scholarly journals Zagzebski, Authority, and Faith

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 47-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trent Dougherty
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
Epistemic Authority ◽  
Religious Epistemology ◽  
The Face ◽  
Mature Work ◽  
High Octane

Epistemic Authority is a mature work of a leading epistemologist and philosopher of religion (and metaphysician, too, but that character doesn’t feature in this story). It is a work primarily in epistemology with applications to religious epistemology. There are obvious applications of the notion of epistemic authority to philosophy of religion. For, on the face of it, the notion of some kind of ‘epistemic authority’ may serve as a conceptual anchor for our understanding of faith. Indeed, there is ample historical precedent for this. Faith, says Locke, is ‘the assent to any proposition ... upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication’. 1 In later Lockeans, ‘credit’ is often rendered ‘authority’, and the terms were used synonymously at the time of his writing. 2 One of the beauties of Locke’s view is its reductionism, that is, it’s parsimony, which is a species of elegance and therefore beauty. Zagzebski’s notion is more high-octane than Locke’s. In this essay I will do four things. In Section 1 I will describe two kinds or notions of authority or at least two usages of the word ‘authority’. In Section 2 I will describe Zagzebski’s use of one of these notions, the non-Lockean one, to ground the reasonableness of religious belief. In Section 3 I will give four arguments against her view. In section 4 I will reply to her critique of Locke. The upshot, in my view, is that though we learn much (very much indeed) from Epistemic Authority (about both testimony in general and religious testimony in particular among many other things), a more Lockean approach to the nature of faith is still preferable.

scholarly journals Reidianism in Contemporary English-Speaking Religious Epistemology

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-284
Author(s):  
Peter Byrne
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
Scottish Enlightenment ◽  
Religious Epistemology ◽  
Specific Topic ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
English Speaking

This paper explores the main contours of recent work in English-speaking philosophy of religion on the justi cation of religious belief. It sets out the main characteristics of the religious epistemologies of such writers as Alston, Plantinga, and Swinburne. It poses and seeks to answer the question of how far any or all of these epistemologies are indebted or similar to the epistemology of the Scottish enlightenment thinker Thomas Reid. It concludes that while there are some links to Reid in recent writing, contemporary approaches depart from Reid’s views on the specific topic of the justification of religious belief. 

Knowledge, Belief, and God

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
Formal Epistemology ◽  
Religious Epistemology ◽  
World Religion ◽  
Fertile Period ◽  
New Developments ◽  
The World ◽  
New Ideas

Recent decades have seen a fertile period of theorizing within mainstream epistemology which has had a dramatic impact on how epistemology is done. Investigations into contextualist and pragmatic dimensions of knowledge suggest radically new ways of meeting skeptical challenges and of understanding the relation between the epistemological and practical environment. New insights from social epistemology and formal epistemology about defeat, testimony, a priority, probability, and the nature of evidence all have a potentially revolutionary effect on how we understand our epistemological place in the world. Religion is the place where such rethinking can potentially have its deepest impact and importance. Yet there has been surprisingly little infiltration of these new ideas into philosophy of religion and the epistemology of religious belief. The present volume incorporates these myriad new developments in mainstream epistemology, and extends these developments to questions and arguments in religious epistemology. The investigations proposed in this volume offer substantial new life, breadth, and sophistication to issues in the philosophy of religion and analytic theology. They pose original questions and shed new light on long-standing issues in religious epistemology; and these developments will in turn generate contributions to epistemology itself, since religious belief provides a vital testing ground for recent epistemological ideas.

How rational is rational theology? A reply to Mikael Stenmark

1999 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-97
Author(s):  
VINCENT BRÜMMER
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Essential Role ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
Language Game ◽  
Religious Language ◽  
Rational Theology ◽  
Truth Claims

In this response to Stenmark's critique of my views on rational theology, I concentrate on his distinction between the epistemic and the practical goals of religion and between descriptive and normative rational theology. With regard to the first distinction, I grant that truth claims play an essential role in religious belief and that it is indeed the task of philosophy of religion to decide on the meaning and rationality of such claims. I argue, however, that since such claims are internally related to the practical context of religious belief, their meaning and rationality cannot be determined apart from this context as is done in the kind of rational theology which Stenmark calls ‘scientific’. With regard to the second distinction, I reject Stenmark's view that philosophy of religion has a descriptive task with reference to religion, and hence also his claim that I have put forward a false description of ‘the religious language game’.

Deep Structure and the Comparative Philosophy of Religion

1992 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-399
Author(s):  
Michael P. Levine
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Comparative Philosophy ◽  
Deep Structure ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
Moral Reason ◽  
Religious Thought

Through various applications of the ‘deep structure’ of moral and religious reasoning, I have sought to illustrate the value of a morally informed approach in helping us to understand the complexity of religious thought and practice…religions are primarily moved by rational moral concerns and…ethical theory provides the single most powerful methodology for understanding religious belief. Ronald Green, Religion and Moral Reason

The Virtues Needed by Experts in Action

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 142-157
Author(s):  
Andrea Lavazza ◽  
Mirko Farina ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Public Policies ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Social Contexts ◽  
Epistemic Authority ◽  
Relational Autonomy ◽  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
The Face ◽  
Specialist Knowledge

The current Covid-19 pandemic is illustrative of both the need of more experts and of the difficulties that can arise in the face of their decisions. This happens, we argue, because experts usually interact with society through a strongly naturalistic framework, which often places experts’ epistemic authority (understood as neutrality and objectivity) at the centre, sometimes at the expenses of other pluralistic values (such as axiological ones) that people (often non-experts) cherish. In this paper, we argue that we need to supplement such a strong naturalistic framework used to promote epistemic authority with a number of virtues -both intellectual and ethical- which include i. intellectual humility, ii. courage, iii. wisdom and cares, as well as iv. relational autonomy. To illustrate this claim, we discuss these ideas in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic and analyse a set of real-life examples where important decisions have been delegated to experts merely based on their epistemic authority. We use the illustrative failures described in the case studies above-mentioned to call for a revision of current understandings of expertise (merely based on epistemic soundness). Specifically, we argue that in social contexts we increasingly need “experts in action”; that is, people with certified specialist knowledge, who can however translate it into practical suggestions, decisions, and/or public policies that are ethically more balanced and that ultimately lead to fairer, more inclusive, and more representative decisions.

In defence of a contented religious exclusivism

2000 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 401-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
JEROME GELLMAN
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Religious Diversity ◽  
John Hick ◽  
The Face

In this paper I defend the possibility that a ‘contented religious exclusivist’, will be fully rational and not neglectful of any of her epistemic duties when faced with the world’s religious diversity. I present an epistemic strategy for reflecting on one's beliefs and then present two features of religious belief that make contented exclusivism a rational possibility. I then argue against the positions of John Hick, David Basinger, and Steven Wykstra on contented exclusivism, and criticize an overly optimistic conception of rationality. Finally, I describe a contented exclusivist who might very well not be fully rational in the face of religious diversity.

Religion, history of philosophy of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
William P. Alston
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
Critical Evaluation ◽  
Religious Tradition ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Attributes Of God

The philosophy of religion comprises any philosophical discussion of questions arising from religion. This has primarily consisted in the clarification and critical evaluation of fundamental beliefs and concepts from one or another religious tradition. Major issues of concern in the philosophy of religion include arguments for and against the existence of God, problems about the attributes of God, the problem of evil, and the epistemology of religious belief. Of arguments for the existence of God, the most prominent ones can be assigned to four types. First, cosmological arguments, which go back to Plato and Aristotle, explain the existence of the universe by reference to a being on whom all else depends for its existence. Second, teleological arguments seek to explain adaptation in the world, for example, the way organisms have structures adapted to their needs, by positing an intelligent designer of the world. Third, ontological arguments, first introduced by Anselm, focus on the concept of a perfect being and argue that it is incoherent to deny that such a being exists. Finally, moral arguments maintain that objective moral statuses, distinctions or principles presuppose a divine being as the locus of their objectivity. Discussions of the attributes of God have focused on omniscience and omnipotence. These raise various problems, for example, whether complete divine foreknowledge of human actions is compatible with human free will. Moreover, these attributes, together with God’s perfect goodness give rise to the problem of evil. If God is all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good, how can there be wickedness, suffering and other undesirable states of affairs in the world? This problem has been repeatedly discussed from ancient times to the present. The epistemology of religious belief has to do with the questions of what is the proper approach to the assessment of religious belief (for rationality, justification, or whatever) and with the carrying out of such assessments. Much of the discussion has turned on the contrast between the roles of human reason and God’s revelation to us. A variety of views have been held on this. Many, such as Aquinas, have tried to forge a synthesis of the two; Kant and his followers have sought to ground religion solely on reason; others, most notably Kierkegaard, have held that the subjecting of religious belief to rational scrutiny is subversive of true religious faith. Recently, a group of ‘Reformed epistemologists’ (so-called because of the heavy influence of the Reformed theology of Calvin and his followers on their thinking) has attacked ‘evidentialism’ and has argued that religious beliefs can be rationally justified even if one has no reasons or evidence for them.

Religion

2019 ◽  
pp. 213-294
Author(s):  
Adrian Bardon
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Motivated Cognition ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Religious Texts ◽  
Religious Ideology ◽  
Literal Truth ◽  
The Face ◽  
Sensus Divinitatis

This chapter critically examines key historical and contemporary justifications for religious literalism. Reasons to believe in the literal truth of certain religious texts are divided into historical and contemporary evidence of miracles, the sensus divinitatis (or sense of God), and cosmological and teleological “proofs” of the existence of God. It finds that literalist religious belief is the product of motivated cognition, and can only be sustained by rationalization and denial. It further investigates ideas about how religious ideology may have originated, as well as how religious literalism can persist in the face of scientific advancements and cosmopolitan knowledge of other cultures.

Conspiracy Theories and Religion: Reframing Conspiracy Theories as Bliks

Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glenn Y. Bezalel
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Conspiracy Theories ◽  
Recent Scholarship ◽  
Area Of Study

Abstract Conspiracy theories have largely been framed by the academy as a stigmatised form of knowledge. Yet recent scholarship has included calls to take conspiracy theories more seriously as an area of study with a desire to judge them on their own merits rather than an a priori dismissal of them as a class of explanation. This paper argues that the debates within the philosophy of religion, long overlooked by scholars of conspiracy theories, can help sow the seeds for re-examining our understanding of conspiracy theories in a more balanced and nuanced way. The nature of religious belief is elemental to understanding the epistemological foundations of the conspiracy theorising worldview amidst what we may call ‘conspiratorial ambiguity’. Specifically, R.M. Hare's concept of bliks, which are unfalsifiable but meaningful worldviews, offers a way forward to reframe our approach towards the theory of conspiracy theories.

The Human Face of Naturalism: Putnam and Diamond on Religious Belief and the “Gulfs between Us”

The Monist ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 103 (4) ◽  
pp. 404-414
Author(s):  
Sofia Miguens
Keyword(s):  
Religious Experience ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Human Face ◽  
Ethical Life ◽  
Cora Diamond

Abstract Hilary Putnam and Cora Diamond both wrote on Wittgenstein’s Three Lectures on Religious Belief. They did it quite differently; my ultimate aim in this article is to explore this difference. Putnam’s view of religion is largely a view of ethical life; I look thus into his writings on ethics and his proposals to face the relativist menace therein. Still, in his incursions into philosophy of religion, describing religious experience through authors such as Rosenzweig, Buber, or Levinas, Putnam deals with what Diamond calls, after Wittgenstein, “the gulfs between us.” Such gulfs, and the threat of relativism they bring, need to be accounted for. With that purpose in mind I complement Putnam’s reading of the Three Lectures with Diamond’s own reading.

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