scholarly journals Emerging Technologies and Dwindling Speech, 16 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1235 (2013)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge R. Roig
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
Emerging Technologies ◽  
Source Code ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Recent Past ◽  
Comprehensive Theory ◽  
Speech Clause

Inspired in part by the recent holding in Bland v. Roberts that the use of the “Like” feature in Facebook is not covered by the Free Speech Clause, this article makes a brief foray into the approach that courts have taken in the recent past towards questions of First Amendment coverage in the context of emerging technologies. Specifically, this article will take a closer look at how courts have dealt with the issue of functionality in the context of First Amendment coverage of computer source code. The analysis of this and other recent experiences, when put in a larger context, reflects a continuing dissatisfaction on the part of both courts and legislatures with the current Supreme Court doctrine on First Amendment coverage. From this discussion, we can also derive some meaningful normative insights regarding the interplay between emerging technologies and First Amendment coverage doctrine. Finally, this article hopes to serve as a stepping stone in a more profound and long term pursuit of a comprehensive theory of constitutional individual rights coverage issues that might serve us well as the future brings unexpected changes in our society.

Expressive Conduct and Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution: A Purposivist Approach

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Raghav Kohli
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
The United States ◽  
Indian Constitution ◽  
The Us ◽  
Indian Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Scrutiny ◽  
Speech Clause

Abstract Unlike the First Amendment of the United States, the quest to develop a grand theory to explain the scope and purpose of the free speech clause of the Indian Constitution has rarely been attempted. In this void, the significant constitutional question of when expressive conduct should trigger free speech protection has not received adequate academic and judicial scrutiny in India despite its global resonance. This article examines the evolution of the current doctrine by the Indian Supreme Court on the issue of expressive conduct and finds that the Court's ad-hoc approach fails to provide a meaningful resolution framework. Analysing the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court on its First Amendment, it discusses two potential approaches available to the Indian Supreme Court: one based on the speaker's conduct, and the other, based on state purposes. It argues that focusing on state purposes not only provides a principled answer to this conundrum but is also consistent with Indian free speech jurisprudence. Contrary to contemporary scholarship, it demonstrates that the law on Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution, as moulded by the Indian Supreme Court over decades, has implicitly treated the examination of state purpose as its predominant inquiry. This article concludes with some ideas on the limitations and prospects of adopting such an approach.

Assembly, Press, and Petition

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Zick
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
Free Expression ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Speech Clause

Chapter 3 examines the Free Speech Clause’s interactions with its First Amendment cousins—the Assembly Clause, Press Clause, and Petition Clause. It explains how and why the Supreme Court collapsed these distinctive rights into a general “Free Expression Clause” that is governed primarily by free speech doctrines and principles. The chapter examines in detail the events and influences that led each clause to be subordinated to or supplanted by the Free Speech Clause. It explains the negative consequences of free speech expansionism, for the non-speech rights and the freedom of speech. The chapter considers existing proposals for recovering or reviving the Assembly, Press, and Petition Clauses, but argues that we must rethink and expand the project. We need to work toward a First Amendment pluralism that not only disaggregates the elements of the fictional “Free Expression Clause,” but also reconnects once and still “cognate” rights of speech, assembly, press, and petition.

Advocacy of Illegal Drug Use

2015 ◽  
pp. 108-121
Keyword(s):  
Drug Use ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Illegal Drug ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
Student Speech ◽  
Illegal Drug Use ◽  
Speech Clause

This chapter examines the Morse v. Frederick (2007) case – the most recent United States Supreme Court decision about students' right to free speech under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It discusses the test created in the case for determining the extent of school-censorship authority over student speech. This test, known as the Morse test, allows schools to censor student speech if the speech advocates illegal drug use. The ultimate goal of the chapter is to analyze the Morse v. Frederick case in order to determine if it gives schools any authority to censor students' off-campus speech.

School-Sponsored Speech

2015 ◽  
pp. 97-107
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
Student Speech ◽  
Speech Clause

This chapter examines the Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988) case – the United States Supreme Court's third review of students' speech rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It discusses the test created in the case for analyzing when schools can regulate students' speech. This test, referred to as the Hazelwood test (also known as the Kuhlmeier test) authorizes schools to censor school-sponsored student speech. The chapter discusses the Supreme Court's approach to student speech in the Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988) case. The ultimate goal of the chapter is to analyze the case in order to determine if it authorizes schools to censor students' speech while they are outside the schoolhouse gate.

Lewd, Vulgar, Plainly-Offensive, and Obscene Speech

2015 ◽  
pp. 84-96
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
School District ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
Student Speech ◽  
Free Speech Rights ◽  
Speech Clause

This chapter focuses on the Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser (1986) case – the United States Supreme Court's second review of students' speech rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It discusses the test created in the case for determining when schools can regulate students' speech. This test, referred to as the Bethel test or the Fraser test authorizes schools to censor students' speech if the speech is vulgar, lewd, plainly offensive or obscene. The chapter also discusses the Supreme Court's decision on the scope of students' free speech rights. The ultimate goal of the chapter is to analyze the Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser case in order to determine if it empowers schools to censor off-campus student speech.

Material and Substantial Disruption/Infringement of Rights

2015 ◽  
pp. 62-83
Keyword(s):  
School District ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Community School ◽  
Student Speech ◽  
School Authority ◽  
Des Moines ◽  
Speech Clause

This chapter focuses on the Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969) case – the first United States Supreme Court decision about student speech under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It discusses the two tests established in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District for determining the scope of school authority over student speech. These tests are the “material and substantial disruption” test and the “infringement-of-rights” test. The ultimate goal of the chapter is to analyze the Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District case in order to determine if it authorizes schools to censor off-campus student speech.

scholarly journals Congress Shall Make No Law: The First Amendment, Unprotected Expression, and the U.S. Supreme Court

AmeriQuests ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Percy DeWitt
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
The United States ◽  
Research Associate ◽  
Daunting Task ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
The University

David M. O’Brien’s Congress Shall Make No Law: The First Amendment, Unprotected Expression, and the Supreme Court serves as a significant contribution to the field of First Amendment Law by offering an overview of crucial issues and, moreover, by emphasizing the outlook for the future of free speech. O’Brien’s credentials position him favorably for the task; he was a judicial fellow and research associate with the Supreme Court, he has written numerous articles and books on the Supreme Court, and he is currently the Leone Reaves and George W. Spicer Professor of Law at the University of Virginia. Considering the daunting task of compiling a succinct account and analysis of the history of free speech in the United States, Professor O’Brien does well to allow readers to better understand the complexities of free speech policy in the United States.

scholarly journals Elonis v. United States: The Doctrine of True Threats: Protecting Our Ever-Shrinking First Amendment Rights in the New Era of Communication

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-223
Author(s):  
Mary Margaret Roark
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
The United States ◽  
New Era ◽  
The Public ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The U.S

The First Amendment protects one of our most precious rights as citizens of the United States—the freedom of speech. Such protection has withstood the test of time, even safeguarding speech that much of the population would find distasteful. There is one form of speech which cannot be protected: the true threat. However, the definition of what constitutes a "true threat" has expanded since its inception. In the new era of communication—where most users post first and edit later—the First Amendment protection we once possessed has been eroded as more and more speech is considered proscribable as a "true threat." In order to adequately protect both the public at large and our individual right to free speech, courts should analyze a speaker’s subjective intent before labeling speech a "true threat." Though many courts have adopted an objective, reasonable listener test, the U.S. Supreme Court now has the opportunity, in deciding Elonis v. United States, to take a monumental step in protecting the First Amendment right to free speech. By holding that the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten is necessary for a true threat conviction, the Court will restore the broad protection afforded by the First Amendment and repair years of erosion caused by an objective approach.

The Sound of Constitutional Silences: Interpretive Holism and Free Speech under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raghav Kohli
Keyword(s):  
First Amendment ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Fundamental Issue ◽  
Indian Constitution ◽  
Academic Literature ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Constitutional Adjudication ◽  
Speech Clause

Abstract Unlike the US First Amendment, Article 19 of the Indian Constitution expressly enumerates eight grounds on which free speech may be restricted. Despite being a fundamental issue of constitutional interpretation, the question of whether Article 19 provides for an exhaustive list of restrictions has largely been neglected in academic literature and Indian jurisprudence. The latest site of contestations on the scope of the free speech clause has been the case of Kaushal Kishor, where the Supreme Court is currently hearing arguments on whether speech can be restricted by invoking fundamental rights beyond Article 19. This Article seeks to develop a principled answer by excavating the meaning of constitutional silences on the relationships between fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution. It argues that a strict textualist approach leads to a distinct form of rights absolutism that is both doctrinally incoherent and inconsistent with Indian jurisprudence. Examining the shift in the Supreme Court’s interpretive outlook from strict textualism to interpretive holism, it finds that the Court’s rich fundamental rights jurisprudence allows importing restrictions on speech from beyond Article 19. Such an approach also provides a meaningful framework for resolving intra-right, inter-right, and right-interest conflicts in the constitutional adjudication of free speech issues.

Reproductive Technologies and Free Speech

2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 514-530
Author(s):  
Sonia M. Suter
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
Reproductive Technologies ◽  
Access To Information ◽  
Patient Relationship ◽  
Patient Access ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lower Courts

AbstractThe Supreme Court and lower courts have not articulated a clear or consistent framework for First Amendment analysis of speech restrictions in health care and with respect to abortion. After offering a coherent doctrine for analysis of speech restrictions in the doctor-patient relationship, this piece demonstrates how potential legislation restricting patient access to information from reproductive testing intended to limit “undesirable” reproductive choices would violate the First Amendment.

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