scholarly journals Distinguishing Charter Rights in Criminal and Regulatory Investigations: What’s the Purpose of Analyzing Purpose?

2010 ◽  
pp. 93
Author(s):  
Christopher Sherrin

This article critically evaluates one of the main justifications for affording persons accused of regulatory offences constitutional protections different from those afforded to persons accused of criminal offences. It is only the latter who enjoy robust constitutional protection against self-incrimination and to privacy. This difference has been justified on the basis that there are different purposes behind regulatory and criminal investigations. The former are supposedly intended to ensure compliance with the law whereas the latter are supposedly intended to gather evidence for prosecution. This article challenges the validity of the justification based on purpose. The author suggests that focusing on investigatory purpose has no relevance to the interests protected by the right to privacy, offers no real protection against the admission of unreliable evidence, and undermines the very principle it is said to protect: the principle against self-incrimination. Moreover, the justification based on purpose misunderstands the purposes of both regulatory and criminal investigations and ignores the reality that in many instances they share the same purpose.

Author(s):  
Jessica Lake

This chapter examines cases in which a right to privacy was invoked by women to protest against violations of their bodies or the bodies of their newborn babies. This chapter offers a history of the right to privacy that charts the ways in which the law traditionally “protected” women’s bodies by treating them as male property and confining them to the home. The advent of the camera, its ability to penetrate physical and temporal boundaries, and its creation of movable as well as moving images, brought into question the efficacy of laws such as trespass and nuisance (grounded in physical structures) to protect personal privacy. To highlight the new invasions inflicted by the camera, I compare the cases of DeMay v Roberts and Feeney v Young, which involved the optic violation of a woman’s reproductive body by a stranger’s eyes and a camera respectively. Using a series of medical cases, I argue that many women invoked a right to privacy to protest against the transformation of their bodies (and the bodies of their dead deformed infants) into voyeuristic spectacles of “monstrosity”.


Philosophy ◽  
1968 ◽  
Vol 43 (163) ◽  
pp. 38-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. R. Lough

A law, say, prohibits homosexual conduct or punishes the prostitute for plying her trade. According to some it is a bad law, according to others a necessary one. Those who argue that it is a bad law do so on a variety of grounds—that it is sheer folly to try to change human nature by law, that such legislation can only be effective at the price of the right to privacy, that the punishment of acts arising from compelling desires is cruel and excessive, that the law has no business meddling in what people do to others with their consent. Those who argue that it is a necessary law do so on one ground, that the act in question is immoral, and that what is wrong must be punished, lest the law itself fall into disrepute by failing to carry out a consistent campaign against wrong-doing.


2021 ◽  
Vol 03 (02) ◽  
pp. 60-67
Author(s):  
Assia BOUAMRA

The new millennium has brought about profound developments in society, reaching all fields through which means of communication have become, as a result of the digital revolution, basic pillars for the growth of countries' economies, which has affected the traditional human lifestyle socially, economically and culturally, and it became necessary to update the current legal arsenal to match the new bets, as the law Not in isolation from developments in the technological arena, it has become necessary to frame these technologies in order to protect the individual and society alike, as it is wrong to ignore the thesis of the effects of cyberspace on society and the law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 567-596
Author(s):  
Mohsin Dhali ◽  
Sonny Zulhuda ◽  
Suzi Fadhilah Ismail

The present unbridled advancement in the field of information and communication technology has resulted in individuals being thrust at a crossroad, where refusing to sacrifice one’s privacy would mean the denial of technological benefits. Concern for privacy begins once a child is born into this world where the right to privacy could now be argued needs to be considered as one of the basic human rights similar to other inalienable rights such as the right to life and liberties. Bangladesh is one of the countries that has not given explicit recognition to the right of privacy. This is evident from the absence of explicit indications of the right to privacy in the Constitution of Bangladesh and judicial interventions make the constitutional protection of privacy questionable. The purpose of the present study is to find out whether the right to privacy is in fact recognized and protected by the Constitution of Bangladesh by examining specific provisions in the Constitution of Bangladesh to locate provisions that could be relied on to show that a sliver of recognition could be given to the right of privacy in Bangladesh. This position is then compared to other jurisdictions, especially the common law jurisdictions. The study finds that although Article 43 of the Constitution guarantees limited protection that encompasses the right to privacy of home and correspondence but if read together with the right to life and liberty in Article 32, it could be argued that these are viable provisions in recognizing the right to privacy under the Constitution of Bangladesh.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-44
Author(s):  
Sandra Seubert ◽  
Carlos Becker

AbstractIn times of digital pervasion of everyday life, the EU has strengthened a normative idea of European fundamental rights, especially by referring to a strong notion of privacy protection. A normative corridor is evolving with the “right to privacy” at its heart, a right that will be instrumental in shaping the European legal architecture’s future structure. In this Article we argue that the constitutional protection of privacy rights is not only of individual relevance but also of major democratic significance: it protects the integrity of the communication structures that underpin democratic self-determination. The debate on privacy protection, however, often lacks a democratic understanding of privacy and misses its public value. Following an interactionist understanding of privacy and a discourse-theoretical model of democracy, our argument puts forward a conceptual link between privacy and the idea of communicative freedom. From this perspective, the substantiation of a European fundamental right to privacy can be seen as a possible contribution to promoting European democracy in general.


1983 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-267
Author(s):  
Nina Zalfzman

In the Secret Monitoring Law, 5739–1979, the Israeli legislature enacted special protection of an individual's right to privacy with respect to his conversations. The Law prohibits:a) the secret monitoring of a person's conversation without lawful authority,b) knowingly using, without lawful authority, any information of the contents of any conversation obtained by secret monitoring, or knowingly disclosing any such information or the contents of any such conversation to a person not authorized to receive it.The legislature, however, grants to certain investigative authorities (The Security Service and the Police Force) the right to conduct secret monitoring pursuant to certain statutory provisions. The legislature provided for this exception to the general prohibition whenever monitoring is deemed essential for reasons of state security, or in order to prevent offences or to detect offenders.


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