scholarly journals MENGUJI ASAS DROIT DE SUITE DALAM JAMINAN FIDUSIA

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
I Made Sarjana ◽  
Desak Putu Dewi Kasih ◽  
I Gusti Ayu Kartika
Keyword(s):  
Civil Law ◽  
Legal Aspects ◽  
The State ◽  
Court Case ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Illegal Logging ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Droit De Suite

The principle of droit de suite is one of the most important principles in the law of guarantee,especially in fiduciary security. The principle implies that the rights of the creditor as therecipient of the fiduciary objects continue to follow the object of guarantee, wherever theobject is, to guarantee the repayment of the debts of the debitor. The rights which are ownedby the creditor as the recipient of fiduciary security in the principle seem to be absolute, butin fact if it is related to de practice, the principle of droit de suite has certain limitations.The limitations of this principle is whon it is faced with higher interest, the individual rightsowned by the recipient of fiduciary must succumb, as in the case of illegal logging, whichonce was decided to test the Forestry Law by the Constitutional Court (Case DecisionNumber 012/PUU-III/2005). Although the State can perform fiduciary deprivation of theobject which is used for committing illegal logging, but from the aspect of material criminallaw, it cannot be done immediately to destroy the object of guarantee, since object of thefiduciary collateral, is not considered a dangerous thing. Whereas, from the legal aspects ofcriminal procedure, if the case has been decided, then there is a duty of the State to returnthe object of fiduciary to those who own it.From the aspect of civil law, the creditor as recipient of fiduciary who feel harmed as aresult of illegal logging practices may have standing to sue for damages under Article 1365of Burgerljik Wetboek. The provision is used, because the act of illegal logging is an actagainst the law and there are losses caused to the recipient of fiduciary.

Liberty and the Common Law

1945 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lord Wright
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Roman Law ◽  
Case System ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right

In preparing the few and elementary observations which I am about to make to you tonight I have wondered if the title I chose was apt or suitable. The Common Law is generally described as the law of liberty, of freedom and of free peoples. It was a home-made product. In the eighteenth century, foreign lawyers called it an insular and barbarous system; they compared it to their own system of law, developed on the basis of Roman and Civil Law. Many centuries before, and long after Bracton's day, when other civilised European nations ‘received’ the Roman Law, England held back and stood aloof from the Reception. It must have been a near thing. It seems there could have been a Reception here if the Judges had been ecclesiastics, steeped in the Civil Law. But as it turned out they were laymen, and were content as they travelled the country, and in London as well, to adopt what we now know as the Case System, instead of the rules and categories of the Civil Law. Hence the method of threshing out problems by debate in Court, and later on the basis of written pleadings which we find in the Year Books. For present purposes, all I need observe is that the Civil Lawyer had a different idea of the relation of the state or the monarch to the individual from that of the Common Lawyer. To the Civil or Roman Lawyer, the dominant maxim was ‘quod placuit principi legis habet vigorem’; law was the will of the princeps. With this may be compared the rule expressed in Magna Carta in 1215: No freeman, it was there said, was to be taken or imprisoned or exiled or in any way destroyed save by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land. Whatever the exact application of that phrase in 1215, it became a text for fixing the relations between the subject and the State. Holdsworth quotes from the Year Book of 1441; the law is the highest English inheritance the King hath, for by the law he and all his subjects are ruled. That was the old medieval doctrine that all things are governed by law, either human or divine. That is the old doctrine of the supremacy of the law, which runs through the whole of English history, and which in the seventeenth century won the day against the un-English doctrine of the divine right of Kings and of their autocratic power over the persons and property of their subjects. The more detailed definition of what all that involved took time to work out. I need scarcely refer to the great cases in the eighteenth century in which the Judges asserted the right of subjects to freedom from arbitrary arrest as against the ministers of state and against the validity of a warrant to seize the papers of a person accused of publishing a seditious libel; in particular Leach v. Money (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1001; Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1029; Wilkes v. Halifax (1769) 19 St. Tr. 1406. In this connexion may be noted Fox's Libel Act, 1792, which dealt with procedure, but fixed a substantive right to a trial by jury of the main issue in the cases it referred to.

Conscientious Objection (European and American approaches)

Law and World ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-144
Keyword(s):  
Deep Understanding ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Legal Aspects ◽  
Conscientious Objection ◽  
State Regulation ◽  
Legal Responsibility ◽  
State Regulations ◽  
Conscientious Objectors ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Individual

The Article concerns the legal issues, connected with the situation, when a person (or group of people) disobey requirements of the Law or other State regulations on the basis of religious or nonreligious belief. The Author analyses almost all related issues – whether imposing certain obligation on individuals, to which the individual has a conscientious objection based on his/her religious beliefs, always represents interference with his/her religion rights, and if it does, then what is subject of the interference – forum integrum or forum externum; whether neutral regulation, which does not refer to religion issues at all, could ever be regarded as interference into someone’s religious rights; whether opinion or belief, on which the individual’s objection and the corresponding conduct is based, must necesserily represent the clear “manifest” of the same religion or belief in order to gain legal protection; what is regarded as “manifest” of the religion or other belief in general and whether a close and direct link must exist between personal conduct and requirements of the religious or nonreligious belief; what are the criteria of the “legitimacy” of the belief; to what extent the following factors should be taken into consideration : whether the personal conduct of the individual represents the official requirements of corresponding religion or belief, what is the burden which was imposed on the believer’s religious or moral feelings by the State regulation, also, proportionality and degree of sincerity of the individual who thinks that his disobidience to the Law is required by his/her religious of philosofical belief. The effects (direct or non direct) of the nonfulfilment of the law requirement (legal responsibility, lost of the job, certain discomfort, etc..) are relevant factors as well. By the Author, all these circumstances and factors are essencial while estimating, whether it arises, actually, a real necessity and relevant obligation before a state for making some exemptions from the law to the benefi t of the conscientious objectors, in cases, if to predict such an objection was possible at all. So, the issues are discussed in the prism of the negative and positive obligations of a State. Corresponding precedents of the US Supreme Court and European Human Rights Court have been presented and analysed comparatively by the Author in the Article. The Article contains an important resume, in which the main points, principal issues and conclusion remarks are delivered. The Author shows, that due analysis of the legal aspects typical to “Conscientious objection” is very important for deep understanding religious rights, not absolute ones, and facilitates finding a correct answer on the question – how far do their boundaries go?

Hobbes among the Classic Jurists

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Boucher
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
International Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
Law Of Nations ◽  
Complete Identification ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Hedley Bull ◽  
Hans Morgenthau

The classic foundational status that Hobbes has been afforded by contemporary international relations theorists is largely the work of Hans Morgenthau, Martin Wight, and Hedley Bull. They were not unaware that they were to some extent creating a convenient fiction, an emblematic realist, a shorthand for all of the features encapsulated in the term. The detachment of international law from the law of nature by nineteenth-century positivists opened Hobbes up, even among international jurists, to be portrayed as almost exclusively a mechanistic theorist of absolute state sovereignty. If we are to endow him with a foundational place at all it is not because he was an uncompromising realist equating might with right, on the analogy of the state of nature, but instead to his complete identification of natural law with the law of nations. It was simply a matter of subject that distinguished them, the individual and the state.

scholarly journals F v MINISTER OF SAFETY AND SECURITY: Vicarious liability and state accountability for the criminal acts of police officers

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heidi Barnes
Keyword(s):  
Police Officers ◽  
The State ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Vicarious Liability ◽  
State Accountability ◽  
Normative Basis ◽  
The Law

The Constitutional Court judgement in F v Minister of Safety and Securityis a ground-breaking judgement in two important respects: firstly, it finally does away with the fiction that an employee acts within the course and scope of her employment in the so-called deviation cases in the law of vicarious liability, and secondly it clarifies the normative basis for holding the state vicariously liable for the criminal acts of police officers. In this latter respect it significantly promotes state accountability for the criminal acts of police officers.

scholarly journals Non-Delimitation of Incompetency Denotations in Jurisprudence and Law and the Contradiction of some of its Titles to the Law on Non-Litigious Matters

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sorush Niknamian
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Civil Procedure ◽  
Legal Capacity ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Mind

“Incompetency” literally means prohibition and it is commonly used to point to an individual being deprived of his rights to take possession of his properties and his financial rights by the law. And, in other words, the incompetents are the individuals that do not possess “the legal capacity to enjoy a certain right” and are deprived from taking possession of their properties and if such a taking possession of the properties by an incompetent occurs, it is invalid and cannot take effect. In the legal system of Islam, the individual with a sort of a disease that features certain types of conditions leading to the weakness of the mind or insanity is called an incompetent. But the example cases of the incompetent and incompetency have not been delimited in the jurisprudence and law. Thus, the investigation of the instruments of incompetency from the perspective of the jurisprudential texts and the statutory provisions via offering an assumption indicating the non-delimitation of the incompetency instruments scope has resulted in conflicts in the non-litigious affairs law with the civil procedure, the necessity to rethink the causes of insanity as one instrument of incompetency in the civil law, the centrality of the incompetency for its setting the ground for the exertion of the law and the non-litigious affairs regulations as well as the incompetency of some patients with nervous diseases like hysterical conversion and dissociative hysteria and so forth. Therefore, conceptualizing the incompetency, the present study aims at assessing, then criticizing and investigating, the proofs offered by the proponents and the opponents of the incompetency of the patients with hysteria so as to consequently conclude an assumption regarding the hysteric patients’ incompetency and the relevant contradictions, if any, with the non-litigious matters law and civil procedure.

The Child’s Right to Be Vaccinated

2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 897-919
Author(s):  
Katherine Hunt Federle
Keyword(s):  
Public Safety ◽  
The State ◽  
Parental Choice ◽  
Vaccine Hesitancy ◽  
Individual Welfare ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Individual

Abstract Vaccine hesitancy highlights a problem within current rights constructs under US law. Refusal to vaccinate is ineluctably cast as a contest between parental choice, to which the law traditionally defers, and state concerns for public safety and the individual welfare of children. But rarely is the discussion cast in terms of the child’s right to be vaccinated because our rights talk revolves around the capacity (or lack thereof) of the rights holder. If, however, we recast rights in terms of empowerment, then we can see that rights flow to the child, not because she has the requisite capacity but because she is less powerful. In this sense, rights exist for children because they are children. The authority of the state to mandate immunisation under US law also may be reconsidered because the state is acting to protect the rights of those less powerful – the children who cannot be vaccinated.

From Liberties to Liberty

2020 ◽  
pp. 105-130
Author(s):  
Charlotte Epstein
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
The Political ◽  
Habeas Corpus ◽  
House Church ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Individual Body

This chapter studies how liberty in the law evolved from being attached to a collective, metaphorical body—the medieval corporation—to being rooted instead in the individual body across a range of practices in seventeenth century Europe. It analyses the early modern forms of toleration that developed from the ground-up in Protestant Europe (Holland and Germany in particular), including the practices of ‘walking out’ (auslauf) to worship one’s God, and the house church (schuilkerk). These practices were key to delinking liberty from place, and thus to paving the way to attaching it instead to territory and the state. The chapter also considers the first common law of naturalisation, known as Calvin’s Case (1608), which wrote into the law the process of becoming an English subject—of subjection. This law decisively rooted the state-subject relation in the bodies of monarch and subject coextensively. Both of these bodies were deeply implicated in the process of territorialisation that begat the modern state in seventeenth-century England, and in shifting the political bond from local authorities to the sovereign. The chapter then examines the corporeal processes underwriting the centralisation of authority, and shows how the subject’s body also became—via an increasingly important habeas corpus—the centre point of the legal revolution that yielded the natural rights of the modern political subject. Edward Coke plays a central role in the chapter.

Outposts of the Law: The Frontier and the Civil-Law Fringe

2019 ◽  
pp. 127-146
Author(s):  
Lawrence M. Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Civil Law ◽  
The State ◽  
American Frontier ◽  
Northwest Ordinance ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Future ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Law ◽  
New Nation

This chapter discusses the history of American frontier law. The new nation faced the problem of how to deal with the western lands. Some of the states had huge, vague, and vast claims to chunks of western land, stretching out far beyond the pale of settlement; other states did not. The Ordinance of 1787 dealt with the issue of governance and the future of the western lands. It set basic law for a huge area of forest and plain that became the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. The Ordinance of 1790 extended the influence of the Northwest Ordinance into what became the state of Tennessee.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document