scholarly journals When is secession legitimate?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Ashleigh Bennett

<p>Secession claims are not sufficiently dealt with at international law. Similarly theoretical analyses of the moral justifications for secession widely differ, with little scholarly agreement on, for example, whether there is a primary right to secede, a remedial right only, or no right to secede at all. This paper reviews the scholarly debate on legal, moral and constitutional legitimacy of secession, and develops five criteria for assessing the overall legitimacy of a secession claim: (1) nationhood and claim to territory; (2) self-determination and autonomy; (3) treatment at the hands of the state; (4) viability of the proposed state ; and (5) position of the existing state. Applying these criteria to three very different but equally topical possible secession claims - Scotland from the United Kingdom, Catalonia from Spain, and Novorossiya from Ukraine - the interplay between these criteria is demonstrated.</p>

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Ashleigh Bennett

<p>Secession claims are not sufficiently dealt with at international law. Similarly theoretical analyses of the moral justifications for secession widely differ, with little scholarly agreement on, for example, whether there is a primary right to secede, a remedial right only, or no right to secede at all. This paper reviews the scholarly debate on legal, moral and constitutional legitimacy of secession, and develops five criteria for assessing the overall legitimacy of a secession claim: (1) nationhood and claim to territory; (2) self-determination and autonomy; (3) treatment at the hands of the state; (4) viability of the proposed state ; and (5) position of the existing state. Applying these criteria to three very different but equally topical possible secession claims - Scotland from the United Kingdom, Catalonia from Spain, and Novorossiya from Ukraine - the interplay between these criteria is demonstrated.</p>


Author(s):  
Anna Stilz

This book offers a qualified defense of a territorial states system. It argues that three core values—occupancy, basic justice, and collective self-determination—are served by an international system made up of self-governing, spatially defined political units. The defense is qualified because the book does not actually justify all of the sovereignty rights states currently claim and that are recognized in international law. Instead, the book proposes important changes to states’ sovereign prerogatives, particularly with respect to internal autonomy for political minorities, immigration, and natural resources. Part I of the book argues for a right of occupancy, holding that a legitimate function of the international system is to specify and protect people’s preinstitutional claims to specific geographical places. Part II turns to the question of how a state might acquire legitimate jurisdiction over a population of occupants. It argues that the state will have a right to rule a population and its territory if it satisfies conditions of basic justice and facilitates its people’s collective self-determination. Finally, Parts III and IV of this book argue that the exclusionary sovereignty rights to control over borders and natural resources that can plausibly be justified on the basis of the three core values are more limited than has traditionally been thought.


1979 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 628-646 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Crawford

In a series of articles in this Journal, Professor Robert Wilson drew attention to the incorporation of references to international law in United States statutes, a technique designed to allow recourse to international law by the courts in interpreting and implementing those statutes, and, consequently, to help ensure conformity between international and U.S. law. The purpose of this article is to survey the references, direct and indirect, to international law in the 20th-century statutes of two Commonwealth countries in order to see to what extent similar techniques have been adopted. The choice of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth of Australia as the subjects of this survey is no doubt somewhat arbitrary (although passing reference will be made to the legislation of Canada and New Zealand). But the United Kingdom, a semi-unitary state whose involvement in international relations has been substantial throughout the century, and the Commonwealth of Australia, a federal polity with substantial legislative power over foreign affairs and defense -whose international role has changed markedly since 1901, do provide useful examples of states with constitutional and legislative continuity since 1901, and (as will be seen) considerable legislative involvement in this field.


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 419-468 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Kattan

This article uses the history of partition to assess when self-determination became a rule of customary international law prohibiting partition as a method of decolonization. In so doing it revisits the partitions of Indochina, Korea, India, Palestine, Cyprus, South Africa, and South West Africa, and explains that UN practice underwent a transformation when the UN General Assembly opposed the United Kingdom’s partition proposals for Cyprus in 1958. Two years later, the UN General Assembly condemned any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country in Resolution 1514 (1960). The illegality of partition under customary international law was raised during the second phase of the South West Africa Cases (1960–1966) in respect of South Africa’s homelands policy, but the International Court of Justice (ICJ) infamously did not address the merits of those cases. The illegality of partition was also raised in the arbitration between the United Kingdom and Mauritius over the establishment of the British Indian Ocean Territory in 1965. Like the ICJ in the South West Africa Cases, the Arbitral Tribunal decided that it did not have jurisdiction to address the legality of the British excision of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius, even though the legality of the excision was argued at length between counsels for Mauritius and the United Kingdom in their oral pleadings and written statements. However, in their joint dissenting opinion, Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum and Judge James Kateka expressed their opinion that self-determination had developed before 1965, and that consequently the partition was unlawful. This paper agrees that selfdetermination prohibited the partition of Mauritius to establish the British Indian Ocean Territory, a new colony, in 1965 although self-determination probably did not emerge as a rule of customary international law until the adoption of the human rights covenants in 1966, after the excision of the Chagos Archipelago in 1965, but before the passage of the Mauritius Independence Act in 1968.


2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 322-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Andrejevic

In February 2009 the House of Lords Constitutional Committee in the United Kingdom published the report Surveillance: Citizens and the State. Some have hailed this as a landmark document. The following is one of four commentaries that the editors of Surveillance & Society solicited in response to the report.


Author(s):  
Olha Ovechkina

In connection with the decision to withdraw the UK from the EU a number of companies will need to take into account that from 1 January 2021 EU law will no longer apply to the United Kingdom and will become a "third country" for EU Member States, unless the provisions of bilateral agreements or multilateral trade agreements. This means that the four European freedoms (movement of goods, services, labor and capital) will no longer apply to UK companies to the same extent as they did during the UK's EU membership. The purpose of the article is to study, first of all, the peculiarities of the influence of Great Britain's withdrawal from the European Union on the legal regulation of the status of European legal entities. Brexit results in the inability to register European companies and European economic interest groups in the UK. Such companies already registered before 01.01.2021 have the opportunity to move their place of registration to an EU Member State. These provisions are defined in Regulations 2018 (2018/1298) and Regulations 2018 (2018/1299).British companies with branches in EU Member States will now be subject to the rules applicable to third-country companies, which provide additional information on their activities. In the EU, many countries apply the criterion of actual location, which causes, among other things, the problem of non-recognition of legal entities established in the country where the criterion of incorporation is used (including the United Kingdom), at the same time as the governing bodies of such legal entities the state where the settlement criterion is applied. Therefore, to reduce the likelihood of possible non-recognition of British companies, given the location of the board of such a legal entity in the state where the residency criterion applies, it seems appropriate to consider reincarnation at the actual location of such a company. Reducing the risks of these negative consequences in connection with Brexit on cross-border activities of legal entities is possible by concluding interstate bilateral and multilateral agreements that would contain unified rules on conflict of law regulation of the status of legal entities.


1999 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Laugharne

Eighteen months ago I came to Geraldton, Western Australia from the United Kingdom to help develop a psychiatric service for Aboriginal people in the mid-west region of the state. This has been a fascinating and challenging experience both professionally and personally and I would like to outline the context of this work and to reflect on some of the issues that seem particularly relevant.


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