scholarly journals The Invention of Common Law Play Right

Author(s):  
Jessica Litman

In this paper, written for Berkeley’s symposium on the 300th birthday of the Statute of Anne, I explore the history of the common law public performance right in dramatic works. Eaton Drone dubbed the dramatic public performance right “playright” in his 1879 treatise, arguing that just as “copyright” conferred a right to make and sell copies, “playright” conferred a right to perform or “play” a script. I examine case law and customary theatrical practice in England, and find no trace of a common law play right before 1833, when Parliament established a statutory public performance right for plays. Similarly, in the United States, the first claims of a common law right to control public performances appeared only after Congress enacted a statutory dramatic public performance right in 1856. Courts and lawyers developed a common law literary property right to control public performances in order to permit the proprietors of dramatic works to recover even though there were formal defects in their U.S. copyright registrations. Eaton Drone then used those cases as a basis for embroidering a full-blown common law literary property right purportedly based in natural law. Courts adopted Drone’s version of common law play right and followed it for the next thirty years. (The breadth of the common law claim, however, made little difference to actual playwrights, who were deemed to have assigned their common law rights to the producers of their plays.) This history suggests that the rights that we perceive as inherent or natural are fundamentally contingent on what rights already have names and a path to enforcement.

2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 208-232
Author(s):  
Caterina Gardiner

The common law that applies to Internet contract formation could be said to exist in a penumbra—a grey area of partial illumination between darkness and light—where it may be possible to lose sight of established contract law principles. Internet contracts raise difficult issues relating to their formation that challenge traditional contract doctrine. Analysis of case law from the United States, United Kingdom and Ireland illustrates that the courts have not applied contract formation doctrine in a principled or consistent way. There is a tendency for decisions to be reached for policy reasons, for example, to facilitate the development of e-commerce, or to achieve a result that is considered fair, rather than on sound principles of contract law. There may also be some uncertainty arising from the relationship between statutory consumer protection rules and common law contract formation doctrine. The enforceability of Internet contracts in the common law courts remains unpredictable. This article argues that although Internet contracting may raise distinctive contract formation issues, it is possible for the judiciary to invoke the inherent flexibility of the common law, to take into account the specific characteristics of Internet contracts, while still adhering to established contract law doctrine and maintaining a principled approach.


Author(s):  
Amanda L. Tyler

The Introduction provides an overview of the history of the writ of habeas corpus and an overview of the book, which tells the story of what is sometimes known as “the Great Writ” as it has unfolded in Anglo-American law. The primary jurisdictions explored are Great Britain and the United States, yet many aspects of this story will ring familiar to those in other countries with a robust habeas tradition. The book chronicles the longstanding role of the common law writ of habeas corpus as a vehicle for reviewing detentions for conformity with underlying law, as well as the profound influence of the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 on Anglo-American law. The Introduction highlights how the writ has at times failed to live up to its glorification by Blackstone and others, while noting that at other times it has proven invaluable to protection of liberty, including as a vehicle for freeing slaves and persons confined solely based on a King’s whim.


Author(s):  
J.C. Thomas ◽  
Sergio López Ayllón

SummaryThe first NAFTA Chapter 19 binational panel review of a Mexican antidumping determination raises important questions about the interpretation of treaties. In confronting the different way in which Mexico, a civil law country, had implemented NAFTA, the panel had to deal with a process of implementation different from that in the common law jurisdictions of Canada and the United States. The authors argue that in interpreting NAFTA, the panel relied on the negotiating history of one party, the United States, to reach a conclusion that did not represent the intentions of the three parties, and led to the exercise of a jurisdiction by a Chapter 19 panel in respect of Mexico that ü different from that exercised by Chapter 19 panels reviewing determinations from the other two NAFTA parties.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-185
Author(s):  
Edyta Sokalska

The reception of common law in the United States was stimulated by a very popular and influential treatise Commentaries on the Laws of England by Sir William Blackstone, published in the late 18th century. The work of Blackstone strengthened the continued reception of the common law from the American colonies into the constituent states. Because of the large measure of sovereignty of the states, common law had not exactly developed in the same way in every state. Despite the fact that a single common law was originally exported from England to America, a great variety of factors had led to the development of different common law rules in different states. Albert W. Alschuler from University of Chicago Law School is one of the contemporary American professors of law. The part of his works can be assumed as academic historical-legal narrations, especially those concerning Blackstone: Rediscovering Blackstone and Sir William Blackstone and the Shaping of American Law. Alschuler argues that Blackstone’s Commentaries inspired the evolution of American and British law. He introduces not only the profile of William Blackstone, but also examines to which extent the concepts of Blackstone have become the basis for the development of the American legal thought.


1967 ◽  
Vol 80 (4) ◽  
pp. 916
Author(s):  
Lord Denning ◽  
Erwin N. Griswold

2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (03) ◽  
pp. 491-506 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin L. Einhorn

The history of slavery cannot be separated from the history of business in the United States, especially in the context of the relationship between public power and individual property rights. This essay suggests that the American devotion to “sacred” property rights stemsmore from the vulnerability of slaveholding elites than to a political heritage of protection for the “common man.”


Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter examines the two models of judicial review that exist in the common law countries: the Diffuse Model and the Second Look Model. The Diffuse Model of judicial review originated in the United States and has spread to India, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, most of the countries of Latin America, the Scandinavian countries (except for the Netherlands), and Japan. It is premised on the idea that a country’s written constitution is its supreme law and that courts, when deciding cases or controversies that are properly before them, are thus duty-bound to follow the constitution, which is supreme law, and not a contrary statute whenever those two items conflict. Meanwhile, the essence of the Second Look Model of judicial review is that a Supreme or Constitutional Court ought to have the power of judicial review, subject to some kind of legislative power of override. This, it is said, best harmonizes the advantages of a written constitution and a bill of rights enforced by courts with the imperatives of democratic self-government. The underlying goal is to obtain the advantages of both constitutional government and also of democratic government.


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