The Israeli Approach to Evidence Obtained in Violation of the Right to Privacy

1983 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-267
Author(s):  
Nina Zalfzman

In the Secret Monitoring Law, 5739–1979, the Israeli legislature enacted special protection of an individual's right to privacy with respect to his conversations. The Law prohibits:a) the secret monitoring of a person's conversation without lawful authority,b) knowingly using, without lawful authority, any information of the contents of any conversation obtained by secret monitoring, or knowingly disclosing any such information or the contents of any such conversation to a person not authorized to receive it.The legislature, however, grants to certain investigative authorities (The Security Service and the Police Force) the right to conduct secret monitoring pursuant to certain statutory provisions. The legislature provided for this exception to the general prohibition whenever monitoring is deemed essential for reasons of state security, or in order to prevent offences or to detect offenders.

Author(s):  
Jessica Lake

This chapter examines cases in which a right to privacy was invoked by women to protest against violations of their bodies or the bodies of their newborn babies. This chapter offers a history of the right to privacy that charts the ways in which the law traditionally “protected” women’s bodies by treating them as male property and confining them to the home. The advent of the camera, its ability to penetrate physical and temporal boundaries, and its creation of movable as well as moving images, brought into question the efficacy of laws such as trespass and nuisance (grounded in physical structures) to protect personal privacy. To highlight the new invasions inflicted by the camera, I compare the cases of DeMay v Roberts and Feeney v Young, which involved the optic violation of a woman’s reproductive body by a stranger’s eyes and a camera respectively. Using a series of medical cases, I argue that many women invoked a right to privacy to protest against the transformation of their bodies (and the bodies of their dead deformed infants) into voyeuristic spectacles of “monstrosity”.


2010 ◽  
pp. 93
Author(s):  
Christopher Sherrin

This article critically evaluates one of the main justifications for affording persons accused of regulatory offences constitutional protections different from those afforded to persons accused of criminal offences. It is only the latter who enjoy robust constitutional protection against self-incrimination and to privacy. This difference has been justified on the basis that there are different purposes behind regulatory and criminal investigations. The former are supposedly intended to ensure compliance with the law whereas the latter are supposedly intended to gather evidence for prosecution. This article challenges the validity of the justification based on purpose. The author suggests that focusing on investigatory purpose has no relevance to the interests protected by the right to privacy, offers no real protection against the admission of unreliable evidence, and undermines the very principle it is said to protect: the principle against self-incrimination. Moreover, the justification based on purpose misunderstands the purposes of both regulatory and criminal investigations and ignores the reality that in many instances they share the same purpose.


Philosophy ◽  
1968 ◽  
Vol 43 (163) ◽  
pp. 38-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. R. Lough

A law, say, prohibits homosexual conduct or punishes the prostitute for plying her trade. According to some it is a bad law, according to others a necessary one. Those who argue that it is a bad law do so on a variety of grounds—that it is sheer folly to try to change human nature by law, that such legislation can only be effective at the price of the right to privacy, that the punishment of acts arising from compelling desires is cruel and excessive, that the law has no business meddling in what people do to others with their consent. Those who argue that it is a necessary law do so on one ground, that the act in question is immoral, and that what is wrong must be punished, lest the law itself fall into disrepute by failing to carry out a consistent campaign against wrong-doing.


2021 ◽  
Vol 03 (02) ◽  
pp. 60-67
Author(s):  
Assia BOUAMRA

The new millennium has brought about profound developments in society, reaching all fields through which means of communication have become, as a result of the digital revolution, basic pillars for the growth of countries' economies, which has affected the traditional human lifestyle socially, economically and culturally, and it became necessary to update the current legal arsenal to match the new bets, as the law Not in isolation from developments in the technological arena, it has become necessary to frame these technologies in order to protect the individual and society alike, as it is wrong to ignore the thesis of the effects of cyberspace on society and the law.


Author(s):  
Claire Fenton-Glynn

This chapter considers the right of the child to respect for private life from the perspective of three interrelated, but distinct, aspects. First, it considers the Court’s case law concerning the right to privacy, and the protection of one’s image. Second, it examines the development of the Court’s approach to the right to receive information—this ranges from rather conservative and paternalistic beginnings to a more robust protection of freedom of expression. Finally, the chapter analyses the Court’s jurisprudence concerning the right to identity, including the right to information on origins and rights concerning the naming of children and their citizenship.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 150-170
Author(s):  
Edita Gruodytė ◽  
Saulė Milčiuvienė

Abstract In Lithuania rules for the anonymization of court decisions were introduced in 2005. These rules require automatic anonymization of all court decisions, which in the opinion of the authors violates the public interest to know and freedom of expression is unjustifiably restricted on behalf of the right to privacy. This issue covers two diametrically opposed human rights: the right to privacy and the right to information. The first question is how the balance between two equivalent rights could be reached. The second question is whether this regulation is in accordance with the law as it is established in the national Constitution and revealed by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania and developed by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. The authors conclude that the legislator is not empowered to delegate to the Judicial Council issues which are a matter of legal regulation and suggest possible solutions evaluating practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Court of Human Rights, and selected EU countries.


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