scholarly journals When Pandemic Threat Does Not Stoke Xenophobia: Evidence from a Panel Survey around COVID-19 in Colombia

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yang-Yang Zhou ◽  
Margaret E. Peters ◽  
Daniel Rojas Lozano

How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected attitudes of host citizens towards refugees and migrants? A large literature, mostly in Global North contexts, links disease threat with increased xenophobia. Indeed, recent studies on the effects of COVID-19 have found an increase in hate crimes and anti-migrant attitudes, particularly when political elites exclude and blame migrants for the pandemic. We examine the case of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, in which elite rhetoric and immigration policies have been largely inclusive. Using a panel experimental survey of 374 Colombian respondents, supplemented by 550 new respondents at endline, we find no evidence that exposure to COVID-19 changes Colombians' attitudes towards Venezuelans, even if the respondents were directly affected by COVID. In fact, we find some evidence of empathy. Our research implies that xenophobia in reaction to pandemics is not a foregone conclusion, but likely a product of political scapegoating.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerasimos Tsourapas

Under what conditions do authoritarian states exercise control over populations abroad? The securitisation of cross-border mobility has been a common theme in examining immigration policies in the Global North. The securitisation of emigration and diasporas in non-democratic contexts remains neglected; this is particularly true with regard to Arab states’ extraterritorial authoritarian practices. This article argues that authoritarian states develop a range of migration policies that are driven by the contradictory pressures of economic and political imperatives or, put differently, an "illiberal paradox": if a state does not expect economic gains from cross-border mobility, it is more likely to securitise its emigration policy; otherwise, it is more likely to securitise its diaspora policy. The article illustrates this trade-off via a most-similar comparison of Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco. Drawing on Arabic and non-Arabic primary and secondary sources, it sketches a novel area of research on migration and security.


Defendologija ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (41-42) ◽  
Author(s):  
Velibor Lalić

In this paper is analysed the role of security providers at the national level in thecontrol of hate crimes. The special particular reference is given on the role of the policeand prosecutor’s offi ce but also the other entities which have a social signifi cance in thecreation of the suitable environment for the prevention of these criminal offences. Thoseare primarily educational institutions, political elites and media. Effi cient control of thehate crimes is a comprehensive process in which should actively be involved differententities in the society, not only the authorities of the formal social control. Integral approachto this problem can give positive results in the long run, whether it is about therepressive action or the prevention.


2021 ◽  
Vol 118 (23) ◽  
pp. e2024125118
Author(s):  
Katherine Clayton ◽  
Nicholas T. Davis ◽  
Brendan Nyhan ◽  
Ethan Porter ◽  
Timothy J. Ryan ◽  
...  

Democratic stability depends on citizens on the losing side accepting election outcomes. Can rhetoric by political leaders undermine this norm? Using a panel survey experiment, we evaluate the effects of exposure to multiple statements from former president Donald Trump attacking the legitimacy of the 2020 US presidential election. Although exposure to these statements does not measurably affect general support for political violence or belief in democracy, it erodes trust and confidence in elections and increases belief that the election is rigged among people who approve of Trump’s job performance. These results suggest that rhetoric from political elites can undermine respect for critical democratic norms among their supporters.


2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Spence

Summary The proposal to create the European External Action Service (EEAS) seemed to be an acceptance by the European Union’s political elites that, in the post-Westphalian world, more attention needed to be given to collective European diplomacy rather than individual national diplomacy. Yet there was no guarantee that existing officials, whether from EU institutions or from the EU member states, would easily accept the related diplomatic norms and values. Melding different epistemic communities into one effective new diplomatic community is not a foregone conclusion. Europe’s new diplomatic service ‘an sich’ is not a diplomatic service ‘für sich’. While creating a team with a spirit of unity was the formal goal, ambiguities in the Lisbon Treaty’s articles on the EEAS have facilitated a major reassertion of bureaucratic politics, which are destined to keep Westphalian diplomacy alive and to produce even more turf battles and complexity. The mind-sets of the component parts of the EEAS are so diverse that, without serious discussion of these issues and concentrated training, creating a new European diplomacy will be difficult.


2021 ◽  
pp. 0308518X2110380
Author(s):  
Hannes Warnecke-Berger

The article argues that the increasing financialization of remittances produces an enormous shift in the political economy of development and contributes to a new power geometry of development. Exploring this power geometry, the article focuses on three main issues: First, migrants intend to support their friends and families on an individual level as remittance senders, and together with the corresponding recipients they form a translocal moral economy. On a macro level, the value of these transactions is high when currency hierarchies remain strong. Financialization of remittances amplifies this micro–macro divergence inherent to remittance flows. Deepening the financial “development” impact of remittances then goes hand in hand with cementing global inequality. Second, economic and political elites in remittance-receiving societies who are able to organize direct and indirect access to remittances with the help of financial instruments and through financialization are able to emancipate from national political control. This indirectly contributes to fostering elite rule in remittance-receiving societies. Third and finally, development is no longer a “national” objective but has become the individual risk of migrants and their relatives and friends. Financialization of remittances therefore consolidates an individualized notion of development. This paper aims to go beyond the narrow economistic and problem-solving approach on which many studies on remittances and financial inclusion draw. It illustrates how financialization of remittances (re)shapes power relations both within the Global South and between the Global South and the Global North.


2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. M. Herek ◽  
J. R. Gillis ◽  
J. C. Cogan
Keyword(s):  

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