This note presents an empirical analysis of optimal taxation in Chile, adopting
Roemer’s equality of opportunities as the evaluation criterion. The equality of opportunities
optimal tax rules seek to equalize income differentials arising from factors
beyond the control of the individual. Roemer’s theory of equality of opportunities
(Roemer, 1998) has been employed to compute the extent to which tax-andtransfer
regimes in some OECD countries equalize opportunities among citizens for
income acquisition. In this note we apply this approach to Chile, a developing economy,
and compare the results to those reported in Roemer, Aaberge, Colombino,
Fritzell, Jenkins, Marx, Page, Pommer, Ruiz-Castillo, Segundo, Tranaes, Wagner and
Zubiri (2003). We find that the optimal tax rate in Chile according to Roemer’s equalopportunities
approach should be zero.
Determinants of Unemployment: An Empirical Analysis for OECD Countries
