War and Women in Jānis Streičs’ Films

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-70
Author(s):  
Inga Pērkone

Abstract This article is devoted to the theme of women and war in the films of Jānis Streičs, possibly the most influential Latvian film director. In the course of his career, which spanned nearly 50 years, Streičs made films that were popular in Latvia, as well as throughout the Soviet Union. He is one of the few Latvian film directors who managed to continue a comparatively stable career in the newly reindependent Republic of Latvia. Streičs skilfully used the canonised means of expression of classical cinema and superficially fulfilled the demands of socialist realism to provide appealing and life-asserting narratives for the audiences. Being a full-time film director at Riga Film Studio, and gradually becoming a master of the studio system, Jānis Streičs managed to subordinate the system to his own needs, outgrowing it and becoming an auteur with an idiosyncratic style and consistently developed topics.1 The most expressive elements of his visual style can be found in his war films, which are presented as women’s reflections on war. In this article, Streičs’ oeuvre in its entirety provides the background for an analysis of two of his innovative war films. Meetings on the Milky Way (Tikšanās uz Piena ceļa, Latvia, 1985) rejects the classical narrative structure, instead offering fragmentary war episodes that were united by two elements – the road and women. In Carmen Horrendum (Latvia, 1989) Streičs uses an even more complicated structure that combines reality, visions and dreams. After watching this film, the only conclusion we can come to with certainty is that war does not have a woman’s face and, in general, war has no traces of humanity. The aim of this article is to demonstrate how World War II, a theme stringently controlled by Soviet ideology, provided the impetus for a search for an innovative film language.

Jimmy Reid ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 159-192
Author(s):  
W.W.J. Knox ◽  
A. McKinlay

The chapter explores his vain attempts to be elected as a full-time national official of the AEU defeated by the right-wing of the union’s leadership. It also exposes the organisational deficiencies of Reid; a man capable of motivating and inspiring workers but unable to build a mass power base within the political or industrial arenas. It also discusses critically Reid’s narrative concerning the road to leaving the CPGB as well as the reception to his decision both within the media and among the party membership. We contend that international events such as the Prague invasion were secondary influences, rather we argue it was events nearer to home that were more influential. Thus, we discuss how the rejection of the concept of the revolutionary party by the CPGB in favour of broad-based parliamentary alliances narrowed the ideological chasm between communists and the Labour left. Indeed, the only issue dividing them was the continued support by the former for the Soviet Union; something that Reid had begun to reject. The other factor was his dissatisfaction with party democracy. Reid left in 1976 and joined the Labour Party two years later. Fast tracked by the left he stood as Labour candidate in 1979 in Dundee where he suffered the same fate as in 1974.


Author(s):  
Jessica M. Chapman

The origins of the Vietnam War can be traced to France’s colonization of Indochina in the late 1880s. The Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh, emerged as the dominant anti-colonial movement by the end of World War II, though Viet Minh leaders encountered difficulties as they tried to consolidate their power on the eve of the First Indochina War against France. While that war was, initially, a war of decolonization, it became a central battleground of the Cold War by 1950. The lines of future conflict were drawn that year when the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union recognized and provided aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hanoi, followed almost immediately by Washington’s recognition of the State of Vietnam in Saigon. From that point on, American involvement in Vietnam was most often explained in terms of the Domino Theory, articulated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower on the eve of the Geneva Conference of 1954. The Franco-Viet Minh ceasefire reached at Geneva divided Vietnam in two at the 17th parallel, with countrywide reunification elections slated for the summer of 1956. However, the United States and its client, Ngo Dinh Diem, refused to participate in talks preparatory to those elections, preferring instead to build South Vietnam as a non-communist bastion. While the Vietnamese communist party, known as the Vietnam Worker’s Party in Hanoi, initially hoped to reunify the country by peaceful means, it reached the conclusion by 1959 that violent revolution would be necessary to bring down the “American imperialists and their lackeys.” In 1960, the party formed the National Liberation Front for Vietnam and, following Diem’s assassination in 1963, passed a resolution to wage all-out war in the south in an effort to claim victory before the United States committed combat troops. After President John F. Kennedy took office in 1961, he responded to deteriorating conditions in South Vietnam by militarizing the American commitment, though he stopped short of introducing dedicated ground troops. After Diem and Kennedy were assassinated in quick succession in November 1963, Lyndon Baines Johnson took office determined to avoid defeat in Vietnam, but hoping to prevent the issue from interfering with his domestic political agenda. As the situation in South Vietnam became more dire, LBJ found himself unable to maintain the middle-of-the-road approach that Kennedy had pursued. Forced to choose between escalation and withdrawal, he chose the former in March 1965 by launching a sustained campaign of aerial bombardment, coupled with the introduction of the first officially designated U.S. combat forces to Vietnam.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 175-207
Author(s):  
Kirill Chunikhin

After World War II, Soviet institutions organized many exhibitions of the American artist Rockwell Kent that bypassed the U.S. government. Promotion of Kent's work in the USSR was an exclusively Soviet enterprise. This article sheds new light on the Soviet approach to the representation of U.S. visual art during the Cold War. Drawing on U.S. and Russian archives, the article provides a comprehensive analysis of the political and aesthetic factors that resulted in Kent's immense popularity in the Soviet Union. Contextualizing the Soviet representation of Kent within relevant Cold War contexts, the article shows that his art occupied a specific symbolic position in Soviet culture. Soviet propaganda reconceptualized his biography and established the “Myth of Rockwell Kent”—a myth that helped to legitimate Soviet ideology and anti-American propaganda.


Author(s):  
Mie Nakachi

In 1955 the Soviet Union re-legalized abortion on the basis of women’s rights. However, this fact is not widely known. In the absence of a feminist movement, how did the idea of women’s right to abortion emerge in an authoritarian society, more than a decade before it appeared in the West? The answer is found in the history of the Soviet politics of reproduction after World War II, a devastation in which 27 million Soviet soldiers and civilians perished. This enormous loss of predominantly adult males posed a threat to economic recovery. In order to replace the dead, the Soviet Union introduced the 1944 Family Law based on the proposal submitted by Nikita S. Khrushchev. This extreme pronatalist policy encouraged men to father out-of-wedlock children and celebrated “Mother Heroines.” However, Replacing the Dead argues that in the absence of serious commitment to supporting Soviet women who worked full-time, the policy actually did extensive collateral damage to gender relations and the welfare of women and children. Replacing the Dead finds the origin of the movement to improve women’s reproductive environment in postwar social critique arising from women and Soviet professionals. Neither Stalin nor Khrushchev allowed any major reform, but the movement did not die out. With re-legalization and lack of contraception, an abortion culture grew among Soviet women. The model of socialist reproduction continues to set socialist and postsocialist countries apart. This history is a cautionary tale for today’s Russia, as well as other countries that attempt to promote a higher birth rate.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Mie Nakachi

In 1955 the Soviet Union became the first country in the world to legalize abortion on the principle of women’s rights. This was the result of the postwar politics of reproduction. The socialist ideology of women and population, as well as prewar Soviet policy on family and marriage, provided important background. In the prewar period Soviet marriage had already become unstable, but it disintegrated further during World War II. Mobilization, evacuation, and warfare and genocide all played their role. This was the context in which policymakers introduced the extreme pronatalist policy that encouraged out-of-wedlock births while expecting women to work full time. The postwar history of Soviet reproductive politics and practice went beyond Russian and Soviet borders, spreading distinct socialist reproductive practices.


2021 ◽  
pp. 127-145
Author(s):  
Yurii Klymenko ◽  
Oleksandr Potiekhin

Abstract. The Russian Federation’s military aggression against Ukraine, preceded by the war of the Russian Federation against Georgia, raised the question of a joint repulse of democratic states to actions aimed at undermining European stability. The problem of protecting small and medium-sized states from the threat posed by Russia has arisen in a new way. In this context, the inability of leading European states to stop the aggression of Nazi Germany is repeatedly mentioned. To assess the relevance of such parallels with modernity, the authors of this article seek to briefly and objectively analyse what was happening in the 1930s. The threat of a military catastrophe and complete destabilisation of Europe had been growing since 1933, when Hitler came to power in Germany. He and his entourage gradually dragged Europe into a series of international conflicts and the World War II. According to the authors of the article, the leading motive for the inaction of Western powers within the military and political allied cooperation was not the desire to balance Germany’s military power and thus deter aggression but the attempt to avoid involvement in a world war by appeasing Hitler. In pursuit of European stability, France aimed to secure the military support of as wide a range of European countries as possible, and Great Britain was seeking to build a stable European system without making clear military commitments to the continental powers. London felt at peace with Berlin’s continental ambitions, as they did not cover the seas. London entertained the illusion that its security could be guaranteed without interfering in the war on the mainland. The authors emphasise that only in a state of conscious self-blindness could Western politicians for years retain the illusion of the prospect of civilising and taming the German dictator by satisfying his whims. Such illusions, however, never concerned Stalin. In the pre-war period, the Stalinist regime did its best to prevent the Soviet Union from being involved in building a system of collective security in Europe. The authors come to the following conclusion: in an effort to preserve at least the remnants of stability in Europe, the states have consistently moved towards continuous destabilization and war. Keywords: Europe, military and political union, World War II, Germany.


Author(s):  
Benjamin Tromly

During the height of the Cold War in the 1950s, the United States government unleashed covert operations intended to weaken the Soviet Union. As part of these efforts, the CIA undertook support of Russian exiles, populations uprooted either during World War II or by the Russian Revolution decades before. No one seemed better prepared to fight in the American secret war against communism than the uprooted Russians, whom the CIA directed to carry out propaganda, espionage, and subversion operations from their home base in West Germany. Yet the American engagement of Russian exiles had unpredictable outcomes. Drawing on recently declassified and previously untapped sources, Cold War Exiles and the CIA examines how the CIA’s Russian operations became entangled with the internal struggles of Russia abroad and also the espionage wars of the superpowers in divided Germany. What resulted was a transnational political sphere involving different groups of Russian exiles, American and German anti-communists, and spies operating on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Inadvertently, CIA’s patronage of Russian exiles forged a complex sub-front in the wider Cold War, demonstrating the ways in which the hostilities of the Cold War played out in ancillary conflicts involving proxies and non-state actors.


1983 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nisha Sahai-Achuthan

In this article the author studies the main trends in the evolution of modern Soviet Indology in the context of developments in Soviet Oriental studies and examines the extent to which both these were conditioned in turn by shifts in Soviet ideology. The development of Soviet Indology is further examined within the context of the organizational growth of the Institute of Oriental Studies (IVAN) and the evolving expertise of Soviet Indologists on contemporary India (along with a study of patterns in the academic training of these scholars). The author thus investigates both the intellectual and organizational bases contributing to the growth of Soviet Indology in an integrated and interconnected manner.


1999 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 537-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vally Koubi

Because of the nature of modern weapons, significant innovations in arms technology have the potential to induce dramatic changes in the international distribution of power. Consider, for example, the “strategic defense initiative” (SDI), a program initiated by the United States in the early 1980s. Had the program been successfully completed, it might have led to a substantial devaluation of Soviet nuclear capabilities and put the United States in a very dominant position. It should not then come as a surprise that interstate rivalry, especially among super powers, often takes the form of a race for technological superiority. Mary Acland-Hood claims that although the United States and the Soviet Union together accounted for roughly half of the world's military expenditures in the early 1980s, their share of world military research and development (R&D) expenditures was about 80 percent. As further proof of the perceived importance of R&D, note that whereas the overall U.S. defense budget increased by 38 percent (from $225.1 billion to $311.6 billion in real terms) from 1981 to 1987, military R&D spending increased by 100 percent (from $20.97 billion to $41.96 billion). Moreover, before World War II military R&D absorbed on average less than 1 percent of the military expenditure of major powers, but since then it has grown to 11–13 percent. The emphasis on military technology is bound to become more pronounced in the future as R&D becomes the main arena for interstate competition.


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