a win-win case led by us-Russian diplomacy, while the comprehensive deal settling the controversy over Iran’s nuclear program was a victory for patient diplomacy involving all permanent members and the eu. These actions show the potentials of the Council.

Safety in the Air: Air Carriers' Rights and Responsibilities at National and International Law

2003 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 275-303
Author(s):  
Ruwantissa Abeyratne
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Passenger Screening ◽  
Air Transport Industry ◽  
Potential Offender ◽  
Air Disaster ◽  
Machine Readable ◽  
Air Carriers ◽  
Legal Consequences

Several air disasters involving loss of lives of passengers and others on the ground have illustrated the key role expected of airlines in ensuring the security of aircraft and the safety of those affected by the contract of carriage by air. The culmination of these expectations came immediately after 11 September 2001 when aircraft were used as weapons of mass destruction against passengers of the aircraft concerned and those on the ground. Sustained debate followed between the air transport industry and regulators as to whether airlines could justifiably be expected to bear full responsibility for the safety of those on board and on the ground who may be affected by an air disaster. The international community now recognizes that the airlines have to bear some responsibility in the decision-making process regarding persons boarding their aircraft. Modern techniques for passenger screening include the use of machine readable travel documents (MRTDs) and advance passenger information (API). In addition, the practice of passenger profiling is not uncommon among some carriers who cooperate with customs and immigration authorities to identify possible offenders, with a view to preventing them from boarding their aircraft. The process of refusal to board, however, may entail legal consequences, particularly in the context of the contract which has already passed between the air carrier and passenger prior to boarding. Although usually a contract can be frustrated thus affecting the performance of that contract, the instance of a potential offender is unique in that refusal of carriage is based on conjecture rather than empirical evidence. This article examines this issue with a focus on developments in some European and United States jurisdictions.

Security Council: Disarmament Commission

1955 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 158-159
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
International Agreement ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Military Installations ◽  
Military Equipment ◽  
Secure Information

The Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission (France, Soviet Union, Canada, United Kingdom, United States) met in London, May 13–June 22. Following discussion of possible approaches for the Sub-Committee, the Soviet representative presented a draft resolution11 prohibiting unconditionally weapons of mass destruction and asking the Security Council to effect an international agreement to guarantee enforcement of that prohibition. Permanent members of the Security Council would reduce by one-third conventional military equipment and personnel within a year. The draft recommended the convening by the Security Council of a conference to effect reduction of armaments by all states and to abolish military installations on foreign territories. The Soviet representative attacked parts of the United Nations Majority Plan for Control of Atomic Energy, stating that the United States desired to monopolize nuclear secrets and to secure information on Soviet armaments without prohibiting nuclear weapons.

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