scholarly journals Central Bank Independence, Transparency and Accountability Indexes: a Survey

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florin Cornel Dumiter
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Aggregate Index ◽  
Central Bank Transparency ◽  
Considerable Impact ◽  
High Degree ◽  
Transparency And Accountability

Abstract Recently, the remarkable trend upon central bank independence and the efficient monetary policy were seriously highlighted in the monetary economics field. Starting from 1990s’ central bank independence was at the core of policy making and central banking problems, because of the widespread economical, political, personal and budgetary autonomy of the central bank. Nowadays, we can observe an increasing trend upon central bank transparency, for evaluating more accurate the central bank’s performances by the wide public, mass-media and financial markets. Consequently, a central bank must encompass a high degree of accountability and responsibility, because of the final liability in case of failure. In this paper we present, analyze and assess the construction of the most important indices regarding central bank independence, transparency and accountability in a chronological manner, presenting also the advantages and disadvantages of these indices related to actual practices of central banks. Moreover, we analyze the analytical results of the empirical testing of these indices with a considerable impact upon the developed and developing country group. In regard with the empirical results of different authors, we suggest the importance and the necessity for constructing an aggregate index for measuring central bank independence, transparency and accountability, based on de jure stipulations and the actual practices of the central banks.

Central Bank Independence

2021 ◽  
pp. 39-67
Author(s):  
Patrick Njoroge ◽  
Désiré Kanga ◽  
Victor Murinde
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
First Century ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Personal Accountability

The chapter covers central bank independence broadly and makes use of rich literature to bring out key issues on central bank independence from the inception of central banking in 1668 to the twenty-first century. The chapter identifies four measures of central bank independence mainly focusing on legal characteristics. The findings of the study point to benefits associated with independence of central banks, including management of inflation. Also, it is found that delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank increases debt sustainability and fosters fiscal discipline. It is noted that central bank independence needs to be reconciled with the requirements of institutional and personal accountability of the governors. Further, the financial regulation role should be strengthened in the mandates of central banks as the objective of price stability does not necessarily foster financial stability.

scholarly journals On the impossibility of central bank independence: four decades of time- (and intellectual) inconsistency

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A Hartwell
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Institutional Analysis ◽  
Financial System ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Time Inconsistency ◽  
Fortieth Anniversary

Abstract The intellectual justification for modern central banking, time-inconsistency, celebrated its fortieth anniversary in 2017 alongside the Cambridge Journal of Economics. However, the key progeny of the time-inconsistency literature, central bank independence, has fundamental flaws that have been thus far neglected in mainstream research. In the first instance, the argument for independence relies on a utilitarian rather than institutional analysis, one that neglects the genesis of central banks and their relation to other institutions within a country. Second, central bank independence neglects the complex interdependencies of the global monetary and financial system. Applying an institutional lens to the concept of central bank independence, I conclude that ‘independence’ fails under the reality of globalization as much as it does in a domestic context. With central banks reliant on all manner of political institutions, they are never really independent operationally or in terms of policy.

scholarly journals Interaction of Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Bibliometric Analysis

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-115
Author(s):  
Victoria Yuriivna Dudchenko
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Bibliometric Analysis ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Google Trends ◽  
Scientific Discussion ◽  
Study Results ◽  
Central Bank Transparency

This paper summarizes the arguments and counterarguments within the scientific discussion on the central bank independence and central bank transparency interaction. he main purpose of the research is to define the substantial relationships between central banks’ independence and transparency based on scientific research results. Systematization literary sources and approaches for the definition of the central bank's independence and transparency indicate that there is no generalized approach to the hierarchy of these concepts. Existing empirical studies have shown that the independence and transparency of the central bank can be interconnected components to increase the effectiveness and flexibility to solve tasks regarding the provision of currency stability and financial stability in general. Methodological tools of the research methods are Google Trends and VOSviewer instruments. The presented results of an empirical analysis of trends regarding the dynamics of the search query number by the keywords “central bank independence” and “central bank transparency” show a decrease from 2004 to the present, with a significant predominance of central bank independence over transparency throughout the study period. The results of bibliometric analysis of keyword coincidence while writing scientific articles show that researchers of the central bank independence very rarely link its solution with the transparency aspects study, while researchers of central bank transparency often study this problem in direct connection with their independence analysis. Along with this, the issues of transparency of central banks are often studied simultaneously with the analysis of their independence. The research empirically confirms and theoretically proves that the central bank’s independence is the primary category that creates the conditions for the study of its transparency. The study results provide a scientific ground to study the strength and direction of the relationship between the levels of transparency and independence of the central bank, identifying quantitative indicators to describe these relationships and can be useful for further research to ensure the central bank efficiency. Keywords: Bibliometric Analysis, Central Bank, Coincidence, Google Trends, Independence, Interaction, Transparency, VoSviewer.

scholarly journals Financial crisis and central bank independence and governance (CBIG) in the Asia Pacific.

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amirul Ahsan
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Positive Relation ◽  
Crisis Period ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the impact of financial crisis on central bank independence and governance in 36 Asia Pacific countries. It constructs a unique CBIG index for fifteen years (1991-2005); which has an overall index and six sub-indices covering all the necessary aspects of central banking operations. These indices are ranked first to measure the relative positions of the central banks and then statistically tested their relationship with inflation, economic growth and financial crisis of 1997. It applies a panel data pooled regression model and finds a robust negative relation of CBIG with inflation; moderate positive relation with economic growth; and CBIG in post crisis period is significantly different from the pre-crisis period.

Reflections on Central Banking

2021 ◽  
pp. 15-38
Author(s):  
Patrick Njoroge ◽  
Victor Murinde
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Exchange Rate Regime ◽  
Bank Regulation ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Policy And Practice ◽  
Peer Monitoring ◽  
Rich Countries

This chapter seeks to code the milestones on the epic journey of central banking from the initial conditions, through the transition, to modern policy and practice today, in a global context and Kenyan perspective. It is argued that although developments in economic theory, evidence, and policy have entrenched the robustness of central banking today, some unresolved issues persist: the issue of central bank independence; exchange rate regime outcomes in natural resource rich countries; bank regulation is still at the crossroads; the challenges presented by globalization and convergence of banking systems are real. The chapter concludes with a futurology of central banking: the future of bank regulation cannot ignore peer monitoring and market discipline; the primary mandate of central banks should be price stability but with some flexibility to respond to extraordinary circumstances; and central bank independence (personnel, financial, and policy independence) is critical for modern central banks.

scholarly journals Central Bank Independence – The Case of the Central Bank of Montenegro

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 25-40
Author(s):  
Milivoje Radovic ◽  
Milena Radonjic ◽  
Jovan Djuraskovic
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Inflation Rate ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Transition Countries ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Eu Accession ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
The Eu

Abstract In recent decades, there has been a trend in increasing the level of independence of central banks. The key factor that has contributed to a growing interest in this concept is grounded in economic theory that confirms the link between a lower inflation rate and a greater level of central bank independence. For this reason, in many countries, the existing regulations relating to central bank have been modified to protect its position from the absolute influence of the executive power of the state. This trend was particularly prevalent in transition countries, which was conditioned primarily by the EU accession criteria. The aim of this paper is to analyse independence of the Central Bank of Montenegro through the prism of functional, institutional, financial, and personal independence, and to assess the level of its legal independence by using appropriate indices.

Does Central Bank Independence in Arab Oil Exporters Matter?

2019 ◽  
pp. 119-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hoda Selim
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Oil Prices ◽  
Macroeconomic Policy ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Policy Performance ◽  
Weak Institutions

This chapter shows that central banks in Arab oil exporters are not independent. Low independence reflects institutional arrangements that allow the executive branch to influence, interfere, even dominate central bank operations. In a context of weak institutions, central bank independence (CBI) has not always mattered for macroeconomic policy outcomes. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) central banks delivered a better macroeconomic policy performance than those of the populous group because the credible peg discouraged discretion. Soft peg arrangements in the populous economies, in a context of weak institutions and discretionary policymaking and no de facto independent central bank, led to disappointing monetary policy outcomes. As oil exporters adapt to a new normal of low oil prices, the sustainability of fixed exchange rate regimes may not be guaranteed without sound macroeconomic institutions. Stronger institutions and effective accountability mechanisms are needed to insulate central banks from political pressures. In the short term, a rules-based framework could help.

Monetary Policy Committees and Central Bank Communication

2020 ◽  
pp. 19-44
Author(s):  
Nicole Baerg
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Size Composition ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Inflation Expectations ◽  
Policy Changes ◽  
Central Bank Communication ◽  
Central Bank Transparency ◽  
Key Policy

This chapter starts by tracing trends in central bank transparency. It reports key policy changes by some of the world’s most important central banks: the FOMC, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan. The second section reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on central bank design, paying close attention to the role of committee size, composition, and decision-making protocol, and classifies central banks around the world according to these features. The third section outlines the aim of central bank communications: to broadcast news and to reduce noise. The author argues that while previous literature has examined both committee design and central bank communications, it has done so in isolation. By putting these two topics together, the chapter argues that we can better understand, first, how different types of committees may be better at communicating and, second, how communication affects households’ inflation expectations and inflation.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document