Konsep Distribusi Pendapatan Dalam Islam

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-97
Author(s):  
Moh. Ah. Subhan ZA
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Wealth Distribution ◽  
The State ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Job Opportunities ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Distribution Of Income

The main problem of social life in the community is about how to make the allocation and distribution of income well. Inequality and poverty basically arise not because of the difference of anyone’s strength and weakness in getting livelihood, but because of inappropriate distribution mechanism. With the result that wealth treasure just turns on the rich wealthy, which is in turn, results in the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.Therefore, a discussion on distribution becomes main focus of theory of Islamic economics. Moreover, the discussion of the distribution is not only related to economic issues, but also social and political aspects. On the other side, the economic vision of Islam gives priority to the guarantee of the fulfillment of a better life. Islam emphasizes distributive justice and encloses, in its system, a program for the redistribution of wealth and prosperity, so that each individual is guaranteed with a respectable and friendly standard of living. Islam recognizes private property rights, but the private property rights must be properly distributed. The personal property is used for self and family livelihood, for investment of the working capital, so that it can provide job opportunities for others, for help of the others through zakat, infaq, and shodaqoh. In this way, the wealth not only rotates on the rich, bringing on gap in social life.The problem of wealth distribution is closely related to the welfare of society. Therefore, the state has a duty to regulate the distribution of income in order that the distribution can be fair and reaches appropriate target. The state could at least attempt it by optimizing the role of BAZ (Badan Amil Zakat) and LAZ (Lembaga Amil Zakat) which has all this time been slack. If BAZ and LAZ can be optimized, author believes that inequality and poverty over time will vanish. This is because the majority of Indonesia's population is Muslim.

scholarly journals Konsep Distribusi Pendapatan Dalam Islam

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Moh. Ah. Subhan ZA
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Wealth Distribution ◽  
The State ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Job Opportunities ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Distribution Of Income

The main problem of social life in the community is about how to make the allocation and distribution of income well. Inequality and poverty basically arise not because of the difference of anyone’s strength and weakness in getting livelihood, but because of inappropriate distribution mechanism. With the result that wealth treasure just turns on the rich wealthy, which is in turn, results in the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.Therefore, a discussion on distribution becomes main focus of theory of Islamic economics. Moreover, the discussion of the distribution is not only related to economic issues, but also social and political aspects. On the other side, the economic vision of Islam gives priority to the guarantee of the fulfillment of a better life. Islam emphasizes distributive justice and encloses, in its system, a program for the redistribution of wealth and prosperity, so that each individual is guaranteed with a respectable and friendly standard of living. Islam recognizes private property rights, but the private property rights must be properly distributed. The personal property is used for self and family livelihood, for investment of the working capital, so that it can provide job opportunities for others, for help of the others through zakat, infaq, and shodaqoh. In this way, the wealth not only rotates on the rich, bringing on gap in social life.The problem of wealth distribution is closely related to the welfare of society. Therefore, the state has a duty to regulate the distribution of income in order that the distribution can be fair and reaches appropriate target. The state could at least attempt it by optimizing the role of BAZ (Badan Amil Zakat) and LAZ (Lembaga Amil Zakat) which has all this time been slack. If BAZ and LAZ can be optimized, author believes that inequality and poverty over time will vanish. This is because the majority of Indonesia's population is Muslim. Keywords: distribution of income, State’ role, Islamic economics

The Neoliberal State

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Harvey
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Private Property ◽  
The State ◽  
Free Markets ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Role Of The State ◽  
Contractual Obligations ◽  
Political Form

The role of the state in neoliberal theory is reasonably easy to define. The practice of neoliberalization has, however, evolved in such a way as to depart significantly from the template that theory provides. The somewhat chaotic evolution and uneven geographical development of state institutions, powers, and functions over the last thirty years suggests, furthermore, that the neoliberal state may be an unstable and contradictory political form. According to theory, the neoliberal state should favour strong individual private property rights, the rule of law, and the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade. These are the institutional arrangements considered essential to guarantee individual freedoms. The legal framework is that of freely negotiated contractual obligations between juridical individuals in the marketplace. The sanctity of contracts and the individual right to freedom of action, expression, and choice must be protected. The state must therefore use its monopoly of the means of violence to preserve these freedoms at all costs. By extension, the freedom of businesses and corporations (legally regarded as individuals) to operate within this institutional framework of free markets and free trade is regarded as a fundamental good. Private enterprise and entrepreneurial initiative are seen as the keys to innovation and wealth creation. Intellectual property rights are protected (for example through patents) so as to encourage technological changes. Continuous increases in productivity should then deliver higher living standards to everyone. Under the assumption that ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’, or of ‘trickle down’, neoliberal theory holds that the elimination of poverty (both domestically and worldwide) can best be secured through free markets and free trade. Neoliberals are particularly assiduous in seeking the privatization of assets. The absence of clear private property rights––as in many developing countries––is seen as one of the greatest of all institutional barriers to economic development and the improvement of human welfare. Enclosure and the assignment of private property rights is considered the best way to protect against the socalled ‘tragedy of the commons’ (the tendency for individuals to irresponsibly super-exploit common property resources such as land and water).

Striving for the Middle Ground

Taxation ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 60-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Brennan
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Horizontal Equity ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Market Interactions ◽  
Normative Authority ◽  
Citizen Interactions ◽  
The One ◽  
Distribution Of Income

Does the fact that considerations of distributive justice entitle governments to interfere with the distribution (of income/wealth/consumption) that emerges from market interactions imply that the property rights structure on which that market distribution is based has no normative authority in structuring government/citizen interactions? That claim is one implied by Nagel and Murphy in their book The Myth of Ownership. Chapter 3 proposes that this claim is false; but insists that denying that claim does not entail denying the legitimacy of public redistribution through the tax-transfer process. One central claim is that the concept of horizontal equity—that individuals should pay taxes in relation to their aggregate returns from market activity—may be thought of as a principle that appropriately reconciles the competing normative claims of the private property rights structure on the one hand with other requirements of distributive justice.

scholarly journals China’s Challenge: Expanding the Market, Limiting the State

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
James A. Dorn
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Private Property ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
The State ◽  
Economic Life ◽  
Free Markets ◽  
State Sector ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
General Secretary

AbstractChina has made significant progress since 1978 in expanding the market, but that progress is threatened by the failure to limit the state. The critical challenge facing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its leadership is to widen the range of choices open to individuals by promoting what Milton Friedman, in his 1988 memorandum to General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, called “free private markets.” Free markets require well-defined private property rights protected by a just rule of law. China has a robust private sector and private property rights are now recognized by law, but the state sector and state ownership continue to play a strong role in directing economic life.

scholarly journals There Will Be Killing: Collectivization and Death of Draft Animals

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 58-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuo Chen ◽  
Xiaohuan Lan
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Difference In Differences ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Lower Animal ◽  
Lower Productivity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Productive Assets

The elimination of private property rights can lead to ineffcient use of productive assets. In China's collectivization movement from 1955 to 1957, instead of transferring draft animals to the ownership of the collectives, peasants slaughtered them to keep the meat and hide. By comparing 1,600 counties that launched the movement in different years, the difference-in-differences estimates suggest that the animal loss during the movement was 12 to 15 percent, or 7.4–9.5 million head. Grain output dropped by 7 percent due to lower animal inputs and lower productivity. (JEL N45, N55, O13, P26, P32, Q11)

Protected areas and property rights in Thailand

1998 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
PHILIP DEARDEN ◽  
SURACHET CHETTAMART ◽  
DACHANEE EMPHANDU
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Protected Areas ◽  
Protected Area ◽  
Private Property ◽  
The State ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Collective Property

Vandergeest (1996) suggested that the protected area (PA) system in Thailand is too large. He proposed that the state should recognize claims to private property rights within the PA system and subject remaining lands to collective property rights where villagers would be allowed to burn, cut and graze for commercial purposes. We disagree and summarize some of our concerns below.

The Modern Constitutional Mode of Government

2020 ◽  
pp. 87-106
Author(s):  
Jean-Philippe Robé
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Private Property ◽  
The State ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Definition Of

The notions of State and of the « Organs of the State » are explained in some details to distinguish their prerogatives from private prerogatives. Private property, in this respect, grants autonomy from the « Organs of the State ». It is part of the constitutional prerogatives protecting private persons against excessive public governmental encroachments. It is part of a constitutional order which combines both democracy and distrust for democracy, by limiting the prerogatives of the Organs of the State. The approach developed proposes a unitary view of the Constitution as providing for both public and private prerogatives, the first ones being exercised by Organs of the State and the second ones by legal persons which are not Organs of the State. Public and private prerogatives operate via fundamentally different rules, private property rights entitling their holders to exercise their prerogatives in a despotic manner, i.e. they can do what they want with what they have without the need to take anybody’s advice or authorization - which is the definition of despotism.

The politics of land property rights

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meina Cai ◽  
Ilia Murtazashvili ◽  
Jennifer Murtazashvili
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
The State ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Legal Reforms ◽  
Government Capacity ◽  
Land Property Rights

AbstractLegal reforms that improve the security of private property rights to land have characteristics of a public good with dispersed benefits. However, nothing ensures that the state will provide property protection as a public good. Some states provide property protection selectively to powerful groups. Others are unable to provide property protection. In this paper, we argue that whether the state provides property protection as a public good, selectively, or cannot establish private property rights depends on the following features of politics: political stability, government capacity to administer and enforce private property rights, constraints on political decision-makers, and the inclusivity of political and legal institutions. We illustrate the theory using evidence from reforms that increased opportunities to privately own land in the US from the late eighteenth through nineteenth centuries, selective enforcement of land property rights in China, and the absence of credible legal rights to land in Afghanistan.

Commons Sense: Common Property Rights, Efficiency, and Institutional Change

1998 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Clark
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Change ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Relative Prices ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Land Owners ◽  
The Rich

Common property rights were widespread in English agriculture for at least 600 years. Since privatizing common fields allegedly produced huge profits in the eighteenth century, common land owners seemingly squandered 15 percent of potential income for generations. Ingenious explanations have been produced for this market failure. This article argues for a simple, brutal resolution. Common fields survived because enclosure was generally unprofitable before 1750, when changing relative prices made private property rights marginally more efficient. Then people responded quickly to modest profits. The rich gains from enclosure existed only in the imaginings of wild-eyed eighteenth century agrarian reformers.

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