scholarly journals Folk Psychology and Proximal Intentions

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred Mele ◽  
Thomas Nadelhoffer ◽  
Maria Khoudary
Keyword(s):  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Garden Variety ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
The Relationship

There is a longstanding debate in philosophy concerning the relationship between intention and intentional action. According to the Single Phenomenon View, while one need not intend to A in order to A intentionally, one nevertheless needs to have an A-relevant intention. This view has recently come under criticism by those who think that one can A intentionally without any relevant intention at all. On this view, neither distal nor proximal intentions are necessary for intentional action. In this paper we present the results of two studies that explore folk ascriptions of proximal intentions and intentional actions in garden-variety, non-moral cases. Our findings suggest a very tight relationship between the two. We argue that the results from these two studies cohere with the Single Phenomenon View and give theorists who reject this view on conceptual grounds reason to worry.

Desire, Foresight, Intentions, and Intentional Actions: Probing Folk Intuitions

2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 133-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Nadelhoffer
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Folk Intuitions

AbstractA number of philosophers working under the rubric of "experimental philosophy" have recently begun focusing on analyzing the concepts of ordinary language and investigating the intuitions of laypersons in an empirically informed way. In a series of papers these philosophers – who often work in collaboration with psychologists – have presented the results of empirical studies aimed at proving folk intuitions in areas as diverse as ethics, epistemology, free will, and the philosophy of action. In this paper, I contribute to this research program by discussing the results of some new experiments that further probe folk intuitions about the relationship between desire, foresight, intent, intentional action, and moral considerations.

scholarly journals The Double Intentionality of Moral Intentional Actions: Scotus and Ockham on Interior and Exterior Acts

Topoi ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonja Schierbaum
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Action ◽  
Faculty Psychology ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
The Mind

AbstractAny account of intentional action has to deal with the problem of how such actions are individuated. Medieval accounts, however, crucially differ from contemporary ones in at least three respects: (i) for medieval authors, individuation is not a matter of description, as it is according to contemporary, ‘Anscombian’ views; rather, it is a metaphysical matter. (ii) Medieval authors discuss intentional action on the basis of faculty psychology, whereas contemporary accounts are not committed to this kind of psychology. Connected to the use of faculty psychology is (iii) the distinction between interior and exterior acts. Roughly, interior acts are mental as opposed to physical acts, whereas exterior acts are acts of physical powers, such as of moving one’s body. Of course, contemporary accounts are not committed to this distinction between two ontologically different kinds of acts. Rather, they might be committed to views consistent with physicalist approaches to the mind. The main interpretative task in this paper is to clarify how Scotus and Ockham explain moral intentional action in terms of the role and involvement of these kinds of acts respectively. I argue that Scotus’s account is close to contemporary, ‘Anscombian’ accounts, whereas Ockham’s account is incompatible with them.

Understanding the Past, Predicting the Future

2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (12) ◽  
pp. 1490-1497 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc J. Buehner
Keyword(s):  
Causal Relation ◽  
Action Planning ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Motor Command ◽  
Temporal Binding ◽  
Binding Effect ◽  
The Past ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Ambiguity Reduction ◽  
Special Case

Temporal binding refers to a subjective shortening of elapsed time between actions and their resultant consequences. Originally, it was thought that temporal binding is specific to motor learning and arises as a consequence of either sensory adaptation or the associative principles of the forward model of motor command. Both of these interpretations assume that the binding effect is rooted in the motor system and, critically, that it is driven by intentional action planning. The research reported here demonstrates that both intentional actions and mechanical causes result in temporal binding, which suggests that intentional action is not necessary for temporal binding and that binding results from the causal relation linking actions with their consequences. Intentional binding is thus a special case of more general causal binding, which can be explained by a theory of Bayesian ambiguity reduction.

scholarly journals Knowledge as Action

Epistemology ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 71-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernest Sosa
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Action ◽  
Normative Structure ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Special Case

This chapter argues that judgment and knowledge itself are forms of intentional action. Such action falls under a certain normative structure of success, competence, and aptness, or success that manifests competence. Judgment is a special case falling under that structure. The chapter explains that intentional actions come in two sorts. An attempt is an intentional action, an endeavor to attain a certain objective. An attempt can fail and remain a mere attempt, whereas an achievement is a certain sort of successful attempt. Intentional actions are one sort of performance. Some performances are also aimings, however, without being intentional. These, too, can fail and remain mere aimings, to be distinguished from those that are successful.

scholarly journals Dogs distinguish human intentional and unintentional action

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Britta Schünemann ◽  
Judith Keller ◽  
Hannes Rakoczy ◽  
Tanya Behne ◽  
Juliane Bräuer
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Action ◽  
Human Behaviour ◽  
Human Actions ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Unintentional Action

AbstractWhen dogs interact with humans, they often show appropriate reactions to human intentional action. But it is unclear from these everyday observations whether the dogs simply respond to the action outcomes or whether they are able to discriminate between different categories of actions. Are dogs able to distinguish intentional human actions from unintentional ones, even when the action outcomes are the same? We tested dogs’ ability to discriminate these action categories by adapting the so-called “Unwilling vs. Unable” paradigm. This paradigm compares subjects’ reactions to intentional and unintentional human behaviour. All dogs received three conditions: In the unwilling-condition, an experimenter intentionally withheld a reward from them. In the two unable-conditions, she unintentionally withheld the reward, either because she was clumsy or because she was physically prevented from giving the reward to the dog. Dogs clearly distinguished in their spontaneous behaviour between unwilling- and unable-conditions. This indicates that dogs indeed distinguish intentional actions from unintentional behaviour. We critically discuss our findings with regard to dogs’ understanding of human intentional action.

Rational Choice and Rational Cognition

Legal Theory ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-203
Author(s):  
Jules L. Coleman
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Economic Models ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Legal Problems

There is a close but largely unexplored connection between law and economics and cognitive psychology. Law and economics applies economic models, modes of analysis, and argument to legal problems. Economic theory can be applied to legal problems for predictive, explanatory, or evaluative purposes. In explaining or assessing human action, economic theory presupposes a largely unarticulated account of rational, intentional action. Philosophers typically analyze intentional action in terms of desires and beliefs. I intend to perform some action because I believe that it will (is likely to) produce an outcome that I desire. This standard “belief-desire” model of action invokes what philosophers of psychology and action theorists aptly refer to as a “folk psychology.”

scholarly journals Belief Through Thick and Thin

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wesley Buckwalter ◽  
David Rose ◽  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Experimental Findings ◽  
The Relationship

We distinguish between two categories of belief—thin belief and thick belief—and provide evidence that they approximate genuinely distinct categories within folk psychology. We use the distinction to make informative predictions about how laypeople view the relationship between knowledge and belief. More specifically, we show that if the distinction is genuine, then we can make sense of otherwise extremely puzzling recent experimental findings on the entailment thesis (i.e. the widely held philosophical thesis that knowledge entails belief). We also suggest that the distinction can be applied to debates in the philosophy of mind and metaethics.

scholarly journals Regional Policy as a Factor in Shaping Regional Development in Poland

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-104
Author(s):  
Maciej Czaplewski ◽  
Rafał Klóska
Keyword(s):  
Regional Development ◽  
Regional Policy ◽  
Regional Level ◽  
Special Importance ◽  
Theoretical Concepts ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Current State ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Theoretical Considerations

AbstractRegional development is firmly rooted in the theory of land management, and today’s considerations and analyses in this area are gaining special importance. The relationship between specific conditions and the observed effects of regional development was considered under various theoretical concepts. Additionally, the interdependence of processes taking place on the international, national and regional level renders it necessary to pursue, inter alia, an effective regional policy. In this study, particular attention was given to the premises and objectives of intentional actions taken both at supra-regional level (inter-regional policy) and regional level (intra-regional policy). The theoretical considerations concerning the regional policy carried out were supplemented with current statistics regarding the development of regions in Poland. The aim of the study is to show the role of regional policy in shaping regional development and to analyse its current state on the basis of own research using multidimensional comparative analysis (MCA) methods. The considerations presented in the article lead to the conclusion that regional policy is an important factor in regional development, and the presented research results allow to assess the current level and diversity of this development in Poland.

scholarly journals Choosing and Refusing: Doxastic Voluntarism and Folk Psychology

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri ◽  
Wesley Buckwalter ◽  
David Rose
Keyword(s):  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Social Judgments ◽  
Doxastic Voluntarism ◽  
Standard View ◽  
Dual Character ◽  
The Will ◽  
Conceptual Necessity ◽  
Ordinary Folk ◽  
Philosophical Debates ◽  
The Relationship

A standard view in contemporary philosophy is that belief is involuntary, either as a matter of conceptual necessity or as a contingent fact of human psychology. We present seven experiments on patterns in ordinary folk-psychological judgments about belief. The results provide strong evidence that voluntary belief is conceptually possible and, granted minimal charitable assumptions about folk-psychological competence, provide some evidence that voluntary belief is psychologically possible. We also consider two hypotheses in an attempt to understand why many philosophers have been tempted to view belief as involuntary: that belief is a prototype concept and that belief is a dual character concept. Altogether, our findings contribute to longstanding philosophical debates about the relationship between the will and the intellect, while also advancing scientific understanding of important social judgments.

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