A Talk on the Question of Dialectical Materialism in Psychology: A Discussion with Comrade pan Shu

1983 ◽  
Vol 16 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 32-44
Author(s):  
Liu Zeru
2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 215-228

This paper deals with the impact that Karl Marx"s Das Kapital (and especially its fourth volume, the theory of Surplus Value) had on the category of economy in Kazimir Malevich"s output. In a series of texts, Malevich proclaims economy the new criterion of art and the Black Square its embodiment in contemporary painting. While the author was analyzing Marx"s views on labor and human nature, echoes of them turned up in Malevich"s manifestos and philosophical essays where the artist pondered the idea of the liberation of creative exaltation. The article others an interpretation of the creative process itself from the standpoint of economy, which for Malevich provided an opportunity to lay down the foundation for a new kind of art that was consistent with the prevailing ideology. The author points out that while Malevich was in Vitebsk he studied Marx"s works with idea of incorporating economic studies into art: his speculations on the relationships between the ideological superstructure and the practical, economic base were written in the manner of Marxist philosophy and provided the basis for his main essays, The World as Non-Objectivity (1923) and Suprematism: Thee World as Non-Objectivity or Eternal Rest (1923-1924). They defined the new art as an independent ideological superstructure positioned “outside of other contents and ideologies.” Parallel to that, the author examines the correspondence between Malevich"s theory of the surplus element and Marxist doctrines on surplus value. It is also shown that Malevich hoped to prove that, as in dialectical materialism, his new surplus element opens the way to a new artistic structure that is emerging from the womb of the old system in the same way that communism comes about as a kind of heterogeneous body from within the underpinnings of bourgeois society.


Author(s):  
Marjorie Levinson

Chapter 2 studies the relationship between historicism and Romanticism. It locates the two between Enlightenment materialism, on one side, and Marxian historical and dialectical materialism, on the other. In so doing, it isolates a paradox of materialism—namely, its production of the very concepts that undo it. These include the ideas of knowing as dissociated conceptual activity, and consciousness as absolute negativity. Romanticism and historicism, it is argued, represent solutions to a common problem—a claim defended through a reading of Wordsworth’s sonnet “The world is too much with us.” In considering how we position ourselves in relation to past literature, the chapter evaluates the choices between contemplation and empathy, knowledge and power, blame and defense. As such, it represents the first move in a self-critical turn on the new historicist method that had shaped the author’s—and part of the field’s—work in the previous decade.


1970 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 32-47
Author(s):  
H. B. Acton

It is easy to understand why Hegel's philosophy should be little studied by English-speaking philosophers today. Those who at the beginning of the twentieth century initiated the movement we are now caught up in presented their earliest philosophical arguments as criticisms of the prevailing Anglo-Hegelian views. It may now be thought illiberal to take much interest in this perhaps excusably slaughtered royal family, and positively reactionary to hanker after the foreign dynasty from which it sometimes claimed descent. Hegel was a systematic philosopher with a scope hardly to be found today, and men who, as we say, wish to keep up with their subject may well be daunted at the idea of having to understand a way of looking at philosophy which they suspect would not repay them for their trouble anyway. Furthermore, since Hegel wrote, formal logic has advanced in ways he could not have foreseen, and has, it seems to many, destroyed the whole basis of his dialectical method. At the same time, the creation of a science of sociology, it is supposed, has rendered obsolete the philosophy of history for which Hegel was at one time admired. In countries where there are Marxist intellectuals, Hegel does get discussed as the inadvertent forerunner of historical and dialectical materialism. But in England, where there is no such need or presence, there do not seem to be any very strong ideological reasons for discussing him. In what follows I shall be asking you to direct your thoughts to certain forgotten far-off things which I hope you will find historically interesting even if you do not agree with me that they give important clues for an understanding of human nature and human society.


1970 ◽  
Vol 20 (79) ◽  
pp. 182
Author(s):  
Anthony Holloway ◽  
Guy Planty-Bonjour

1964 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 533-534
Author(s):  
G. L. Arnold

2021 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 360-384
Author(s):  
Eric-John Russell

Engels once remarked to Marx that the “materialist dialectic, which for years has been our best working tool and our sharpest weapon, was, remarkably enough, discovered not only by us but also, independently of us and even of Hegel, by a German worker, Joseph Dietzgen.” The status of the dialectic, however, within what ought to instead be described as Dietzgen's inductive empiricism, is problematic. Dietzgen's work stands as a hitherto unacknowledged precursor to the Marxist ideology of Diamat. The first question is whether or not Marx's materialism ought to be conflated with Dietzgen's empiricism. Second, Dietzgen's efforts to establish a theory of human thought structured through the methods of the natural sciences requires critical evaluation. Although Dietzgen's works may anticipate some of the theoretical contours of Diamat, equating materialism with empiricism and rendering the dialectical method into a universal methodology on a par with the methods of the natural sciences, as pursued by Dietzgen, is a project that is perhaps not worthy of Marx's and Engels’ nominal veneration.


Subjectivity ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 376-395 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Flisfeder

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