scholarly journals The Doctrine of Legitimate Defense

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens David Ohlin

The following article reorients mainstream conceptions of self-defense by defending a broader doctrine of legitimate defense that, in limited circumstances, justifies unilateral intervention. The source of the doctrine is natural law, which was explicitly incorporated into the text of UN Charter article 51. The effect of this incorporation was to preserve, as a carve-out from the prohibition against force in Article 2, the natural law rights of defensive force. Specifically, the Article concludes that defensive force under natural law included, in extreme situations, a right of intervention in rogue States that refused to comply with natural law. The Article then provides a normative foundation for the doctrine of legitimate defense by showing how the right of self-determination, the right to be free from genocide, and the right to self-defense, all flow from a more primary right to exist that applies to nations and peoples. Finally, drawing on earlier work published with George Fletcher, the Article explains how a national group’s right of self-defense can trigger a third party’s right to intervene on its behalf. This reading of Article 51 shows how its explicit incorporation of natural law and its textual reference to “legitimate defense” provides the conceptual ground for a modern doctrine of humanitarian intervention. However, unlike other legal justifications for humanitarian intervention that are framed as “exceptions” to article 51, the doctrine of legitimate defense is based on a textual interpretation of that provision.Published: Jens David Ohlin, "The Doctrine of Legitimate Defense," 91 International Law Studies (2015)

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan J. Criddle

AbstractThis Article explores three theories of humanitarian intervention that appear in, or are inspired by, the writings of Hugo Grotius. One theory asserts that natural law authorizes all states to punish violations of the law of nations, irrespective of where or against whom the violations occur, to preserve the integrity of international law. A second theory, which also appears in Grotius’s writings, proposes that states may intervene as temporary legal guardians for peoples who have suffered intolerable cruelties at the hands of their own state. Each of these theories has fallen out of fashion today based on skepticism about their natural law underpinnings and concerns about how they have facilitated Western colonialism. As an alternative, this Article outlines a third theory that builds upon Grotius’s account of humanitarian intervention as a fiduciary relationship, while updating Grotius’s account for the twenty-first century. According to this new fiduciary theory, when states intervene to protect human rights abroad they exercise an oppressed people’s right of self-defense on their behalf and may use force solely for the people’s benefit. As fiduciaries, intervening states bear obligations to consult with and honor the preferences of the people they seek to protect, and they must respect international human rights governing the use of force within the affected state. By clarifying the respective responsibilities of the Security Council and individual states for humanitarian intervention, the fiduciary theory also lends greater coherency to the international community’s “responsibility to protect” human rights.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 413-436 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauro Barelli

AbstractThe right of peoples to self-determination represents one of the most controversial norms of international law. In particular, two questions connected with the meaning and scope of this right have been traditionally contentious: first, who constitutes a ‘people’ for the purposes of self-determination, and, secondly, what does the right of self-determination actually imply for its legitimate holders. Against this unsettled background, the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) affirmed, in a straightforward manner, that indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. In light of the uncertainties that were mentioned above, it becomes necessary to clarify the actual implications of this important recognition. This article will seek to do so by discussing the drafting history of the provision on self-determination contained in the UNDRIP and positioning it within the broader normative framework of the instrument.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Munafrizal Manan

This paper discusses the right of self-determinationfrom  international  law  and international human rights law perspective. It traces the emergence and development of self-determination from political principle to human right. It also explores the controversy of the right of self-determination. There have been different and even contradictory interpretations of the right of self-determination. Besides, there is no consensus on the mechanism to apply the right of self-determination. Both international law and international human rights law are vague about this.


Author(s):  
Mitul Dutta ◽  
◽  
Navin Sinha ◽  

Under the international human rights regime, the right to self-determination is a right guaranteed to the groups of “people”. This right is one of the most controversial issues of international law as it comes into conflict with the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states. There are various uncertainties associated with this right regarding the scope of the right and mode of implementation etc. The present article seeks to make an in-depth analysis of the claimants of the right and the uncertainties associated with the meaning of the term “people” in the context of the right to self-determination. The article encompasses, among other things, the right of indigenous people under various international instruments and how they interrelate to the right of self-determination.


1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Franck ◽  
Nigel S. Rodley

In the Bangladesh crisis, two important objectives of international law appeared to be in conflict: that of peace and that of justice. The former objective is set out in the rules of the U.N. Charter against the use of force by states except in self-defense against an armed attack. The second is found in the provisions of the Charter and in various resolutions, declarations, and covenants pertaining to fundamental human rights and self determination.


Author(s):  
José Tudela Aranda

Decidida la independencia, las fuerzas políticas partidarias de la misma, tenían que encontrar la manera de poder encauzar sus aspiraciones. No teniendo cauce ni en derecho interno ni el derecho internacional, se busco ese cauce en el principio democrático mediante la construcción del llamado derecho a decidir. Un derecho a decidir que suponía, en esencia, reducir el principio democrático a un solo acto electoral, con reglas establecidas unilateralmente. En este artículo se pretende desmentir tanto la oposición entre principio de legalidad y principio democrático como la propia ortodoxia democrática del derecho a decidir. Junto a ello, se argumenta que en ningún caso resulta posible constitucionalizar, normativizar, un derecho de autodeterminación. Más allá de su naturaleza difícilmente compatible con la esencia de cualquier orden constitucional, las dificultades de fijar las condiciones concretas de su ejercicio, lo antojan imposible. No en vano, ningún ordenamiento jurídico del mundo lo reconoce.After having decided the objective of independence, the political parties in favour of this objective had to find a way how to articulate their aspirations. Since there is no legal way within the national or international law, the independence movement based their demands in the democratic principle by building the so-called right to decide. However this right to decide means to limit the democratic principle to a single electoral act, with unilaterally established rules and outside the existing legal framework. In this article we try to disprove both the supposed opposition between the rule of law and the democratic principle, as well as the supposed democratic spirit of the right to decide. Along with this, we will argue that it is impossible to constitutionalise the right of self-determination. The right of self-determination is opposed to the essence of any constitutional order, moreover the difficulties of setting the conditions in order to implement this right, and particularly, the definition of the subject, makes the application impossible.


Polar Record ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dorothée Céline Cambou

Abstract In 2009, the Act on Greenland Self-Government was adopted. It recognises that “the people of Greenland is a people pursuant to international law with the right of self-determination”. Within this framework, the people of Greenland have gained significant control over their own affairs and the right to access to independence. Yet, the extent to which this framework ensures the right of self-determination in accordance with fundamental human rights can still be questioned. From a human rights perspective, the right of self-determination is not a one-time right. It is fundamental human right that applies in different contexts beyond decolonisation and which has implications not only for colonial countries and peoples but also for the population of all territories, including indigenous and minority groups. From this perspective, this contribution seeks to disentangle and analyse the different facets of self-determination in Greenland while considering the implications of the right based on the multifarious identity of the peoples living in the country as colonial people, citizens, indigenous and minority groups, including their claim to control mining resources.


2002 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terry Nardin

This article discusses the moral principles underlying the idea of humanitarian intervention. The analysis is in two parts, one historical and the other philosophical. First, the article examines arguments made in late medieval and early modern Europe for using armed force to punish the violation of natural law and to defend communities from tyranny and oppression, regardless of where they occur. It seeks to understand how moralists writing before the emergence of modern international law conceived what we now call humanitarian intervention.In the context of international law, humanitarian intervention is usually understood to be an exception to the nonintervention principle. However, the natural law tradition regards international law as less important than the moral imperative to punish wrongs and protect the innocent.Second, the article considers how humanitarian intervention is justified within the reformulation of the natural law tradition displayed in recent efforts to theorize morality along Kantian lines. In this reformulation, humanitarian intervention is a product of the duty of beneficence and, more specifically, of the right to use force to protect the innocent. The article draws upon the biblical injunction “Thou shalt not stand idly by the blood of thy neighbor,” which has become a centerpiece of the modern reformulation, and briefly explores its application to humanitarian intervention in the context of international relations today. This reformulation of natural law explains why, despite modern efforts to make it illegal, humanitarian intervention remains, in principle, morally defensible.


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