Private property rights and the public good

2016 ◽  
pp. 48-81
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 397-425
Author(s):  
Tamar Megiddo ◽  
Eyal Benvenisti

AbstractThis Article examines the authority of states to settle individual private property claims in post–conflict negotiations towards settlement. We analyze this question by exploring the limits of states’ authority to take or limit private property rights for the public good. We argue that this authority rests on two cumulative justifications: the inclusion of the property owners among the public that stands to benefit from the public good, and their representation by the government that decides on the taking of the property. In post–conflict settlement, the negotiating states may redistribute both private property and the public good between and within their respective communities. Their authority to redistribute continues to rests on the same justifications of inclusion and representation. Hence, their authority extends only to the redistribution of property of owners who are members of the respective communities that negotiate the agreement, and who are represented by a negotiating government.


Google Rules ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 65-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanne Elizabeth Gray

This chapter provides an examination of Google’s US copyright case law, covering disputes over Google’s use, without permission, of copyrighted content in Google Search, Google Images, Google Books, YouTube, and its phone operating system Android. When resolving Google’s copyright disputes, US courts have considered the public benefits of Google’s services and have exhibited a willingness to limit private property rights in favor of the public interest in accessing information and content. These decisions have legitimized Google’s activities, and they have gifted Google private gains that fuel its information empire.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meina Cai ◽  
Ilia Murtazashvili ◽  
Jennifer Murtazashvili

AbstractLegal reforms that improve the security of private property rights to land have characteristics of a public good with dispersed benefits. However, nothing ensures that the state will provide property protection as a public good. Some states provide property protection selectively to powerful groups. Others are unable to provide property protection. In this paper, we argue that whether the state provides property protection as a public good, selectively, or cannot establish private property rights depends on the following features of politics: political stability, government capacity to administer and enforce private property rights, constraints on political decision-makers, and the inclusivity of political and legal institutions. We illustrate the theory using evidence from reforms that increased opportunities to privately own land in the US from the late eighteenth through nineteenth centuries, selective enforcement of land property rights in China, and the absence of credible legal rights to land in Afghanistan.


2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-94
Author(s):  
Andrew P. Morriss

Modern discussions of natural resources focus on increasing public control over extractive industries proposing measures that range from increasing the public's share of the gain via royalties and taxes to regulating extractive activities to prevent environmental problems to outright expropriation of private investments. This article argues that such efforts are counterproductive because the fundamental economic problem of natural resources is producing the knowledge necessary to locate and extract resource deposits. The public benefit comes from enabling the use of the resources and the increased economic activity their discovery produces rather than from royalties or expropriation. The key question in designing natural resource laws is thus their effects on the incentive to discover and manage resources. Private property rights in natural resources are the best way to provide such incentives. Fortunately, the combination of property rights and tort law principles (trespass and nuisance) enables property rights to solve environmental problems related to natural resource extraction as well.


1989 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 173-190
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Clerico

Abstract Because of the market failures private property rights not always are such to obtain socially acceptable outcomes through the exchange. To guarantee social welfare the policy maker usually limits the property rights. Such limitations concern: the existence of the private property rights in itself; the right of transferring and exchanging the above mentioned; the right of discretionary use of the private property.The restrictions to private property rights are motivated by efficiency and equity. On the efficiency side the public policy can be set up by three reasons: presence of externalities; existence of imperfect information; difficulties to coordinate economic activity and exchange.Efficiency and equity are obviously affected by any restriction of the property rights. We face the fact that often the equity aim is not a universal aim but instead a particular one restricted to some social group. On the equity side public policy claims its right to intervene particularly when the right holder earns pure profits limitative of the consumer welfare and exploits his market power.Any restriction to private property rights is either a source of benefits for people not paying the relative cost or a cause of cost for people not enjoying any benefit. Ideally it would be necessary either to levy a tax or to give a subsidy in order to bring back the initial welfare conditions. This rarely happens above all because of tangled effects and transaction costs.


2016 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brightman Gebremichael

AbstractExpropriation of private land rights involves two contradictory interests: there is a public need for land; and landholders expect security of tenure and protection of their private property rights. A satisfactory expropriation policy must strike a balance between these interests. Legislation must therefore only authorize the government to expropriate land rights for a clear and limited public purpose under the supervision of an independent body. The author argues that Ethiopia's rural land laws have defined the public purpose for the expropriation of rural land rights in different ways depending on the nature of the landholders. For peasants and pastoralists the public purpose requirement is defined vaguely and broadly, whereas for investors the concept is limited to projects implemented by government. The author argues that the protection of private property rights and security of tenure are further undermined by a legislative failure to authorize affected people to appeal to an independent body on the basis that the public purpose requirement has not been satisfied.


2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-88
Author(s):  
James Arvanitakis

Over the last 20-years, markets come to dominate the way 'resources' are managed. The expansion of the market doctrine has at its core the belief that the apporpiate private property rights are the best way to promote innovation and protect freedoms. The scramble over the private property rights is now well entrenched in the intellectual property arena, with countless examples of patents entering areas that once seemed inconceivable. Thi article moves from Bollier's (2002) disucssion of the concept to argue that intellect, rather than being commodity that is promoted by private property rights is rather a commons— specifically a 'cultural commons'. As such, the process of commodification turn intellect into intellectual property—limiting availability. As a commons, if intellect is to be prmoted, it must be open and shared in the public sphere. In contrast to the ongoing commodification of all aspects of life, social movements and academics are begining to rediscover the commons. This rediscovery now takes the battle between the dominant forces of free market fundamentalism and those who oppose them, into the cultural sphere.


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