scholarly journals NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM OF THE DPRK AND IRAN IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

Author(s):  
A.I KOZINETS ◽  
◽  
M.A SOROKIN ◽  

This article examines the nuclear programs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran in the context of the current state of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The nuclear non-proliferation regime is one of the cornerstones of global security. The legal basis for this regime is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which entered into force in 1970. Within the framework of this document, the circle of states that have the right to develop and possess nuclear weapons and the circle of states that do not have such a right are strictly defined. The main international body responsible for overseeing compliance with the NPT provisions is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In the event of violations of the nonproliferation regime that pose a clear threat to global security, the appropriate response should be from the UN Security Council, as the main structure designed to ensure global security. Nevertheless, today there are serious problems with the preservation of the international regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In particular, these problems are caused by the developing nuclear programs of the DPRK and Iran, which do not have the right to possess nuclear weapons under the NPT. The authors analyze the content of a number of international documents adopted by the IAEA and the UN Security Council to identify the common and specific in the nuclear programs of these two countries, and also consider various scenarios for resolving the existing problems of violation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Author(s):  
Mirsad Miki Jacevic

Since 2005, UN Security Council Resolution 1325, national action plans (NAPs) have been tools for institutionalizing the women, peace, and security agenda. Yet, gaps remain between their promise and their capacity to facilitate safer, more stable local communities. Inclusive Security’s “high-impact NAP” methodology posits that these plans can only achieve this goal when inclusively designed, effectively monitored and evaluated, adequately resourced, and fully supported politically. Using this framework and illustrative country examples, this chapter reviews NAP progress and challenges to date. Specifically, this chapter provides a close examination of the effectiveness of NAPs in countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, Iraq, and Japan. In doing so, it critically examines the current “state of the field” and emerging trends (e.g. localization), and offers concluding lessons learned in order to translate women, peace, and security commitments into action. This chapter argues that while NAPs face a number of limitations, they are nevertheless important policy and advocacy mechanisms as they strengthen institutional efforts for change.


Author(s):  
Bianca Leticia de Oliveira Tosta

RESUMEN: El trabajo aborda las sanciones inteligentes aplicadas por el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU en la lucha contra el terrorismo y tiene como objetivo analizar el impacto de aquellas en el ámbito de los derechos humanos, con énfasis en el derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva, lo que suscita complejas divergencias, cuyo análisis implica examen de cómo ocurre la articulación entre el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU y los Estados demandados por éste en la aplicación de las dichas medidas, así como cuáles son los parámetros de vinculación y limitación de estos. ABSTRACT: The work addresses the smart sanctions applied by the UN Security Council in the fight against terrorism and aims to analyze the impact of those in the field of human rights, with emphasis on the right to effective judicial protection , which raises complex divergences, whose analysis implies an examination of how the articulation between the UN Security Council and the States demanded by it in the application of these measures takes place, as well as the parameters of linkage and limitation of these. PALABRAS CLAVE: terrorismo, sanciones inteligentes, derechos humanos, tutela judicial efectiva. KEYWORDS: terrorism, smart sanctions, human rights, effective judicial protection.


Author(s):  
James Crawford

This chapter discusses international law governing the use or threat of force by states. The UN Security Council has primary responsibility for enforcement action to deal with breaches of the peace, threats to the peace, or acts of aggression. Individual member states have the right of individual or collective self-defence, but only ‘until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security’. However, the practice has evolved of authorizing peacekeeping operations that are contingent upon the consent of the state whose territory is the site of the operations.


2008 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 51-108
Author(s):  
Dan Kuwali

AbstractThe concept of ‘the responsibility to protect’ (R2P) was endorsed at the 2005 World Summit by the UN General Assembly. This concept, like the right to intervene under Article 4(h) of theConstitutive Act of the African Union, aims to end mass atrocity crimes in the form of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Yet the question that remains is: what if the UN Security Council is unwilling or unable to act? Further, there is a continuing unanswered question: ‘should action to prevent large-scale killing in an African country be beholden to a Security Council that has no permanent African membership?’ The High-level Panel indicated that in some urgent situations UN Security Council authorization may be sought after operations have commenced, whereas the World Summit Outcome rejected demands that states or organizations such as the African Union (AU) should be able to act before gaining UN authorization. These are the principal issues addressed in this analysis, which discusses how the AU can implement the right to intervene under Article 4(h) against the background of the prohibition of the use of force regime under the UN Charter. The analysis explores the current thinking of the AU and the international community on the key question of how to proceed in cases where the UN Security Council is deadlocked in using force to prevent mass atrocity crimes. The discussion highlights the intention of the framers of the AU Actvis-à-visthe practice of the Security Council in authorizing enforcement action as well as views of various commentators in this regard.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Obinna Ifediora

The African Union (AU) has rejected R2P and opposed the UN Security Council-authorized military action in Libya for human rights protection, claiming primacy in decision-making on peace and security interventions on the continent. Yet, existing studies have assumed that the right to protect, as the AU established in article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, is compatible with R2P. Drawing on the concept of regional multilateralism, this article argues that the right to protect involves a unique African logic and ambition, albeit with an extraordinary significance for global security governance. Particularly, the right to protect is a robust, bold, stable, and uncontested international security regime, which favourable Permanent Five members of the Security Council can turn to when facing the twin problems of legitimacy and veto-induced paralysis. However, such P5 members must embrace the AU’s novel principle: continental sovereignty, which underlines the AU’s primacy claims in decision-making in peace and security.


2021 ◽  
pp. 251-272
Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter discusses the regulation of when and for what purpose a state may use force against another state jus ad bellum. It provides an overview of the legal framework in the 1945 UN Charter. It analyses the content of the prohibition on the use of force in article 2(4) of the Charter; discusses the competences of the UN Security Council; and examines the right to self-defence. The Security Council is entrusted with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council may authorize the use of force if required to maintain and/or restore the peace. Article 51 of the Charter allows a state to defend itself in the case of armed attack.


2020 ◽  
pp. 335-365
Author(s):  
Paola Gaeta ◽  
Jorge E. Viñuales ◽  
Salvatore Zappalà

The Cold War era prevented the UN Security Council from using most of the powers provided for by the UN Charter, including adopting measures under Chapter VII (the so-called ‘collective security system’ which provides for measures ranging from sanctions to the use of armed force) for events deemed (by the Security Council) to be threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression. However, the end of the Cold War enabled the Security Council to take some of the measures short of force envisaged in Article 41 and to interpret creatively the provisions of the Charter so as to authorize enforcement action through the use of armed force by individual States or coalitions of States. This chapter discusses measures short of armed force; peacekeeping operations; resort to force by States, as well as regional and other organizations, upon authorization of the Security Council; the special case of authorization to use force given by the General Assembly; as well as the right to self-defence and the various situations in which armed force has been used unilaterally by States.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document