scholarly journals Como é que é 'ver através' uma fotografia

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 442-447
Author(s):  
Fernão Pessoa Ramos
Keyword(s):  

A exposição do argumento de que as fotografias são transparentes, por Kendall Walton, está longe de ser simplória e envolve carga conceitual sofisticada, dentro do campo analítico-cognitivo. Mas podemos ir além disto. O fato da imagem-câmera fotográfica de ser transparente, conforme exposto por Kendall, não implica consequência sobre matéria do mundo ser manipulada, alterada ou fatiada. A transparência apenas indica que é ‘vendo através’ que percebemos o que nos é indicado. É deste patamar que emerge o campo da subjetividade que abriga o que chega de lá, pela transparência. É coisa própria do mundo, ser-aí que habitamos em nossa intuição ou percepção, ao interagirmos com outras coisas e seres. A conformação imagética da imagem-câmera interage sobre a radical indeterminação da presença na tomada, conforme ela transcorre grudada no fluxo da duração. A encenação na tomada, sua mise-em-scène, é um modo de ‘morar’ na indeterminação radical do acontecer que nos habita como existência. Ela, encenação, potencializa assim a exterioridade num ‘de-fora’, num aderir ao mundo que, neste modo, a conformação maquínica fotográfica/audiovisual inaugura. Encontra-se nesta imagem, uma espécie de recuo de mim no estar-aí do ser.PALAVRAS CHAVE: Teoria da Fotografia, Imagem-Câmera, Tomada, Transparência, Cognitivismo, Fenomenologia.

1993 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marion A. Guck
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (20) ◽  
pp. 15-30
Author(s):  
Arash Sedaghatkish ◽  
Marzieh Piravi Vanak ◽  
Mohammad Zaimaran ◽  
Mohammad Reza Emadi ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Steinbeck

Marion A. Guck, following Kendall Walton, has examined the “fictions” that underlie many analyses of European concert music. Here I discuss the fictions that we often tell in our analyses of musical improvisation, and I show how these fictions relate to recent developments in the interdisciplinary field of improvisation studies.


Author(s):  
Simona Zetterberg-Nielsen ◽  
Henrik Zetterberg-Nielsen

Fictionality is a term used in various fields within and beyond literary theory, from speech act theory through the theory of fictional worlds, to theories of “as if.” It is often equated with the genre of the novel. However, as a consequence of the rhetorical theory of fictionality developed from the early 21st century, the concept has gained ground as an autonomous communicative device, independent of its relation to any genre. Theories of fictionality have been developed (1) prior to the establishment of fiction as a genre, with Plato, Aristotle, Philip Sidney, and Pierre Daniel Huet; (2) with the establishment of fiction by Blankenburg and some of the first novelists, such as Daniel Defoe and Horace Walpole; (3) after the establishment of the novel, with Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Hans Vaihinger, John Searle, Kendall Walton, Dorrit Cohn, Richard Walsh, and others. From the 1990s, the debates on fictionality have centered on questions of whether fictionality is best described in terms of semantic, syntactic, or pragmatic approaches. This includes discussions about possible signposts of fictionality, encouraged by the semantic and syntactic approaches, and about how to define the concept of fictionality, as either a question of text internal features as argued by the semantic and syntactic theorists, or as a question of contextual assumptions, as held by the pragmatists. Regarding fictionality as a rhetorical resource, among many other resources in communication at large, has a number of consequences for the study of fictionality and for literary theory in general. First, it contributes the insight that literature is similar to other acts of communication. Second, overtly invented stories do not have to follow the rules of non-invented communication. Third, a rhetorical approach to fictionality makes visible the ways in which fiction interacts with and affects reality, in concrete, yet complicated ways.


Author(s):  
Mohan Matthen

Vision is organized around material objects; they are most of what we see. But we also see beams of light, depictions, shadows, reflections, etc. These things look like material objects in many ways, but it is still visually obvious that they are not material objects. This chapter articulates some principles that allow us to understand how we see these ‘ephemera’. H.P. Grice’s definition of seeing is standard in many discussions; here I clarify and augment it with a criterion drawn from Fred Dretske. This enables me to re-analyse certain ephemera that have received counter-intuitive treatments in the work of Kendall Walton (photographs), Brian O’Shaughnessy (light), and Roy Sorenson (occlusions).


Daímon ◽  
2016 ◽  
pp. 39
Author(s):  
Alberto Murcia Carbonell
Keyword(s):  

En este artículo se revisa la hipótesis sobre la transparencia de las imágenes de Kendall Walton y sus diferentes críticas. Propongo que la imagen fotográfico-cinematográfica solo puede ser potencialmente transparente. Debería, así, hablarse de grados de transparencia. La transparencia de la imagen se divide en umbrales que dependen de la fase de producción en la que esté. De esta forma tenemos transparencia en el registro, de representación, de enunciación y epistémica.


1991 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 407
Author(s):  
Nicholas Wolterstorff ◽  
Kendall Walton
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-158
Author(s):  
Monika Jovanovic

The public opinion in philosophy is guided by a multitude of factors and sometimes an idea gets general recognition but is systematically studied only after a few decades have passed. There aren?t many papers in contemporary aesthetics that can match the originality and influence of Kendall Walton?s ?Categories of Art?. It is unsurprising, then, that contemporary aestheticians often expand upon its main theses. Nevertheless, even after almost half a century from its first publication, an exhaustive and comprehensive interpretation of Walton?s paper is still lacking. Moreover, even Walton himself doesn?t provide a detailed elucidation of his ideas, many of which are merely outlined in his seminal paper. Furthermore, he doesn?t apply his view to evaluative aesthetic judgments, even though such an attempt could today, when the debate about aesthetic canons is on the wane, might help us understand the nature of aesthetic evaluation. The goal of this paper is to once again shed some light on the significance of Walton?s approach and on its reception in contemporary aesthetics.


2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 33-46
Author(s):  
Monika Jovanovic

As Kendall Walton correctly noticed, which aesthetic properties a work of art will possess does not depend solely on its directly percetible properties but also to which ?category of art? it belongs. However, appropriate interpretation of an artwork, especially a literary work requires knowing of intentional context in which the work was made. Concerning the relationship between meaning of some literary work and semantic intentions of its author, in contemporary aesthetics there is a debate between actual and hypothetical intentionalists. In this paper I will exemine the main questions which are posed in this debate, and try to show how we can improve Levinson's hypothetical intentionalism, appealing to the dispositional conception of intentions. I will finally suggest an alternative way of understanding the relationship between suitable intentional factors and meaning of a given literary work.


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