N-Player Games

Author(s):  
João P. Hespanha

This chapter extends several of the concepts for two-player games to games with N-players. It begins by considering general games with N players P₁, P₂, . . ., P(subscript N), which are allowed to select policies within action spaces Γ‎₁, Γ‎₂, . . ., Γ‎(subscript N). Each player wants to minimize their own outcome, and does not care about the outcome of the other players. The chapter proceeds by discussing the security level, security policy, and Nash equilibrium for N-player games, pure N-player games in normal form, mixed policy for N-player games in normal form, and computation of the completely mixed Nash equilibrium for N-player games. A mixed Nash equilibrium is computed for a different game in which some (or all) players want to maximize instead of minimize the outcome.

Author(s):  
João P. Hespanha

This chapter defines a number of key concepts for non-zero-sum games involving two players. It begins by considering a two-player game G in which two players P₁ and P₂ are allowed to select policies within action spaces Γ‎₁ and Γ‎₂, respectively. Each player wants to minimize their own outcome, and does not care about the outcome of the other player. The chapter proceeds by discussing the security policy and Nash equilibrium for two-player non-zero-sum games, bimatrix games, admissible Nash equilibrium, and mixed policy. It also explores the order interchangeability property for Nash equilibria in best-response equivalent games before concluding with practice exercises and their corresponding solutions, along with additional exercises.


2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (04) ◽  
pp. 1450012 ◽  
Author(s):  
RABIA NESSAH ◽  
MOUSSA LARBANI

In this paper, we investigate the existence of Berge–Zhukovskii equilibrium in general normal form games. We characterize its existence via the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium of some n-person subgame derived of the initial game. The significance of the obtained results is illustrated by two applications. One in economy with environmental externalities and the other in oligopoly markets.


Author(s):  
A. V. Crewe

We have become accustomed to differentiating between the scanning microscope and the conventional transmission microscope according to the resolving power which the two instruments offer. The conventional microscope is capable of a point resolution of a few angstroms and line resolutions of periodic objects of about 1Å. On the other hand, the scanning microscope, in its normal form, is not ordinarily capable of a point resolution better than 100Å. Upon examining reasons for the 100Å limitation, it becomes clear that this is based more on tradition than reason, and in particular, it is a condition imposed upon the microscope by adherence to thermal sources of electrons.


Author(s):  
Shahriar Aslani ◽  
Patrick Bernard

Abstract In the study of Hamiltonian systems on cotangent bundles, it is natural to perturb Hamiltonians by adding potentials (functions depending only on the base point). This led to the definition of Mañé genericity [ 8]: a property is generic if, given a Hamiltonian $H$, the set of potentials $g$ such that $H+g$ satisfies the property is generic. This notion is mostly used in the context of Hamiltonians that are convex in $p$, in the sense that $\partial ^2_{pp} H$ is positive definite at each point. We will also restrict our study to this situation. There is a close relation between perturbations of Hamiltonians by a small additive potential and perturbations by a positive factor close to one. Indeed, the Hamiltonians $H+g$ and $H/(1-g)$ have the same level one energy surface, hence their dynamics on this energy surface are reparametrisation of each other, this is the Maupertuis principle. This remark is particularly relevant when $H$ is homogeneous in the fibers (which corresponds to Finsler metrics) or even fiberwise quadratic (which corresponds to Riemannian metrics). In these cases, perturbations by potentials of the Hamiltonian correspond, up to parametrisation, to conformal perturbations of the metric. One of the widely studied aspects is to understand to what extent the return map associated to a periodic orbit can be modified by a small perturbation. This kind of question depends strongly on the context in which they are posed. Some of the most studied contexts are, in increasing order of difficulty, perturbations of general vector fields, perturbations of Hamiltonian systems inside the class of Hamiltonian systems, perturbations of Riemannian metrics inside the class of Riemannian metrics, and Mañé perturbations of convex Hamiltonians. It is for example well known that each vector field can be perturbed to a vector field with only hyperbolic periodic orbits, this is part of the Kupka–Smale Theorem, see [ 5, 13] (the other part of the Kupka–Smale Theorem states that the stable and unstable manifolds intersect transversally; it has also been studied in the various settings mentioned above but will not be discussed here). In the context of Hamiltonian vector fields, the statement has to be weakened, but it remains true that each Hamiltonian can be perturbed to a Hamiltonian with only non-degenerate periodic orbits (including the iterated ones), see [ 11, 12]. The same result is true in the context of Riemannian metrics: every Riemannian metric can be perturbed to a Riemannian metric with only non-degenerate closed geodesics, this is the bumpy metric theorem, see [ 1, 2, 4]. The question was investigated only much more recently in the context of Mañé perturbations of convex Hamiltonians, see [ 9, 10]. It is proved in [ 10] that the same result holds: if $H$ is a convex Hamiltonian and $a$ is a regular value of $H$, then there exist arbitrarily small potentials $g$ such that all periodic orbits (including iterated ones) of $H+g$ at energy $a$ are non-degenerate. The proof given in [ 10] is actually rather similar to the ones given in papers on the perturbations of Riemannian metrics. In all these proofs, it is very useful to work in appropriate coordinates around an orbit segment. In the Riemannian case, one can use the so-called Fermi coordinates. In the Hamiltonian case, appropriate coordinates are considered in [ 10,Lemma 3.1] itself taken from [ 3, Lemma C.1]. However, as we shall detail below, the proof of this Lemma in [ 3], Appendix C, is incomplete, and the statement itself is actually wrong. Our goal in the present paper is to state and prove a corrected version of this normal form Lemma. Our proof is different from the one outlined in [ 3], Appendix C. In particular, it is purely Hamiltonian and does not rest on the results of [ 7] on Finsler metrics, as [ 3] did. Although our normal form is weaker than the one claimed in [ 10], it is actually sufficient to prove the main results of [ 6, 10], as we shall explain after the statement of Theorem 1, and probably also of the other works using [ 3, Lemma C.1].


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-38
Author(s):  
Will Smiley

This Article addresses and critiques the case for state-level legislative bans on courts citing “Islamic law” or the law of Muslim-majority countries. In particular, the Article reviews the most substantive evidence adduced by the bans’ supporters, in the form of a set of state court cases published by the Center for Security Policy (CSP). Very few of these cases, in fact, show courts actually applying Islamic or foreign law, and in none of these cases would the various forms of proposed legislation have been likely to alter the result. Thus even this report does not suggest a need for the state laws purporting to ban sharīʿa. The Article thus argues that even if these bans are not unconstitutionally discriminatory in their effect, they are ineffective at achieving their claimed purpose. This Article was originally published as an Occasional Paper in the Harvard Papers in Islamic Law series in 2018.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. e1008217
Author(s):  
Yohsuke Murase ◽  
Seung Ki Baek

Repeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash equilibrium is to find a ‘friendly-rivalry’ strategy, which aims at full cooperation but never allows the co-players to be better off. Recently it has been shown that for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in the presence of error, a friendly rival can be designed with the following five rules: Cooperate if everyone did, accept punishment for your own mistake, punish defection, recover cooperation if you find a chance, and defect in all the other circumstances. In this work, we construct such a friendly-rivalry strategy for the iterated n-person public-goods game by generalizing those five rules. The resulting strategy makes a decision with referring to the previous m = 2n − 1 rounds. A friendly-rivalry strategy for n = 2 inherently has evolutionary robustness in the sense that no mutant strategy has higher fixation probability in this population than that of a neutral mutant. Our evolutionary simulation indeed shows excellent performance of the proposed strategy in a broad range of environmental conditions when n = 2 and 3.


Author(s):  
João P. Hespanha

This chapter explores the concept of mixed policies and how the notions for pure policies can be adapted to this more general type of policies. A pure policy consists of choices of particular actions (perhaps based on some observation), whereas a mixed policy involves choosing a probability distribution to select actions (perhaps as a function of observations). The idea behind mixed policies is that the players select their actions randomly according to a previously selected probability distribution. The chapter first considers the rock-paper-scissors game as an example of mixed policy before discussing mixed action spaces, mixed security policy and saddle-point equilibrium, mixed saddle-point equilibrium vs. average security levels, and general zero-sum games. It concludes with practice exercises with corresponding solutions and an additional exercise.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (02) ◽  
pp. 1940011
Author(s):  
Thomas A. Weber

To quantify a player’s commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a “canonical extension,” which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment measure relates to the average overall adjustment probabilities for which the given Nash equilibrium can be implemented as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the canonical extension.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (07) ◽  
pp. 2050043
Author(s):  
MAXIM BICHUCH ◽  
KE CHEN

In a crisis, when faced with insolvency, banks can sell stock in a dilutive offering in the stock market and borrow money in order to raise funds. We propose a simple model to find the maximum amount of new funds the banks can raise in these ways. To do this, we incorporate market confidence of the bank together with market confidence of all the other banks in the system into the overnight borrowing rate. Additionally, for a given cash shortfall, we find the optimal mix of borrowing and stock selling strategy. We show the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium point for all these problems. Finally, using this model we investigate if banks have become safer since the crisis. We calibrate this model with market data and conduct an empirical study to assess safety of the financial system before, during after the last financial crisis.


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