scholarly journals Cantor’s paradise from the perspective of non‐revisionist Wittgensteinianism

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 351-372
Author(s):  
Jakub Gomułka

Cantor’s paradise from the perspective of non‐revisionist Wittgensteinianism: Ludwig Wittgenstein is known for his criticism of transfinite set theory. He forwards the claim that we tend to conceptualise infinity as an object due to the systematic confusion of extension with in‐ tension. There can be no mathematical symbol that directly refers to infinity: a rule is the only form by which the latter can appear in our symbolic operations. In consequence, Wittgenstein rejects such ideas as infinite cardinals, the Cantorian understanding of non‐denumerability, and the view of real numbers as a continuous sequence of points on a number line. Moreover, as he understands mathematics to be an anthropological phenomenon, he rejects set theory due to its lack of application. As I argue here, it is possible to defend Georg Cantor’s theory by taking a standpoint I call quietistic conventionalism. The standpoint broadly resembles Wittgenstein’s formalist middle period and allows us to view transfinite set theory as a result of a series of definitions established by arbitrary decisions that have no ontological consequences. I point to the fact that we are inclined to accept such definitions because of certain psycho‐ logical mechanisms such as the hypothetical Basic Metaphor of Infinity proposed by George Lakoff and Rafael E. Núñez. Regarding Wittgenstein’s criterion of applicability, I argue that it presupposes a static view of science. Therefore, we should not rely on it because we are unable to foresee what will turn out to be useful in the future.

1942 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bernays

The foundation of analysis does not require the full generality of set theory but can be accomplished within a more restricted frame. Just as for number theory we need not introduce a set of all finite ordinals but only a class of all finite ordinals, all sets which occur being finite, so likewise for analysis we need not have a set of all real numbers but only a class of them, and the sets with which we have to deal are either finite or enumerable.We begin with the definitions of infinity and enumerability and with some consideration of these concepts on the basis of the axioms I—III, IV, V a, V b, which, as we shall see later, are sufficient for general set theory. Let us recall that the axioms I—III and V a suffice for establishing number theory, in particular for the iteration theorem, and for the theorems on finiteness.


Author(s):  
Susan D'Agostino

“Proceed with care, because some infinities are larger than others” explains in detail why the infinite set of real numbers—all of the numbers on the number line—represents a far larger infinity than the infinite set of natural numbers—the counting numbers. Readers learn to distinguish between countable infinity and uncountable infinity by way of a method known as a “one-to-one correspondence.” Mathematics students and enthusiasts are encouraged to proceed with care in both mathematics and life, lest they confuse countable infinity with uncountable infinity, large with unfathomably large, or order with disorder. At the chapter’s end, readers may check their understanding by working on a problem. A solution is provided.


1997 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 1379-1428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joan Bagaria ◽  
W. Hugh Woodin

Some of the most striking results in modern set theory have emerged from the study of simply-definable sets of real numbers. Indeed, simple questions like: what are the posible cardinalities?, are they measurable?, do they have the property of Baire?, etc., cannot be answered in ZFC.When one restricts the attention to the analytic sets, i.e., the continuous images of Borel sets, then ZFC does provide an answer to these questions. But this is no longer true for the projective sets, i.e., all the sets of reals that can be obtained from the Borel sets by taking continuous images and complements. In this paper we shall concentrate on particular projective classes, the , and using forcing constructions we will produce models of ZFC where, for some n, all , sets have some specified property. For the definition and basic facts about the projective classes , and , as well as the Kleene (or lightface) classes , and , we refer the reader to Moschovakis [19].The first part of the paper is about measure and category. Early in this century, Luzin [16] and Luzin-Sierpiński [17] showed that all analytic (i.e., ) sets of reals are Lebesgue measurable and have the property of Baire.


Author(s):  
Radim Bělohlávek ◽  
Joseph W. Dauben ◽  
George J. Klir

The chapter begins by introducing the important and useful distinction between the research agendas of fuzzy logic in the narrow and the broad senses. The chapter deals with the latter agenda, whose ultimate goal is to employ intuitive fuzzy set theory for emulating commonsense human reasoning in natural language and other unique capabilities of human beings. Restricting to standard fuzzy sets, whose membership degrees are real numbers in the unit interval [0,1], the chapter describes how this broad agenda has become increasingly specific via the gradual development of standard fuzzy set theory and the associated fuzzy logic. An overview of currently recognized nonstandard fuzzy sets, which open various new directions in fuzzy logic, is presented in the last section of this chapter.


1999 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 1601-1627 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Hauser

AbstractFor a canonical model of set theory whose projective theory of the real numbers is stable under set forcing extensions, a set of reals of minimal complexity is constructed which fails to be universally Baire. The construction uses a general method for generating non-universally Baire sets via the Levy collapse of a cardinal, as well as core model techniques. Along the way it is shown (extending previous results of Steel) how sufficiently iterable fine structure models recognize themselves as global core models.


1951 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Myhill

In a previous paper, I proved the consistency of a non-finitary system of logic based on the theory of types, which was shown to contain the axiom of reducibility in a form which seemed not to interfere with the classical construction of real numbers. A form of the system containing a strong axiom of choice was also proved consistent.It seems to me now that the real-number approach used in that paper, though valid, was not the most fruitful one. We can, on the lines therein suggested, prove the consistency of axioms closely resembling Tarski's twenty axioms for the real numbers; but this, from the standpoint of mathematical practice, is a pitifully small fragment of analysis. The consistency of a fairly strong set-theory can be proved, using the results of my previous paper, with little more difficulty than that of the Tarski axioms; this being the case, it would seem a saving in effort to derive the consistency of such a theory first, then to strengthen that theory (if possible) in such ways as can be shown to preserve consistency; and finally to derive from the system thus strengthened, if need be, a more usable real-number theory. The present paper is meant to achieve the first part of this program. The paragraphs of this paper are numbered consecutively with those of my previous paper, of which it is to be regarded as a continuation.


Kybernetes ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 37 (3/4) ◽  
pp. 453-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wujia Zhu ◽  
Yi Lin ◽  
Guoping Du ◽  
Ningsheng Gong

PurposeThe purpose is to show that all uncountable infinite sets are self‐contradictory non‐sets.Design/methodology/approachA conceptual approach is taken in the paper.FindingsGiven the fact that the set N={x|n(x)} of all natural numbers, where n(x)=df “x is a natural number” is a self‐contradicting non‐set in this paper, the authors prove that in the framework of modern axiomatic set theory ZFC, various uncountable infinite sets are either non‐existent or self‐contradicting non‐sets. Therefore, it can be astonishingly concluded that in both the naive set theory or the modern axiomatic set theory, if any of the actual infinite sets exists, it must be a self‐contradicting non‐set.Originality/valueThe first time in history, it is shown that such convenient notion as the set of all real numbers needs to be reconsidered.


2011 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Ferreirós

AbstractSet theory deals with the most fundamental existence questions in mathematics-questions which affect other areas of mathematics, from the real numbers to structures of all kinds, but which are posed as dealing with the existence of sets. Especially noteworthy are principles establishing the existence of some infinite sets, the so-called “arbitrary sets.” This paper is devoted to an analysis of the motivating goal of studying arbitrary sets, usually referred to under the labels ofquasi-combinatorialismorcombinatorial maximality. After explaining what is meant by definability and by “arbitrariness,” a first historical part discusses the strong motives why set theory was conceived as a theory of arbitrary sets, emphasizing connections with analysis and particularly with the continuum of real numbers. Judged from this perspective, the axiom of choice stands out as a most central and natural set-theoretic principle (in the sense of quasi-combinatorialism). A second part starts by considering the potential mismatch between the formal systems of mathematics and their motivating conceptions, and proceeds to offer an elementary discussion of how far the Zermelo–Fraenkel system goes in laying out principles that capture the idea of “arbitrary sets”. We argue that the theory is rather poor in this respect.


AJS Review ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 333-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cass Fisher

In recent years Jewish philosophers and theologians from across the religious spectrum have claimed that the philosophy of the Austrian-born British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein is a crucial resource for understanding Jewish belief and practice. The majority of these thinkers are drawn to Wittgenstein's work on account of the diminished role that he ascribes to religious belief—a position that affirms the widespread view that theology has played a minimal role in Judaism. Another line of thought sees in Wittgenstein's philosophy resources that can illuminate the forms and functions of Jewish theological language and bolster the place of theological reflection within Jewish religious life. This article undertakes a critical analysis of the reception of Wittgenstein's philosophy among contemporary Jewish thinkers with the goal of delineating these alternative responses to his work. The paper concludes by arguing that the way in which Jewish thinkers appropriate Wittgenstein's philosophy will have profound consequences for the future of Jewish theology.


1994 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 187-190
Author(s):  
James E. BAUMGARTNER
Keyword(s):  

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