scholarly journals The Democratic Impact of Strengthening European Fundamental Rights in the Digital Age: The Example of Privacy Protection

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-44
Author(s):  
Sandra Seubert ◽  
Carlos Becker

AbstractIn times of digital pervasion of everyday life, the EU has strengthened a normative idea of European fundamental rights, especially by referring to a strong notion of privacy protection. A normative corridor is evolving with the “right to privacy” at its heart, a right that will be instrumental in shaping the European legal architecture’s future structure. In this Article we argue that the constitutional protection of privacy rights is not only of individual relevance but also of major democratic significance: it protects the integrity of the communication structures that underpin democratic self-determination. The debate on privacy protection, however, often lacks a democratic understanding of privacy and misses its public value. Following an interactionist understanding of privacy and a discourse-theoretical model of democracy, our argument puts forward a conceptual link between privacy and the idea of communicative freedom. From this perspective, the substantiation of a European fundamental right to privacy can be seen as a possible contribution to promoting European democracy in general.

2020 ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Najarian Peters

The right to privacy is one of the most fundamental rights in American jurisprudence. In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis conceptualized the right to privacy as the right to be let alone and inspired privacy jurisprudence that tracked their initial description. Warren and Brandeis conceptualized further that this right was not exclusively meant to protect one’s body or physical property. Privacy rights were protective of “the products and the processes of the mind” and the “inviolate personality.” Privacy was further understood to protect the ability to “live one’s life as one chooses, free from assault, intrusion or invasion except as can be justified by the clear needs of community living under a government of law.” Case law supported and extended their theorization by recognizing that privacy is essentially bound up in an individual’s ability to live a self-authored and self-curated life without unnecessary intrusions and distractions. Hence, privacy may be viewed as the right of individuals to be and become themselves. This right is well-established; however, scholars have vastly undertheorized the right to privacy as it intersects with racial discrimination and childhood. Specifically, the ways in which racial discrimination strips Black people—and therefore Black children—of privacy rights and protections, and the ways in which Black people reclaim and reshape those rights and protections remain a dynamic and fertile space, ripe for exploration yet unacknowledged by privacy law scholars. The most vulnerable members of the Black population, children, rely on their parents to protect their rights until they are capable of doing so themselves. Still, the American education system exposes Black children to racial discrimination that results in life-long injuries ranging from the psychological harms of daily racial micro-aggressions and assaults, to disproportionate exclusionary discipline and juvenile incarceration. One response to these ongoing and often traumatic incursions is a growing number of Black parents have decided to remove their children from traditional school settings. Instead, these parents provide their children with home-education in order to protect their children’s right to be and become in childhood.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-85
Author(s):  
Yohanes Firmansyah ◽  
Imam Haryanto

The Covid-19 case has had a huge influence on all aspects of human life, starting from health, economy, sosial, law, and many more. The COVID-19 pandemic has caused various frictions between various interests, one of which is a clash between individual interests and community interests. One of the obvious things about this problem is regarding the impact of COVID-19 in the field of sociology, especially the relationship between individuals, especially the issue of community stigmatization regarding infectious diseases, the dilemma between the privacy rights of the identity of COVID-19 patients and the disclosure of publik data on COVID-19 patients with various risks will injure and cause multiple material and immaterial losses. On the other hand, Covid-19 also raises various sosial-psychological problems and legal problems that still do not regulate all aspects of human life. This paper describes the sociological elements of COVID-19, the right to privacy, publik information disclosure, and the sosial-psychological impact of COVID-19, along with a juridical review of the right to privacy and publik disclosure of information regarding the transparency of COVID-19.


2017 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 11-25
Author(s):  
Marta De Bazelaire De Ruppierre

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF LEGAL PERSONS DURING THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S INSPECTIONSThe paper aims to discuss the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the EU institutions in competition law proceedings, showing as an example the respect for the right to privacy of undertakings during the inspections carried out by the European Commission. Although exercising the control powers of the Commission potentially collides with a number of fundamental rights expressed in the Charter, it is the analysis of Art. 7 CFR that allows to depict the evolution of the EU’s approach to privacy of legal persons, showing the accompanying judicial dialogue, or lack thereof, between the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the EU. The article short-defines the dawn raids, examines the application of Article 7 CFR to legal persons, highlighting the aspects of protection of domicile and secrecy of correspondence, compares the standards provided by ECHR and EU law, pondering also on how the CFR guarantees can be provided and effectively controlled. It also reflects on the issue whether the Court of Justice has a forerunner role in promoting fundamental rights of undertakings in matters of competition law.


2010 ◽  
pp. 93
Author(s):  
Christopher Sherrin

This article critically evaluates one of the main justifications for affording persons accused of regulatory offences constitutional protections different from those afforded to persons accused of criminal offences. It is only the latter who enjoy robust constitutional protection against self-incrimination and to privacy. This difference has been justified on the basis that there are different purposes behind regulatory and criminal investigations. The former are supposedly intended to ensure compliance with the law whereas the latter are supposedly intended to gather evidence for prosecution. This article challenges the validity of the justification based on purpose. The author suggests that focusing on investigatory purpose has no relevance to the interests protected by the right to privacy, offers no real protection against the admission of unreliable evidence, and undermines the very principle it is said to protect: the principle against self-incrimination. Moreover, the justification based on purpose misunderstands the purposes of both regulatory and criminal investigations and ignores the reality that in many instances they share the same purpose.


2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-60
Author(s):  
Veljko Turanjanin

This paper is focused on several important issues that deal with special investigation measures. The main perspective of the analysis is based on the ECtHR case law on this issue. Two issues are from primary interests: secret monitoring of communication and undercover investigator. Intensive ICT development enables various modern techniques and methods of crime investigation but also results in some new types of crime that could be committed using ICT. Expansion of the fundamental rights and their protection, especially in Europe, raised global awareness of the right to privacy and the need to protect it. Having that in mind, it seems that the main question that should be answered by legislator is: Where is the borderline between the right to privacy and the public interest to investigate or prevent crime and collect evidence? The undercover investigator falls under Article 6 of the Convention and there are different rules on the admissibility of such evidence. Serbian Criminal Procedure Law on some points is in line with ECtHR standards, but some very important provisions, as well as practice, are not.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (05) ◽  
pp. 722-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentin M. Pfisterer

AbstractIn recent years, the CJEU has impressively brought to bear the protection of the fundamental rights to privacy and protection of personal data as contained in the CFREU. The Court’s decisions in the Digital Rights, Schrems, Tele2, and PNR cases have reshaped the political and legal landscape in Europe and beyond. By restricting the powers of the governments of EU Member States and annulling legislative acts enacted by the EU legislator, the decisions had, and continue to have, effects well beyond the respective individual cases. Despite their strong impact on privacy and data protection across Europe, however, these landmark decisions reveal a number of flaws and inconsistencies in the conceptualization of the rights to privacy and protection of personal data as endorsed and interpreted by the CJEU. This Article identifies and discusses some of the shortcomings revealed in the recent CJEU privacy and data protection landmark decisions and proposes to the CJEU a strategy aimed at resolving these shortcomings going forward.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (4) ◽  
pp. 994-1000
Author(s):  
Menaka Guruswamy

On August 24, 2017, the Supreme Court of India issued a rare, unanimous nine-judge decision holding that the right to privacy is protected by the Constitution of India. The case is all the more noteworthy because the Court reversed its prior decisions holding that the right to privacy was not protected by the country's Constitution. It arose out of the government's creation of a national database of biometric and demographic information for every Indian. Rejecting the government's arguments, the Court found that the right to privacy applies across the gamut of “fundamental” rights including equality, dignity (Article 14), speech, expression (Article 19), life, and liberty (Article 21). The six separate and concurring judgments in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Ret'd) and Anr v. Union of India and Ors are trailblazing for their commitment to privacy as a fundamental freedom and for the judges’ use of foreign law across jurisdictions and spanning centuries.


2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 567-596
Author(s):  
Mohsin Dhali ◽  
Sonny Zulhuda ◽  
Suzi Fadhilah Ismail

The present unbridled advancement in the field of information and communication technology has resulted in individuals being thrust at a crossroad, where refusing to sacrifice one’s privacy would mean the denial of technological benefits. Concern for privacy begins once a child is born into this world where the right to privacy could now be argued needs to be considered as one of the basic human rights similar to other inalienable rights such as the right to life and liberties. Bangladesh is one of the countries that has not given explicit recognition to the right of privacy. This is evident from the absence of explicit indications of the right to privacy in the Constitution of Bangladesh and judicial interventions make the constitutional protection of privacy questionable. The purpose of the present study is to find out whether the right to privacy is in fact recognized and protected by the Constitution of Bangladesh by examining specific provisions in the Constitution of Bangladesh to locate provisions that could be relied on to show that a sliver of recognition could be given to the right of privacy in Bangladesh. This position is then compared to other jurisdictions, especially the common law jurisdictions. The study finds that although Article 43 of the Constitution guarantees limited protection that encompasses the right to privacy of home and correspondence but if read together with the right to life and liberty in Article 32, it could be argued that these are viable provisions in recognizing the right to privacy under the Constitution of Bangladesh.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 442-456
Author(s):  
Radosław Wiśniewski ◽  
Inga Oleksiuk ◽  
Bożena Iwanowska

The main objective of the paper is to identify the imbalance between the right to privacy and the business objectives of entities creating new Data-Driven Business Models (DDBMs) of consumers (EU citizens). Information about the consumer and their characteristics has nowadays become a service or market commodity thanks to which new economic processes, based on the use of advanced data processing technologies, are created. In digital space, new types of DDBM are established, which provide entrepreneurs with added value, based on the mass use of the consumer’s data collected often without their knowledge, on the margins of legality. This paper analyzes the impact of the development of DDBMs on selected privacy areas: personal data, the right to be forgotten, confidentiality of communications, one’s image and identity. In each of these areas, situations are identified that indicate a progressive re-evaluation of citizens’ privacy rights. The authors suggest that disruption of the balance between the right to privacy and business objectives may lead to unambiguous consequences, not only for the consumer (EU citizen), but also for the business entities.


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