Effects of Different Payoff Matrices on Arithmetical Estimation Tasks: An Attempt to Produce “Rationality”

1969 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 467-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Israel Lieblich ◽  
Amia Lieblich
Keyword(s):  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Decision Time ◽  
Forced Choice ◽  
Estimation Task ◽  
Payoff Matrices

5 experiments were conducted in an attempt to produce a shift in the decision pattern in a forced-choice arithmetical estimation task. The expected shift was related to a change in the payoff matrix attached to the possible outcomes of the decision. The experiments varied in the amount of payoff, clarity of the explanation of the payoff matrix, difficulty of the task, feedback after decision and the length of decision time. None of these manipulations produced the expected rational shift. The role of payoff matrices in decisions in tasks involving skill is discussed.

scholarly journals Optimistic amnesia: how online and offline processing shape belief updating and memory biases in immediate and long-term optimism biases

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ziqing Yao ◽  
Xuanyi Lin ◽  
Xiaoqing Hu
Keyword(s):  
Active Role ◽  
Prior Beliefs ◽  
Belief Updating ◽  
Estimation Task ◽  
Memory Biases ◽  
Brain Potentials ◽  
Adverse Life Event ◽  
Offline Processing

Abstract When people are confronted with feedback that counters their prior beliefs, they preferentially rely on desirable rather than undesirable feedback in belief updating, i.e. an optimism bias. In two pre-registered EEG studies employing an adverse life event probability estimation task, we investigated the neurocognitive processes that support the formation and the change of optimism biases in immediate and 24 h delayed tests. We found that optimistic belief updating biases not only emerged immediately but also became significantly larger after 24 h, suggesting an active role of valence-dependent offline consolidation processes in the change of optimism biases. Participants also showed optimistic memory biases: they were less accurate in remembering undesirable than desirable feedback probabilities, with inferior memories of undesirable feedback associated with lower belief updating in the delayed test. Examining event-related brain potentials (ERPs) revealed that desirability of feedback biased initial encoding: desirable feedback elicited larger P300s than undesirable feedback, with larger P300 amplitudes predicting both higher belief updating and memory accuracies. These results suggest that desirability of feedback could bias both online and offline memory-related processes such as encoding and consolidation, with both processes contributing to the formation and change of optimism biases.

ERP correlates of the decision time-IQ relationship: The role of complexity in task- and brain-IQ effects

Intelligence ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 65 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Euler ◽  
Ty L. McKinney ◽  
Hannah M. Schryver ◽  
Hidefusa Okabe
Keyword(s):  
Decision Time

scholarly journals Revisiting the role of recollection in item versus forced-choice recognition memory

2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 720-725 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel I. Cook ◽  
Richard L. Marsh ◽  
Jason L. Hicks
Keyword(s):  
Recognition Memory ◽  
Forced Choice

scholarly journals Learning Optimal Strategies to Commit To

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 2149-2156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Binghui Peng ◽  
Weiran Shen ◽  
Pingzhong Tang ◽  
Song Zuo
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Prior Knowledge ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Full Information ◽  
The Past ◽  
Security Games ◽  
Payoff Matrices ◽  
Novel Algorithms

Over the past decades, various theories and algorithms have been developed under the framework of Stackelberg games and part of these innovations have been fielded under the scenarios of national security defenses and wildlife protections. However, one of the remaining difficulties in the literature is that most of theoretical works assume full information of the payoff matrices, while in applications, the leader often has no prior knowledge about the follower’s payoff matrix, but may gain information about the follower’s utility function through repeated interactions. In this paper, we study the problem of learning the optimal leader strategy in Stackelberg (security) games and develop novel algorithms as well as new hardness results.

scholarly journals Communication speeds up but impairs the consensus decision in a dyadic colour estimation task

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (7) ◽  
pp. 191974
Author(s):  
Liutao Yu ◽  
Chundi Wang ◽  
Si Wu ◽  
Da-Hui Wang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Group Decision ◽  
Daily Life ◽  
Consensus Formation ◽  
Exact Role ◽  
Estimation Task ◽  
Consensus Decision Making ◽  
Consensus Decision ◽  
Better Than

Communication plays an important role in consensus decision-making which pervades our daily life. However, the exact role of communication in consensus formation is not clear. Here, to study the effects of communication on consensus formation, we designed a dyadic colour estimation task, where a pair of isolated participants repeatedly estimated the colours of discs until they reached a consensus or completed eight estimations, either with or without communication. We show that participants’ estimates gradually approach each other, reaching towards a consensus, and these are enhanced with communication. We also show that dyadic consensus estimation is on average better than individual estimation. Surprisingly, consensus estimation without communication generally outperforms that with communication, indicating that communication impairs the improvement of consensus estimation. However, without communication, it takes longer to reach a consensus. Moreover, participants who partially cooperate with each other tend to result in better overall consensus. Taken together, we have identified the effect of communication on the dynamics of consensus formation, and the results may have implications on group decision-making in general.

scholarly journals Temporal experience modifies future thoughts: Manipulation of Libet’s W influences difficulty assessment during a decision-making task

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eve A. Isham
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Decision Time ◽  
List Type ◽  
Temporal Experience ◽  
Temporal Index ◽  
Perceived Difficulty ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Decision Difficulty

Past studies have employed the subjective experience of decision time (Libet’s W) as an index of consciousness, marking the moment at which the agent first becomes aware of a decision. In the current study, we examined whether the temporal experience of W affects subsequent experience related to the action. Specifically, we tested whether W influenced the perception of difficulty in a decision-making task, hypothesizing that temporal awareness of W might influence the sense of difficulty. Consistent with our predictions, when W was perceived as early or late, participants subsequently rated the decision difficulty to be easy or difficult, respectively (Exp.1). Further investigation showed that perceived difficulty, however, did not influence W (Exp.2). Together, our findings suggest a unidirectional relationship such that W plays a role in the metacognition of difficulty evaluation. The results imply that subjective temporal experience of decision time modifies the consequential sense of difficulty.HighlightsPerceived timing of decision (W) can bias the metacognition of difficulty evaluation in a decision-making task.Defined as a temporal index of consciousness, time W’s influence on difficulty evaluation reflects the possibility that the role of consciousness is to modify subsequent thoughts and behaviors.Explicit attention is necessary for the timing of decision (W) to be consciously experienced and effectively influential on subsequent thoughts.

scholarly journals ‘Grandpa’ or ‘opera’? Production and perception of unstressed /a/ and /əʁ/ in German

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Tamara Rathcke ◽  
Christine Mooshammer
Keyword(s):  
Forced Choice ◽  
Identification Task ◽  
The North ◽  
Minimal Pairs ◽  
Chance Performance ◽  
Prosodic Phrase ◽  
Male Speaker ◽  
Opera Production ◽  
Better Than

In the description of German phonology, two distinct phonetic symbols are currently recommended for the transcription of the vowels [a] (a central low vowel, phonemically /a/) and [ɐ] (phonemically /əʁ/) in word-final, unstressed positions. The present study examines whether differences between these two vowels exist in production and perception of Standard German speakers from the north of Germany. In Experiment 1, six speakers produced a series of minimal pairs that were embedded in meaningful sentences and varied with respect to their accentuation and position within a prosodic phrase. In Experiment 2, the minimal pairs produced by the six speakers of the first experiment were extracted from their respective contexts and tested with 44 native German listeners in a forced-choice identification task. Perceptual results showed a better-than-chance performance for one male speaker of the corpus only. Phonetic analyses also confirmed that only this male speaker produced subtle, but consistent F2/F3 differences between [a] and [ɐ] while the contrast was completely neutralised in the rest of the corpus. We discuss the role of prosody in vowel neutralisation with a specific focus on unstressed vowels and make suggestions for phonetic and phonological accounts of Standard German.

The role of decision criterion in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) false recognition memory: False memory falls and rises as a function of restriction on criterion setting

2018 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 499-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerwen Jou ◽  
Eric E. Escamilla ◽  
Mario L. Arredondo ◽  
Liann Pena ◽  
Richard Zuniga ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
False Memory ◽  
False Recognition ◽  
False Memories ◽  
Decision Criterion ◽  
Forced Choice ◽  
Choice Test ◽  
Critical Lure ◽  
Criterion Setting ◽  
Choice Restriction

How much of the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) false memory is attributable to decision criterion is so far a controversial issue. Previous studies typically used explicit warnings against accepting the critical lure to investigate this issue. The assumption is that if the false memory results from using a liberally biased criterion, it should be greatly reduced or eliminated by an explicit warning against accepting the critical lure. Results showed that warning was generally ineffective. We asked the question of whether subjects can substantially reduce false recognition without being warned when the test forces them to make a distinction between true and false memories. Using a two-alternative forced choice in which criterion plays a relatively smaller role, we showed that subjects could indeed greatly reduce the rate of false recognition. However, when the forced-choice restriction was removed from the two-item choice test, the rate of false recognition rebounded to that of the hit for studied list words, indicating the role of criterion in false recognition.

Searle vs. Searle on language, speech, and thought

2014 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 352-372
Author(s):  
Sanford Goldberg ◽  
Guiming Yang
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Speech Acts ◽  
Forced Choice ◽  
Linguistic Usage

Searle’s (1963/1991) account of the communicative intentions in speech acts purports to be an advance over that of Grice (1957), in acknowledging the ineliminable role of the linguistic (usage) rules in enabling the hearer to recognize the speaker’s communicative intentions. In this paper we argue that, given some plausible assumptions about ordinary speech exchanges, Searle’s insight on this score is incompatible with his (1983) commitment to internalism in the philosophy of mind. As a result, Searle cannot have it both ways: either he must give up his core insight regarding the ineliminable role of linguistic (usage) rules in the hearer’s recognition of a speaker’s communicative intentions, or he must give up his commitment to internalism the philosophy of mind. We conclude by arguing that this lesson is generic: the forced choice is one that all theorists must face, insofar as we theorize about the role of language in the communication of thought through speech.

Role of Surprise in the Discrimination of the Facial Expression of Fear

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Gordillo ◽  
Lilia Mestas ◽  
Miguel Ángel Pérez ◽  
José M. Arana ◽  
Eduardo Alejandro Escotto
Keyword(s):  
Facial Expression ◽  
Reaction Times ◽  
Forced Choice ◽  
Choice Test ◽  
Prime Duration ◽  
Neutral Expression

AbstractThe facilitating role of the facial expression of surprise in the discrimination of the facial expression of fear was analyzed. The sample consisted of 202 subjects that undertook a forced-choice test in which they had to decide as quickly as possible whether the facial expression displayed on-screen was one of fear, anger or happiness. Variations were made to the prime expression (neutral expression, or one of surprise); the target expression (facial expression of fear, anger or happiness), and the prime duration (50 ms, 150 ms or 250 ms). The results revealed shorter reaction times in the response to the expression of fear when the prime expression was one of surprise, with a prime duration of 50 ms (p = .009) and 150 ms (p = .001), compared to when the prime expression was a neutral one. By contrast, the reaction times were longer in the discrimination of an expression of fear when the prime expression was one of surprise with a prime duration of 250 ms (p < .0001), compared to when the prime expression was a neutral one. This pattern of results was obtained solely in the discrimination of the expression of fear. The discussion focuses on these findings and the possible functional continuity between surprise and fear.

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