Gorgo: Sparta’s Woman of Autonomy, Authority, and Agency

Claims that Herodotus reveals himself as a proto-biographer are not yet widely accepted. To advance this claim, I have selected one man, Alexander I, who finds himself and his kingdom caught in the middle of the Greco-Persian Wars and whose activities are recounted in the Histories. It is to a near contemporary, Heraclitus, to whom we attribute the maxim—character is human destiny. It is the truth of this maxim—which implies effective human agency—that makes Herodotus’ creation of historical narrative possible. He is often read for his off-topic vignettes, which colour-in the character of the individuals depicted without necessarily advancing his narrative. But by hop scotching through five of the nine books of the Histories, we can assemble a largely continuous narrative for this remarkable individual. This narrative permits us to attribute both credit and moral responsibility for his actions. Arguably, this implied causation demonstrates that Herodotus’ writings include much that amounts to proto-biography.

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Introduction

10.1093/oso/9780190682781.003.0001 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Christopher Evan Franklin

Keyword(s):

Moral Responsibility ◽

Free Will ◽

Human Agency ◽

Causal Role ◽

Central Question ◽

Agent Causation ◽

The Right

This chapter lays out the book’s central question: Assuming agency reductionism—that is, the thesis that the causal role of the agent in all agential activities is reducible to the causal role of states and events involving the agent—is it possible to construct a defensible model of libertarianism? It is explained that most think the answer is negative and this is because they think libertarians must embrace some form of agent-causation in order to address the problems of luck and enhanced control. The thesis of the book is that these philosophers are mistaken: it is possible to construct a libertarian model of free will and moral responsibility within an agency reductionist framework that silences that central objections to libertarianism by simply taking the best compatibilist model of freedom and adding indeterminism in the right junctures of human agency. A brief summary of the chapters to follow is given.

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Autonomy and Addiction

Canadian Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.1353/cjp.2006.0018 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 36 (3) ◽

pp. 427-447 ◽

Cited By ~ 46

Author(s):

Neil Levy

Keyword(s):

Moral Responsibility ◽

Human Agency ◽

The Other ◽

Reasons Responsiveness ◽

Extended Agency ◽

Conception Of The Good ◽

Autonomous Agency ◽

The Way

Whatever its implications for the other features of human agency at its best — for moral responsibility, reasons-responsiveness, self-realization, flourishing, and so on—addiction is universally recognized as impairing autonomy. But philosophers have frequently misunderstood the nature of addiction, and therefore have not adequately explained the manner in which it impairs autonomy. Once we recognize that addiction is not incompatible with choice or volition, it becomes clear that none of the Standard accounts of autonomy can satisfactorily explain the way in which it undermines fully autonomous agency. In order to understand to what extent and in what ways the addicted are autonomy-impaired, we need to understand autonomy as consisting, essentially, in the exercise of the capacity for extended agency. It is because addiction undermines extended agency, so that addicts are not able to integrate their lives and pursue a Single conception of the good, that it impairs autonomy.

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Religion in the Yugoslav conflicts: post-war perspectives

Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis ◽

10.30674/scripta.67312 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 19 ◽

pp. 256-275

Author(s):

Christian Moe

Keyword(s):

Moral Responsibility ◽

Relevant Literature ◽

Human Agency ◽

Holy War ◽

Religious Wars ◽

Yugoslav Wars ◽

Post War ◽

Critical Notes ◽

The Way

The wars that dissolved Yugoslavia – were they religious wars? Why are conflicts increasingly coded as religious, rather than as, for example, social or ethnic? What constitutes a ‘religious’ or ‘holy’ war. This article attempts an inventory of important categories and hypotheses generated in the relevant literature so far, with a few critical notes along the way. The author considers the role assigned to religion in structural, cultural, and actor-oriented explanations of the Yugoslav wars. Structural and cultural explanations downplay the role of human agency and, hence, of moral responsibility; actor-oriented approaches focus on it.

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Greek History

Greece and Rome ◽

10.1017/s0017383518000037 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 65 (1) ◽

pp. 115-119

Author(s):

Kostas Vlassopoulos

Keyword(s):

Military History ◽

Fifth Century ◽

Second Sophistic ◽

Historical Reconstruction ◽

Ancient Greek ◽

Persian Wars ◽

Greek History ◽

The Subject ◽

External Forces ◽

Continuous Narrative

Political and military history used to be the main staple of ancient Greek history. This review includes a number of volumes devoted to the subject. Matteo Zaccarini's book focuses on Cimon and the period between 478 and 450 bce. Sandwiched between Herodotus’ Persian Wars and Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War, the Pentekontaetia (478–431) is the most problematic period of classical Greek history, primarily because of the lack of a continuous narrative and our reliance on much later and fragmentary sources. Zaccarini has divided his work into two sections: the first studies the development of narrative traditions concerning Cimon and his age, from the fifth century to the Second Sophistic, and presents a context for interpreting the shaping of the information provided in these traditions. This is undoubtedly the most profitable part of the work, and a good model that others could imitate. The second part attempts to present a historical reconstruction of the period 478–450 on the basis of the conclusions of the first part. Many of Zaccarini's arguments are, in my view, correct: he shows the need to emancipate our narratives from models based on competition between aristocratic/popular or pro- and anti-Spartan leaders and programmes; he argues that the late 460s–450s is the crucial period of change in the balance of internal and external forces; and he minimizes the actual significance of Cimon's role. These sensible conclusions could have been strengthened by engaging with the rethinking of the nature of early Athenian imperialism by scholars such as Lisa Kallet and John Davies. But the volume is still a worthy contribution towards reassessing this crucial period.

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Is conscious will an illusion?

Disputatio ◽

10.2478/disp-2004-0004 ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 1 (16) ◽

pp. 58-70 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Jing Zhu

Keyword(s):

Moral Responsibility ◽

Free Will ◽

Human Agency ◽

Conscious Will

Abstract In this essay I critically examine Daniel Wegner’s account of conscious will as an illusion developed in his book The Illusion of Conscious Will (MIT Press, 2002). I show that there are unwarranted leaps in his argument, which considerably decrease the empirical plausibility and theoretical adequacy of his account. Moreover, some features essential to our experience of willing, which are related to our general understanding of free will, moral responsibility and human agency, are largely left out in Wegner’s account of conscious will. This substantially diminishes its implications and significance for some profound philosophical issues.

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Addiction, recovery and moral agency: Philosophical considerations

The International Journal of Alcohol and Drug Research ◽

10.7895/ijadr.v2i0.190 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 4 (1) ◽

pp. 85-89

Author(s):

Susanne Uusitalo

Keyword(s):

Moral Responsibility ◽

Moral Agency ◽

Drug Research ◽

Human Agency ◽

General Level ◽

Evidence Based ◽

Addiction Recovery ◽

Moral Accountability ◽

Agency Design ◽

Reason Responsiveness

Uusitalo, S. (2015). Addiction, recovery and moral agency: Philosophical considerations. The International Journal Of Alcohol And Drug Research, X(Y), N-M. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.7895/ijadr.vXiY.190 Aims: The purpose of this paper is to argue that it is important to recognize that addicts are morally accountable even for their addictive action, as moral agency is more generally an important factor in full-blown human agency. The challenge is to identify the problems that addicts have in their agency without discarding their potentially full-blown agency. Design: In philosophy of agency, moral responsibility and accountability, in particular, may refer to control over one’s action. I discuss this control as reason-responsiveness and, on a more general level, illustrate the importance of moral agency to human agency with a contrasting example of psychopaths and addicts as agents. Measures: A philosophical analysis is carried out in order to argue for the relevance and importance of moral accountability in therapeutic models of addiction. Findings: The example of psychopaths and addicts illustrates that moral agency is part of full-blown human agency, as psychopaths are generally believed to lack moral skills common to non-psychopathic individuals. I argue that addicts are not analogous to psychopaths in the framework of moral agency in this respect. Conclusions: By fleshing out the conceptual considerations in the framework of addiction therapies, I clarify the relevance and importance of moral accountability in therapeutic models of addiction. If evidence-based therapies attempt to restore the addict’s full-fledged agency at least in respect to addiction, then acknowledging addicts’ moral accountability for their action does matter.

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Addiction, recovery and moral agency: Philosophical considerations

The International Journal of Alcohol and Drug Research ◽

10.7895/ijadr.v4i1.190 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 4 (1) ◽

pp. 85-89 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Susanne Uusitalo

Keyword(s):

Moral Responsibility ◽

Moral Agency ◽

Drug Research ◽

Human Agency ◽

General Level ◽

Evidence Based ◽

Addiction Recovery ◽

Moral Accountability ◽

Agency Design ◽

Reason Responsiveness

Uusitalo, S. (2015). Addiction, recovery and moral agency: Philosophical considerations. The International Journal Of Alcohol And Drug Research, X(Y), N-M. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.7895/ijadr.vXiY.190 Aims: The purpose of this paper is to argue that it is important to recognize that addicts are morally accountable even for their addictive action, as moral agency is more generally an important factor in full-blown human agency. The challenge is to identify the problems that addicts have in their agency without discarding their potentially full-blown agency. Design: In philosophy of agency, moral responsibility and accountability, in particular, may refer to control over one’s action. I discuss this control as reason-responsiveness and, on a more general level, illustrate the importance of moral agency to human agency with a contrasting example of psychopaths and addicts as agents. Measures: A philosophical analysis is carried out in order to argue for the relevance and importance of moral accountability in therapeutic models of addiction. Findings: The example of psychopaths and addicts illustrates that moral agency is part of full-blown human agency, as psychopaths are generally believed to lack moral skills common to non-psychopathic individuals. I argue that addicts are not analogous to psychopaths in the framework of moral agency in this respect. Conclusions: By fleshing out the conceptual considerations in the framework of addiction therapies, I clarify the relevance and importance of moral accountability in therapeutic models of addiction. If evidence-based therapies attempt to restore the addict’s full-fledged agency at least in respect to addiction, then acknowledging addicts’ moral accountability for their action does matter.

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Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 5

10.1093/oso/9780198830238.001.0001 ◽

2019 ◽

Keyword(s):

Moral Responsibility ◽

Free Will ◽

Human Agency ◽

Weakness Of Will ◽

Michael Smith ◽

Gary Watson ◽

Susan Wolf ◽

Over Time ◽

Antony Duff

No one has written more insightfully on the promises and perils of human agency than Gary Watson, who has spent a career thinking about issues such as moral responsibility, blame, free will, weakness of will, addiction, and psychopathy. The chapters of this volume pay tribute to Watson’s work by taking up and extending themes from his pioneering essays. Themes covered include:: compatibilist views of freedom and moral responsibility, the distinction between attributability and accountability, the responsibility of psychopaths, the nature of blame and its relationship to morality, the relevance of addiction to responsibility, the continuing influence of P. F. Strawson’s work, the connection between criminal and moral responsibility, the philosophical development of Gary Watson and the ways Watson’s views have changed over time. Contributors include: Michael McKenna, Susan Wolf, Pamela Hieronymi, R. Jay Wallace, Michael Smith, T. M. Scanlon, Jeanette Kennett, Antony Duff, Gideon Yaffe, Gary Watson, Sarah Buss, Neal Tognazzini, and D. Justin Coates.

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Agency and Responsibility in a Natural World

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199988457.013.38 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Erik J. Wielenberg

Keyword(s):

Moral Responsibility ◽

Human Agency ◽

Natural World ◽

Physical Universe ◽

Moral Conduct ◽

Key Features ◽

The Universe

This chapter examines the question of whether key features expected from moral conduct, such as freedom, choice, agency, and responsibility, can sufficiently exist within the natural world as understood by science. A secular, naturalistic view of the universe excludes the existence of nonphysical souls standing outside of the physical universe yet able to causally influence it, and it excludes the existence of a nonphysical deity that could be responsible for human agency and responsibility. Absent those possibilities, this chapter considers the prospects for freedom in a naturalistic universe, together with the issue of what sort of freedom (if any) is required for agency and moral responsibility. Three models of naturalistic agency are explained and discussed: compatibilism, event-causal libertarianism, and agent-causal libertarianism.

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