scholarly journals 'I have a patent lawyer on my payroll': Intellect v intellectual property rights- battle over the cultural commons

2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-88
Author(s):  
James Arvanitakis
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Cultural Sphere ◽  
The Public Sphere ◽  
Cultural Commons

Over the last 20-years, markets come to dominate the way 'resources' are managed. The expansion of the market doctrine has at its core the belief that the apporpiate private property rights are the best way to promote innovation and protect freedoms. The scramble over the private property rights is now well entrenched in the intellectual property arena, with countless examples of patents entering areas that once seemed inconceivable. Thi article moves from Bollier's (2002) disucssion of the concept to argue that intellect, rather than being commodity that is promoted by private property rights is rather a commons— specifically a 'cultural commons'. As such, the process of commodification turn intellect into intellectual property—limiting availability. As a commons, if intellect is to be prmoted, it must be open and shared in the public sphere. In contrast to the ongoing commodification of all aspects of life, social movements and academics are begining to rediscover the commons. This rediscovery now takes the battle between the dominant forces of free market fundamentalism and those who oppose them, into the cultural sphere.

The Law and Economics Analysis of Intellectual Property: Paradigmatic Shift From Incentives to Traditional Property

2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eli M. Salzberger
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Physical Property ◽  
Microeconomic Theory ◽  
General Notion ◽  
Technological Revolution ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Commons

This paper focuses on the normative analysis of intellectual property rights, in light of the technological revolution of the Internet and accompanying technologies. After a brief overview of the various philosophical justifications for awarding intellectual property rights, it identifies two major Law and Economics paradigms for the analysis of intellectual property: the incentives paradigm, which is founded upon the public goods analysis of neo-classical microeconomic theory, and the tragedy of the commons literature, which is based on the economic analysis of externalities. The paper raises several points of critique towards both frameworks of analysis and especially towards their inability to point to the desirable extent of intellectual property rights (IPR) and the direction of their reform required as the result of the recent technological revolution. It further criticizes the dominant contemporary Law and Economics writings in this field as shifting to a new proprietary paradigm that pre-assumes information to be an object of property, overlooking its fundamental differences from physical property and focusing on its management rather than on its initial justifications. The paper is concluded with some tentative thoughts on the general notion of “Property Rights” in light of the contemporary approach concerning intellectual property.

Spectrum anarchy: why self-governance of the radio spectrum works better than we think

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 863-882 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pedro Bustamante ◽  
Marcela Gomez ◽  
Ilia Murtazashvili ◽  
Martin Weiss
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Spectrum Sharing ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Radio Spectrum ◽  
Federal Communications Commission ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Enforcement Mechanisms

AbstractThe exploitation of radio-electric spectrum bands for wireless transmission purposes has some features of the commons: it is subject to congestion and conflict without rules governing its use. The Coasean approach is to assign private property rights to overcome the tragedy of the spectrum commons. The process of assigning these rights is still centralized, with governments assigning property rights through agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission and National Telecommunications and Information Administration in the USA. We consider the possibility of self-governance of the spectrum. We use insights from the study of common pool resources governance to analyze the emergence of property rights to spectrum in a ‘government-less’ environment in which norms, rules, and enforcement mechanisms are solely the product of the repeated interactions among participants in the network. Our case study considers the spectrum-sharing arrangement in the 1,695–1,710 MHz band. Using agent-based modeling (ABM), we show that self-governance of the spectrum can work and under what conditions it is likely to improve the efficiency of the allocation of property rights.

scholarly journals Tropical Deforestation: Can Property Rights Stem the Tide?

SURG Journal ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-54
Author(s):  
Daniel Bayley
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Tropical Forests ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Tropical Deforestation ◽  
Private Ownership ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Effective Form ◽  
Tropical Forest Management ◽  
Market Environmentalism

In this report the property right structures surrounding tropical forest management are analyzed with a specific case study presented on tropical forests in Honduras. In order to adequately understand the set of property rights in place surrounding tropical forests, the applicable sets of property rights are laid out and explained (private, common, state, and open access). It is argued that the current property rights regimes in place surrounding tropical forests are inadequate and are the issue leading to high levels of deforestation. Conflicts and controversies surrounding the issue are presented for a counterargument and separate view of the issue. It was found that the current property rights regime in Honduras is inadequate for effective resource management as it lacks enforceability along with structure and is the prominent issue surrounding tropical deforestation. Private property rights were the most effective form of property rights found for maintaining natural resources, and it is therefore recommended that private ownership be instilled upon tropical forests to reduce the rate of deforestation. Free Market Environmentalism (FME) is offered as a solution to the current methodology for the management of tropical forests, as it advocates for private ownership and an enforceable set of rights. Therefore, it is recommended that a private property rights regime following the FME methodology replace existing state property rights in order to stem the tide of tropical deforestation.

Contesting Privatization: NGOs and Farmers' Rights in the African Model Law

2007 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noah Zerbe
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Focal Point ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Food And Agriculture ◽  
Food And Agriculture Organization ◽  
African Experience ◽  
Model Law

The development of the concept of farmers' rights in the Food and Agriculture Organization, and its adoption by the African Union as a counterbalance to the private property rights of plant breeders, highlights the divisiveness of the question of ownership in biodiversity and biotechnology. This article examines the development of the African Model Law, a regional regime intended to promote indigenous control over local biodiversity. The principal argument is that key nongovernmental organizations were able to draw on African efforts and concerns regarding conceptions of private property rights embodied in international agreements, framing the question of farmers' rights in a way that spoke to the African experience. Farmers' rights thus came to be a focal point for African negotiators at international discussions on intellectual property rights and biodiversity, enabling Africa to take a key role in the articulation of alternatives to the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement.

Property-Rights Regimes over Biological Resources

10.1068/c13s ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 651-664 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Cullet
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Biodiversity Management ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Environmentally Sustainable ◽  
Biological Resources ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
International Instruments ◽  
And Control

The increasing economic importance of biological resources and, in particular, knowledge related to these resources, has made the allocation of property rights one of the most contentious issues in the debate concerning biodiversity management at the international level. The author surveys the different property-rights regimes developed to regulate access to and control over biological resources, and the relevant international instruments and institutions. He argues that the overemphasis on private property rights regimes, in particular monopoly intellectual property rights such as patents, has been inimical to the sustainable management of biological resources at local and international levels. He suggests ways to allocate property rights so as to promote forms of biodiversity management that are both socially equitable and environmentally sustainable, and analyses some of the recent developments concerning alternative forms of intellectual-property protection.

Inclusion and Representation: The Settlement of Property Claims of the Dispossessed in the Aftermath of an Armed Conflict

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 397-425
Author(s):  
Tamar Megiddo ◽  
Eyal Benvenisti
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
The Public ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Property Owners ◽  
The Government

AbstractThis Article examines the authority of states to settle individual private property claims in post–conflict negotiations towards settlement. We analyze this question by exploring the limits of states’ authority to take or limit private property rights for the public good. We argue that this authority rests on two cumulative justifications: the inclusion of the property owners among the public that stands to benefit from the public good, and their representation by the government that decides on the taking of the property. In post–conflict settlement, the negotiating states may redistribute both private property and the public good between and within their respective communities. Their authority to redistribute continues to rests on the same justifications of inclusion and representation. Hence, their authority extends only to the redistribution of property of owners who are members of the respective communities that negotiate the agreement, and who are represented by a negotiating government.

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