scholarly journals The Panwaslih Province of Aceh Decision That Conflict With KPU Regulation

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 491-510
Author(s):  
Riski Afrial ◽  
Husni Husni ◽  
Zahratul Idami

The purpose of the research aims to analyse the validity of the decision by Panwaslih Aceh number 001/PS/SN.20/VII/2018 as opposed to article 60 section (1) letter j under KPU regulations number 14 in 2018. KPU regulations do not allow individual prospective candidates to participate in the regional representative board election whose former drug convicts, had committed sexual crimes against children, or had corruption before. the research is normative juridic research using theory and legislation approach. The result of the research showed the moment of decision was made, KPU regulations still applied. The decision of Panwaslih Aceh has already exceeded its own authority as a result of not accommodating KPU regulations. KPU regulations should be changed at first or being said by the supreme court that KPU regulations are contrary to the law. DKPP as electoral management body ethics council was expected to run its function more actively without a complaint first.

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 280
Author(s):  
Victor Juzuf Sedubun

<p>The present study investigates the consequences of supervisory law on the regional regulations with local characteristics. The study is normative with regards to the commandment and conceptual approaches. The consequences of supervisory law on the regional regulations with local characteristics, according to Article Number 251 verse 1 and 2, are dismissed (‘vernietigbaar’). ‘Vernietigbaar’ is ‘ex nunc’ that means ‘since the moment’. As a consequence of the law, the dismissal of regional regulations is valid until it is issued by the regional government. Due to the existing supervisory law performed by the Supreme Court, the judge declares the regional regulations ‘invalid’ since they are lack of powerful relevant laws. The Regional Government took a legal action on the issue of dismissed regional regulations by submitting an objection to the Supreme Court.</p>


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-180
Author(s):  
Atanas Ivanov

Abstract The right of the party concerned to a cassation appeal is result of specific inspection performed by the Supreme Court of Cassation where examined is the presence of conditions, foreseen in art. 280, par. 1 of Civil-Procedure Code. The right of cassation, however, shall incur from the presence of appellate judgment [1], and not from the specific inspection of Supreme Court of Cassation. The cassation appeal is submitted when the resolution is void, impermissible or inaccurate. This is why the right of cassation appeal is presented and guaranteed by the law opportunity of an individual to oblige Supreme Court of Cassation to rule on the first stage of cassation proceeding - the proceeding on allowing the cassation appeal estimating the statutory criteria in art. 280 of Civil-Procedure Code.


FIAT JUSTISIA ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhtadi Muhtadi

In order to preserve and uphold the honor, dignity, and the behavior of the judge is required to supervise the attitude constitutional judge to fit the code of ethics, so that each judge's ruling will be implemented in order to enforce the law and justice based on Pancasila and the Constitution 1945 as a permanent legal political for supervision of the constitutional judges. Whereas legal politics incidental that becomes choice among others: a) Behavior of Constitutional Judges are overseen by the Board of Ethics established by the Constitutional Court, and for the reported judges or suspected violations of ethic codes of Constitutional Judges formed by Honorary Council of the Constitutional Judges whose creation was proposed by Ethics Council, with the task of implementing and serves as ethic judicial; and b) there is no judicial supervision against Constitutional Court's decision as well as supervision of a court decision which was in the Supreme Court through the mechanism of legal remedies (ordinary and extraordinary). Keywords: Supervision, Behavior, Constitutional Judges


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 213
Author(s):  
Budi Suhariyanto

Diskresi sebagai wewenang bebas, keberadaannya rentan akan disalahgunakan. Penyalahgunaan diskresi yang berimplikasi merugikan keuangan negara dapat dituntutkan pertanggungjawabannya secara hukum administrasi maupun hukum pidana. Mengingat selama ini peraturan perundang-undangan tentang pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi tidak merumuskan secara rinci yang dimaksudkan unsur menyalahgunakan kewenangan maka para hakim menggunakan konsep penyalahgunaan wewenang dari hukum administrasi. Problema muncul saat diberlakukannya Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2014 dimana telah memicu persinggungan dalam hal kewenangan mengadili penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) antara Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara dengan Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. Pada perkembangannya, persinggungan kewenangan mengadili tersebut ditegaskan oleh Peraturan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 4 Tahun 2015 bahwa PTUN berwenang menerima, memeriksa, dan memutus permohonan penilaian ada atau tidak ada penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) dalam Keputusan dan/atau Tindakan Pejabat Pemerintahan sebelum adanya proses pidana. Sehubungan tidak dijelaskan tentang definisi dan batasan proses pidana yang dimaksud, maka timbul penafsiran yang berbeda. Perlu diadakan kesepakatan bersama dan dituangkan dalam regulasi tentang tapal batas persinggungan yang jelas tanpa meniadakan kewenangan pengujian penyalahgunaan wewenang diskresi pada Pengadilan TUN.Discretion as free authority is vulnerable to being misused. The abuse of discretion implicating the state finance may be prosecuted by both administrative and criminal law. In view of the fact that the law on corruption eradication does not formulate in detail the intended element of authority abuse, the judges use the concept of authority abuse from administrative law. Problems arise when the enactment of Law No. 30 of 2014 triggered an interception in terms of justice/ adjudicate authority on authority abuse (including discretion) between the Administrative Court and Corruption Court. In its development, the interception of justice authority is affirmed by Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 4 of 2015 that the Administrative Court has the authority to receive, examine and decide upon the appeal there is or there is no misuse of authority in the Decision and / or Action of Government Officials prior to the criminal process. That is, shortly before the commencement of the criminal process then that's when the authority of PTUN decides to judge the misuse of authority over the case. In this context, Perma No. 4 of 2015 has imposed restrictions on the authority of the TUN Court in prosecuting the abuse of discretionary authority.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Akhmad Firdiansyah ◽  
Wachid Hasyim ◽  
Yonathan Agung Pahlevi

ABSTRACT In accordance with the mandate of Article 23A of the 1945 Constitution, all tax stipulations must be based on the law. To carry out the mandate in accordance with Article 17 of the Customs Law Number 17 of 2006, the Director General of Customs and Excise is given the attributive authority to issue reassignment letter on Customs Tariff and / or Value for the calculation of import duty within two years starting from the date of customs notification carried out through a mechanism of audit or re-research. To examine the application of these legal norms, there are currently Supreme Court (MA) Judgment (PK) decisions that accept PK applications from PK applicants and question the legality of issuing SPKTNP by the Director General of BC. This study uses explosive qualitative analysis to analyze the issuance of SPKTNP by the Director General of BC. The results of this study indicate that the Supreme Court is of the view that the issuance of SPKTNP by the Director General of BC is a legal defect, while DGCE considers the issuance of SPKTNP by the Director General of BC according to the provisions.Key words: official decision, reassignment letter, DCGE  ABSTRAKSesuai amanah Pasal 23A Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 Segala penetapan pajak harus berdasar undang-undang. Untuk menjalankan amanah tersebut sesuai Pasal 17 Undang-Undang Kepabeanan Nomor 17 Tahun 2006 Direktur Jenderal Bea dan Cukai (Dirjen BC) diberikan kewenangan atributif untuk menerbitkan Surat Penetapan Kembali Tarif dan/atau Nilai Pabean (SPKTNP) guna penghitungan bea masuk dalam jangka waktu dua tahun terhitung sejak tanggal pemberitahuan pabean yang dilakukan melalui mekanisme audit atau penelitian ulang. Untuk meneliti penerapan norma hukum tersebut dewasa ini terdapat putusan Peninjauan Kembali (PK) Mahkamah Agung (MA) yang menerima permohonan PK dari pemohon PK dan mempermasalahkan legalitas penerbitan SPKTNP oleh Dirjen BC. Penelitian ini mengunakan analisis kualitatif eksplotarif untuk menganalisis penerbitan SPKTNP oleh Dirjen BC. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa MA berpandangan penerbitan SPKTNP oleh Dirjen BC adalah cacat hukum, sedangkan DJBC beranggapan penerbitan SPKTNP oleh Dirjen BC telah sesuai ketentuan.Kata Kunci: penetapan pejabat, SPKTNP, Direktur Jenderal Bea dan Cukai.


Author(s):  
V.C. Govindaraj

In deciding cases of private international law or conflict of laws, as it is widely known, judges of the Supreme Court in India generally consult the works of renowned English jurists like Dicey and Cheshire. This volume argues that our country should have its own system of resolving inter-territorial issues with cross-border implications. The author critically analyses cases covering areas such as the law of obligations, the law of persons, the law of property, foreign judgments, and foreign arbitral awards. The author provides his perspectives on the application of law in each case. The idea is to find out where the judges went wrong in deciding cases of private international law, so that corrective measures can be taken in future to resolve disputes involving complex, extra-territorial issues.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-271
Author(s):  
Emile Zitzke

In this article, I trace the development in the law of delict of recognising general damages claims on account of psychiatric lesions with the aim of making suggestions on how to transform it. Using the tragic case of Michael Komape as a springboard for the discussion, I argue that even though the Supreme Court of Appeal has recently brought clarity on the law on psychiatric lesions, more transformative work still needs to be done. More specifically, this article contends that the constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity might require us to rethink the high evidentiary threshold that courts have set for proving the element of harm in cases related to psychiatric lesions. I argue that this can be done in at least three ways: First, by very cautiously bringing about a development that would involve protecting victims of psychological harm whose expert witnesses are shown to be inadequate despite all other facts indicating the existence of a psychiatric lesion. Secondly, by lowering the requirement of “recognised psychiatric lesion” to “grievous mental injury”, in line with similar arguments made in England. Thirdly, and most controversially, by acknowledging that perhaps the time has come for our law to recognise claims for so-called “grief in the air”.


Legal Theory ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-99
Author(s):  
Andrew Altman

Recently, legal and social thinkers have turned to the idea that actions possess a nonlinguistic meaning, called “expressive meaning.” In this article I examine the idea of expressive meaning and its role in legal reasoning. My focus is on a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases involving constitutional challenges to election districts drawn on the basis of race. The Supreme Court used the idea of expressive meaning in striking down the districts. After explicating the idea of expressive meaning, I explain and criticize the Court’s reasoning. I distinguish the approach of Justices Thomas and Scalia, who hold that all uses of race in districting do constitutional harm, from that of Justice O’Connor, who distinguishes uses of race that do constitutional harm from those that do not. I contend that Justice O’Connor is right to make the distinction but she draws the line using a questionable standard. A more defensible standard would be more accommodating to the districts that the Court invalidated.


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