scholarly journals Four Unconstitutional Constitutions and their Democratic Foundations

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Albert

Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 50 : No. 2 , Article 1.The present fascination with the global phenomenon of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment has left open the question whether a constitution can be unconstitutional. To declare an entire constitution unconstitutional seems different in both kind and degree from invalidating a single amendment for violating the architectural core of a constitution, itself undoubtedly an extraordinary action. In this Article, I illustrate and evaluate four different conceptions of an unconstitutional constitution. Each conception draws from a different constitution currently in force around the world, specifically the Constitutions of Canada, Mexico, South Africa and the United States. Despite their unconstitutionality in different senses of the concept, each constitution is nonetheless rooted in democratic foundations. The strength of these foundations, however, varies as to each.

1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 226-230

The Security Council discussed this question at its 1022nd–1025th meetings, on October 23–25, 1962. It had before it a letter dated October 22, 1962, from the permanent representative of the United States, in which it was stated that the establishment of missile bases in Cuba constituted a grave threat to the peace and security of the world; a letter of the same date from the permanent representative of Cuba, claiming that the United States naval blockade of Cuba constituted an act of war; and a letter also dated October 22 from the deputy permanent representative of the Soviet Union, emphasizing that Soviet assistance to Cuba was exclusively designed to improve Cuba's defensive capacity and that the United States government had committed a provocative act and an unprecedented violation of international law in its blockade.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 416-416

A meeting of the International Sugar Council was held in London, June 26 to July 20, 1950. The meeting was attended by delegates of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, France, Haiti, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Peru, Philippine Republic, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, the United Kingdom, Yugoslavia, and the United States. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the world situation in sugar and the proposal for a new international sugar agreement. The council adopted a protocol which extended the international sugar agreement of 1937 one year from August 31, 1950. During 1950, the council created a special committee to 1) study the changing sugar situation as it related to the need or desirability for negotiating a new agreement, and 2) report to the council, as occasion might arise, on its findings and recommendations as to the possible basis of a new agreement. The special committee prepared a document which set forth certain proposals in the form of a preliminary draft agreement. The draft agreement included six fundamental bases: 1) the regulation of exports, 2) the stabilization of sugar prices on the world market, 3) a solution to the currency problem, 4) the limitation of sugar production by importing countries, 5) measures to increase consumption of sugar and 6) the treatment of non-signatory countries. The draft was then considered by the council at its meeting on July 20 at which time the council decided to submit it to member and observer governments for comments and to transmit such comments for consideration at a meeting of the special committee.


2021 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Itumeleng D. Mothoagae

The question of blackness has always featured the intersectionality of race, gender, sexuality and class. Blackness as an ontological speciality has been engaged from both the social and epistemic locations of the damnés (in Fanonian terms). It has thus sought to respond to the performance of power within the world order that is structured within the colonial matrix of power, which has ontologically, epistemologically, spatially and existentially rendered blackness accessible to whiteness, while whiteness remains inaccessible to blackness. The article locates the question of blackness from the perspective of the Global South in the context of South Africa. Though there are elements of progress in terms of the conditions of certain Black people, it would be short-sighted to argue that such conditions in themselves indicate that the struggles of blackness are over. The essay seeks to address a critique by Anderson (1995) against Black theology in the context of the United States of America (US). The argument is that the question of blackness cannot and should not be provincialised. To understand how the colonial matrix of power is performed, it should start with the local and be linked with the global to engage critically the colonial matrix of power that is performed within a system of coloniality. Decoloniality is employed in this article as an analytical tool.Contribution: The article contributes to the discourse on blackness within Black theology scholarship. It aims to contribute to the continual debates on the excavating and levelling of the epistemological voices that have been suppressed through colonial epistemological universalisation of knowledge from the perspective of the damnés.


2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Albert

The constitutional text in a constitutional democracy does not necessarily constrain constitutional change. Quite the contrary, constitutional change in a constitutional democracy often occurs in ways that depart from the rigid procedures governing constitutional amendment enshrined in the text of the constitutional.In this article, I illuminate this peculiar phenomenon in comparative perspective, drawing from the constitutional traditions of Canada, Germany, India, South Africa and the United States. In addition to illuminating distinctions in the amendment practices of liberal democratic constitutional states, I deploy those contrasts as a springboard to substantive insights about fundamental principles of statehood, namely sovereignty and legitimacy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Allan A. Boesak

The assassination of Martin Luther King Jr, 50 years ago on 04 April 1968, has been recalled in the United States with memorial services, conferences, public discussions and books. In contrast, the commemoration in 2017 of the death of Albert John Mvumbi Luthuli, 50 years ago on December 1967, passed almost unremarked. That is to our detriment. Yet, these two Christian fighters for freedom, in different contexts, did not only have much in common, but they also left remarkably similar and equally inspiring legacies for South Africa, the United States and the world in the ways they lived their lives in complete faith commitment to ideals and ways of struggle that may guide us in the ongoing struggles to make the world a more just, peacable and humane place. For South African reflections on our ethical stance in the fierce, continuing struggles for justice, dignity and the authenticity of our democracy, I propose that these two leaders should be considered in tandem. We should learn from both. This article engages Martin Luther King Jr’s belief in the ‘inescapable network of mutuality’, applies it to the struggle for freedom in South Africa and explores the ways in which South Africans can embrace these ethical ideals in facing the challenges of post-liberation.


1934 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 555-559
Author(s):  
William L. Rodgers

At the recent annual dinner of the American Society of International Law I listened with much interest to the eloquent and impassioned address of Judge Florence E. Allen, of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, asserting that the conservation of peace has not hitherto been, and should be made, the principal objective in the development of international law. I think that her views might be summarized not unfairly in the form of a syllogism. Undeniable is its major premise that war is cruel, costly in life and resources, full of horror—a terrible infliction on those who resort to it. The minor premise is that means exist and others may be discovered whereby disputes may always be settled and peace enforced without recourse to war. And so comes the conclusion that all these means should be sought for, discovered and used, after which war will be unnecessary and will disappear from the world, leaving us under the rule of perpetual physical peace, no matter what may be the mental and emotional differences between nations.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon A. Christenson

In the merits phase of decision in the case brought by Nicaragua against the United States, the World Court briefly mentions references by states or publicists to the concept of jus cogens. These expressions are used to buttress the Court’s conclusion that the principle prohibiting the use of force found in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter is also a rule of customary international law.


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