School-Level Effects of Teachers' Participation in Decision Making

1994 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 302-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dianne L. Taylor ◽  
Ira E. Bogotch

This article presents findings from a study of teachers' participation in decision making. Data gathered from a large metropolitan district involved in restructuring are analyzed to isolate dimensions of participation and to explore linkages between these dimensions and several outcome variables. Results indicate that participation did not improve outcomes for teachers or students and that teachers did not feel sufficiently involved in decision making was sufficient despite working in a reform district. These findings suggest that restructuring models must be reexamined to identify and remedy obstacles that inhibit the success of reform efforts.

1993 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 33-49
Author(s):  
Sebastian (Nello) Raciti

Parents have the right to participate in the educational planning for their child with a disability, however they often need assistance when interacting with professionals to ensure the best programs for their children. Professionals also require guidelines and opportunities to develop appropriate communication skills when interacting with other professionals and parents. This paper investigates the level of participatory decision-making which exists between parents and professionals, and professionals amongst themselves. The present thrust for including children with a disability in mainstream schools is used as the contextual setting for this investigation. Furthermore, the author presents an intervention plan based on the Collaborative Consultation Model to enhance the participatory decision-making skills of parents and professionals at the local school level.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur Campbell

Abstract An important task for organizations is establishing truthful communication between parties with differing interests. This task is made particularly challenging when the accuracy of the information is poorly observed or not at all. In these settings, incentive contracts based on the accuracy of information will not be very effective. This paper considers an alternative mechanism that does not require any signal of the accuracy of any information communicated to provide incentives for truthful communication. Rather, an expert sacrifices future participation in decision-making to influence the current period’s decision in favour of their preferred project. This mechanism captures a notion often described as ‘political capital’ whereby an individual is able to achieve their own preferred decision in the current period at the expense of being able to exert influence in future decisions (‘spending political capital’). When the first-best is not possible in this setting, I show that experts hold more influence than under the first-best and that, in a multi-agent extension, a finite team size is optimal. Together these results suggest that a small number of individuals hold excessive influence in organizations.


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