scholarly journals Verifying Privacy Preserving Combinatorial Auctions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Ben Palmer
Keyword(s):  
Privacy Preserving ◽  
Combinatorial Auctions ◽  
Combinatorial Auction ◽  
Sealed Bid

<p>Suppose you are competing in an online sealed bid auction for some goods. How do you know the auction result can be trusted? The auction site could be performing actions that support its own commercial interests by blocking certain bidders or even reporting incorrect winning prices. This problem is magnified when the auctioneer is an unknown party and the auctions are for high value items. The incentive for the auctioneer to cheat can be high as they could stand to make a significant profit by inflating winning prices or by being paid by a certain bidder to announce them the winner. Verification of auction results provides confidence in the auction result by making it computationally infeasible for an auction participant to cheat and not get caught. This thesis examines the construction of verifiable privacy preserving combinatorial auction protocols. Two verifiable privacy preserving combinatorial auction protocols are produced by extending existing auction protocols.</p>

scholarly journals Verifying Privacy Preserving Combinatorial Auctions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Ben Palmer
Keyword(s):  
Privacy Preserving ◽  
Combinatorial Auctions ◽  
Combinatorial Auction ◽  
Sealed Bid

<p>Suppose you are competing in an online sealed bid auction for some goods. How do you know the auction result can be trusted? The auction site could be performing actions that support its own commercial interests by blocking certain bidders or even reporting incorrect winning prices. This problem is magnified when the auctioneer is an unknown party and the auctions are for high value items. The incentive for the auctioneer to cheat can be high as they could stand to make a significant profit by inflating winning prices or by being paid by a certain bidder to announce them the winner. Verification of auction results provides confidence in the auction result by making it computationally infeasible for an auction participant to cheat and not get caught. This thesis examines the construction of verifiable privacy preserving combinatorial auction protocols. Two verifiable privacy preserving combinatorial auction protocols are produced by extending existing auction protocols.</p>

Quantum-based Privacy-Preserving Sealed-bid Auction on the Blockchain

Optik ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 167039
Author(s):  
Hussein Abulkasim ◽  
Atefeh Mashatan ◽  
Shohini Ghose
Keyword(s):  
Privacy Preserving ◽  
Sealed Bid

scholarly journals PP-VCA: A Privacy-Preserving and Verifiable Combinatorial Auction Mechanism

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Mingwu Zhang ◽  
Bingruolan Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Privacy Preserving ◽  
Network Routing ◽  
Combinatorial Auction ◽  
Sensitive Information ◽  
Sensitive Data ◽  
Winner Determination ◽  
Spectrum Auction ◽  
Auction Price ◽  
Data Volume ◽  
Auction Mechanisms

Combinatorial auctions can be employed in the fields such as spectrum auction, network routing, railroad segment, and energy auction, which allow multiple goods to be sold simultaneously and any combination of goods to be bid and the maximum sum of combinations of bidding prices to be calculated. However, in traditional combinatorial auction mechanisms, data concerning bidders’ price and bundle might reveal sensitive information, such as personal preference and competitive relation since the winner determination problem needs to be resolved in terms of sensitive data as above. In order to solve this issue, this paper exploits a privacy-preserving and verifiable combinatorial auction protocol (PP-VCA) to protect bidders’ privacy and ensure the correct auction price in a secure manner, in which we design a one-way and monotonically increasing function to protect a bidder’s bid to enable the auctioneer to pick out the largest bid without revealing any information about bids. Moreover, we design and employ three subprotocols, namely, privacy-preserving winner determination protocol, privacy-preserving scalar protocol, and privacy-preserving verifiable payment determination protocol, to implement the combinatorial auction with bidder privacy and payment verifiability. The results of comprehensive experimental evaluations indicate that our proposed scheme provides a better efficiency and flexibility to meet different types of data volume in terms of the number of goods and bidders.

Combinatorial Auctions

2013 ◽  
pp. 107-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Porter ◽  
Stephen Rassenti ◽  
David Munro
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Space Shuttle ◽  
Combinatorial Auctions ◽  
Combinatorial Auction ◽  
Valuable Resource ◽  
Individual Values ◽  
Transportation Services ◽  
Spectrum Auctions ◽  
Auction Mechanisms ◽  
Efficient Allocations

Traditional auctions struggle to achieve efficient allocations in multi-resource environments where individual resources are complements (the value of obtaining a package of items is worth more than the sum of the unbundled individual values) or they are substitutes. For this reason, Combinatorial Auctions are valuable resource allocation mechanisms in a host of environments. These environments include, but are not limited to, spectrum auctions, procurement of transportation services, exchange of pollution credits, and the allocation of space shuttle resources. This chapter provides a summary of several important combinatorial auction mechanisms. For each mechanism examined we highlight the strengths, weaknesses, and the environments for which they are well suited. In addition, the chapter provides examples of how these mechanisms have been used by business and government to gain efficiency and revenue in these complex resource allocation environments.

scholarly journals Multiobjective Combinatorial Auctions in Transportation Procurement

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Ignatius ◽  
Seyyed-Mahdi Hosseini-Motlagh ◽  
Mark Goh ◽  
Mohammad Mehdi Sepehri ◽  
Adli Mustafa ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Cost Savings ◽  
Combinatorial Auctions ◽  
Combinatorial Auction ◽  
Optimization Models ◽  
Multi Objective Optimization ◽  
Winner Determination ◽  
Objective Model ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Transportation Procurement ◽  
Preemptive Goal Programming

This paper presents a multiobjective winner determination combinatorial auction mechanism for transportation carriers to present multiple transport lanes and bundle the lanes as packet bids to the shippers for the purposes of ocean freight. This then allows the carriers to maximize their network of resources and pass some of the cost savings onto the shipper. Specifically, we formulate three multi-objective optimization models (weighted objective model, preemptive goal programming, and compromise programming) under three criteria of cost, marketplace fairness, and the marketplace confidence in determining the winning packages. We develop solutions on the three models and perform a sensitivity analysis to show the options the shipper can use depending on the existing conditions at the point of awarding the transport lanes.

scholarly journals Combinatorial Auctions for Transportation Service Procurement: The Carrier Perspective

2003 ◽  
Vol 1833 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiongjiong Song ◽  
Amelia Regan
Keyword(s):  
Cost Savings ◽  
Combinatorial Auctions ◽  
Transportation Services ◽  
Service Levels ◽  
Single Carrier ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Transportation Service ◽  
Simple Simulation ◽  
Delivery Routes ◽  
Service Procurement

The procurement of transportation services is an important task for shippers because of the need to control costs while providing high service levels. When shippers need to transport goods and materials, they seek transportation services from outside companies and typically issue a request for quotes from a group of carriers. The shippers then assign contracts on the basis of negotiated service charges. This process is similar to a simple sealed-bid auction in which each bidder submits a sealed bid for a single item. In the past, when shippers needed to procure transportation services for a set of distinctive delivery routes (called lanes), they would obtain quotes for each lane individually and repeat the simple auction process for each lane. Alternatively, they might negotiate for bundles of lanes with a single carrier at a time. However, in the last several years, software has been developed to enable shippers to make all lanes available for bidding simultaneously and to enable carriers to simultaneously bid on combinations of individual lanes. This method of awarding contracts, conventionally called a combinatorial auction, has resulted in significant cost savings for shippers. This research examines the benefits of combinatorial auctions primarily from the carrier's perspective. On the basis of a simple simulation model, preliminary findings suggest that carrier benefits can also be significant.

Combinatorial Bid Generation Problem for Transportation Service Procurement

2005 ◽  
Vol 1923 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiubin Wang ◽  
Mu Xia
Keyword(s):  
Service Providers ◽  
Optimality Criterion ◽  
Combinatorial Auctions ◽  
Combinatorial Auction ◽  
Routing Problem ◽  
Transportation Service ◽  
Insertion Method ◽  
Truck Routing ◽  
Service Procurement ◽  
Generation Problem

In combinatorial auctions, solving the bid generation problem (BGP) for bidders is critical to achieving efficiency. However, in the recent surge of combinatorial auction research, little attention has been paid to the BGP. In this paper, the BGP faced by transportation service providers is studied. First, the bidder's optimality criterion of a combinatorial bid is clarified, and then the focus is on the bundling method when an OR bid language is used. Through examples, bundles generated by solving the optimal truck routing problem were examined, and it was found that the resulting bid might not be optimal. This heuristic is compared with a simple nearest insertion method. The simulation result shows that whereas the former outperforms the latter in most cases, many times the latter outperforms the former by 5% to 8%.

scholarly journals Incentive Based Load Shedding Management in a Microgrid Using Combinatorial Auction with IoT Infrastructure

Sensors ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (6) ◽  
pp. 1935
Author(s):  
Bizzat Hussain Zaidi ◽  
Ihsan Ullah ◽  
Musharraf Alam ◽  
Bamidele Adebisi ◽  
Atif Azad ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Genetic Algorithm ◽  
Particle Swarm Optimization ◽  
Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm ◽  
Hybrid Genetic Algorithm ◽  
Combinatorial Auctions ◽  
Load Shedding ◽  
Combinatorial Auction ◽  
Swarm Optimization ◽  
Winner Determination ◽  
Management Scheme

This paper presents a novel incentive-based load shedding management scheme within a microgrid environment equipped with the required IoT infrastructure. The proposed mechanism works on the principles of reverse combinatorial auction. We consider a region of multiple consumers who are willing to curtail their load in the peak hours in order to gain some incentives later. Using the properties of combinatorial auctions, the participants can bid in packages or combinations in order to maximize their and overall social welfare of the system. The winner determination problem of the proposed combinatorial auction, determined using particle swarm optimization algorithm and hybrid genetic algorithm, is also presented in this paper. The performance evaluation and stability test of the proposed scheme are simulated using MATLAB and presented in this paper. The results indicate that combinatorial auctions are an excellent choice for load shedding management where a maximum of 50 users participate.

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