Epochê e Época no pensamento logotectónico

Phainomenon ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-128
Author(s):  
Marcus Brainard

Abstract This article deals with “epoch” and “epoché”, each of which plays a central role in Heribert Boeder’s thought. Because it understands itself as the building of rational wholes, or logoi, his thought - but also that which it builds - is termed the “logotectonic”. The first part of the article situates the logotectonic epoché in the phenomenological tradition, particularly with respect to its key manifestations in Husserl and Heidegger, while also setting it off from that tradition. It is shown to be not a method of access to consciousness, to say nothing of a withholding of Being, but rather a fundamental reticence on the part of the inquirer with respect to what has been thought. It is an exclusion of one’s idiosyncrasies in order to approach what has been thought in and on its own terms. It is this new epoché, and it atone, that gives access to the epoch in Boeder’s sense. Each of three epochs of philosophy is governed by a unique principle, which is given voice in the wisdom proper to that epoch atone and to which philosophy responds (either negatively or positively). The character of this response is the basis of Boeder’s claim that the history of philosophy is the “crisis of principles.” The principle of a given epoch determines the tasks to be accomplished by the philosophy of that epoch. Once the full range of tasks is completed, the epoch is concluded, making way for a new principle and thus a new epoch. The succession of epochs comes to an end, however - in Hegel. In view of this end, the article then takes up the subsequent “periods” of thought: modernity and submodernity; it seeks to show briefly how neither constitutes an epoch, but also how the end of submodernity coincides with the opening up of the possibility of rescuing wisdom from its oblivion and granting it a present that makes dwelling possible once again. This is precisely task that moves the logotect and, by extension, the logotectonic.

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 408-424
Author(s):  
Christopher Fear

Abstract R. G. Collingwood’s declaration that belief in “eternal questions” in philosophy is “merely a vulgar error, consequent on a kind of historical myopia which, deceived by superficial resemblances, failed to detect profound differences” has been vigorously discussed over the last sixty years, thanks partly to its resurrection by Quentin Skinner. But another of Collingwood’s provocative claims has been relatively neglected. If the claims and arguments of classic authors in the history of philosophy provide answers to questions that are not ours, but that are in fact limited to the context of their own time; and if the purpose of history is to illuminate those answers in light of their historical contexts, should historians ask – as Collingwood claimed they “must” – not only “what was So-and-so’s theory on such and such a matter?”, but also “was he right?”? Should the historian of ideas in a world of changing questions nevertheless describe a theory as “false” or “true”, as Collingwood does, or is truth assessment no proper part of the history of philosophy? This essay draws on the full range of Collingwood’s writings, and presents his strongest case for the claim that historians “must” ask “the truth question” about old philosophy.


2009 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-128
Author(s):  
Henk G. Geertsema

It is no easy task to respond to the 95 theses on Herman Dooyeweerd by J. Glenn Friesen. The theses are not complete in rendering Dooyeweerd’s thought. For example, his analyses of the history of philosophy and his legal philosophy are hardly touched upon. Yet the theses cover a wide range of topics that are central to Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. Therefore, to give a wellargued assessment of all of them would require more than one issue of this journal. Fortunately the editors have put severe restrictions on the amount of space that is available. So I will limit myself to some comments. My first comment concerns the method of Friesen and the misunderstandings it sometimes leads to. Second I mention some points where I disagree with his interpretation. Third I discuss the idea of supratemporality. I agree with Friesen that it is central to Dooyeweerd’s philosophy but I have problems with the views of Dooyeweerd himself. Then I will deal with another issue where my main problem is with Dooyeweerd, the idea of theoretical thought as opening up naïve thinking. I end with some concluding remarks. They concern my general assessment of the theses and what I see as the importance of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy.


The Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology contains thirty-seven new essays by leading scholars in the field. The essays all highlight historical influences, connections, and developments and provide an in-depth coverage of the development of phenomenology; one that allows for a better comprehension and assessment of the continuity as well as diversity of the phenomenological tradition. The handbook is divided into three distinct parts. The first part contains chapters that address the way phenomenology has been influenced by earlier periods or figures in the history of philosophy. The second part contains chapters targeting prominent phenomenologists: How was their work affected by earlier figures, how did their own views change over time, and what kind of influence did they exert on subsequent thinkers? The contributions in the third part trace various core topics such as subjectivity, intersubjectivity, embodiment, spatiality, and imagination in the work of different phenomenologists, in order to explore how the notions were transformed, enriched, and expanded up through the century. The handbook will be a source of insight for philosophers, students of philosophy, and for people working in other disciplines of the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, who are interested in the phenomenological tradition. It is an authoritative guide to how phenomenology started, how it developed, and where it is heading.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 330-343
Author(s):  
Fabio Camilletti

It is generally assumed that The Vampyre was published against John Polidori's will. This article brings evidence to support that he played, in fact, an active role in the publication of his tale, perhaps as a response to Frankenstein. In particular, by making use of the tools of textual criticism, it demonstrates how the ‘Extract of a Letter from Geneva’ accompanying The Vampyre in The New Monthly Magazine and in volume editions could not be written without having access to Polidori's Diary. Furthermore, it hypothesizes that the composition of The Vampyre, traditionally located in Geneva in the course of summer 1816, can be postdated to 1818, opening up new possibilities for reading the tale in the context of the relationship between Polidori, Byron, and the Shelleys.


Author(s):  
Galen Strawson ◽  
Galen Strawson

John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves—yet it is widely thought to be wrong. This book argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. The book argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word “person” as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like “human being.” In actuality, Locke uses “person” primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word “consciousness.” When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.


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