scholarly journals Fake news, fast and slow: Deliberation reduces belief in false (but not true) news headlines

Author(s):  
Bence Bago ◽  
David Gertler Rand ◽  
Gordon Pennycook

What role does deliberation play in susceptibility to political misinformation and “fake news”? The “Motivated System 2 Reasoning” account posits that deliberation causes people to fall for fake news because reasoning facilitates identity-protective cognition and is therefore used to rationalize content that is consistent with one’s political ideology. The classical account of reasoning instead posits that people ineffectively discern between true and false news headlines when they fail to deliberate (and instead rely on intuition). To distinguish between these competing accounts, we investigated the causal effect of reasoning on media truth discernment using a two-response paradigm. Participants (N= 1635 MTurkers) were presented with a series of headlines. For each, they were first asked to give an initial, intuitive response under time pressure and concurrent working memory load. They were then given an opportunity to re-think their response with no constraints, thereby permitting more deliberation. We also compared these responses to a (deliberative) one-response baseline condition where participants made a single choice with no constraints. Consistent with the classical account, we found that deliberation corrected intuitive mistakes: subjects believed false headlines (but not true headlines) more in initial responses than in either final responses or the unconstrained 1-response baseline. In contrast – and inconsistent with the Motivated System 2 Reasoning account – we found that political polarization was equivalent across responses. Our data suggest that, in the context of fake news, deliberation facilitates accurate belief formation and not partisan bias.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asher Lawson ◽  
Hemant Kakkar

Sharing of misinformation can be catastrophic, especially during times of national importance. Typically studied in political contexts, sharing of fake news has been positively linked with conservative political ideology. However, such sweeping generalizations run the risk of increasing already rampant political polarization. We offer a more nuanced account by proposing that the sharing of fake news is largely driven by low conscientiousness conservatives. At high levels of conscientiousness there is no difference between liberals and conservatives. We find support for our hypotheses in the contexts of Covid-19 and political news across 7 studies (six pre-registered; one conceptual replication) with 4,149 participants and 84,556 unique participant-news observations. Furthermore, our findings suggest the inadequacy of fact-checker interventions to deter the spread of fake news, and that a general desire for chaos drives the interactive effect of political ideology and personality on the sharing of fake news. This underscores the challenges associated with tackling fake news, especially during a crisis like Covid-19 where misinformation threatens to exacerbate the pandemic even further.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon Pennycook ◽  
Jabin Binnendyk ◽  
Christie Newton ◽  
David G. Rand

Coincident with the global rise in concern about the spread of misinformation on social media, there has been influx of behavioral research on so-called “fake news” (fabricated or false news headlines that are presented as if legitimate) and other forms of misinformation. These studies often present participants with news content that varies on relevant dimensions (e.g., true v. false, politically consistent v. inconsistent, etc.) and ask participants to make judgments (e.g., accuracy) or choices (e.g., whether they would share it on social media). This guide is intended to help researchers navigate the unique challenges that come with this type of research. Principle among these issues is that the nature of news content that is being spread on social media (whether it is false, misleading, or true) is a moving target that reflects current affairs in the context of interest. Steps are required if one wishes to present stimuli that allow generalization from the study to the real-world phenomenon of online misinformation. Furthermore, the selection of content to include can be highly consequential for the study’s outcome, and researcher biases can easily result in biases in a stimulus set. As such, we advocate for pretesting materials and, to this end, report our own pretest of 224 recent true and false news headlines, both relating to U.S. political issues and the COVID-19 pandemic. These headlines may be of use in the short term, but, more importantly, the pretest is intended to serve as an example of best practices in a quickly evolving area of research.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon Pennycook ◽  
Jabin Binnendyk ◽  
Christie Newton ◽  
David Gertler Rand

Coincident with the global rise in concern about the spread of misinformation on social media, there has been influx of behavioural research on so-called “fake news” (fabricated or false news headlines that are presented as if legitimate) and other forms of misinformation. These studies often present participants with news content that varies on relevant dimensions (e.g., true v. false, politically consistent v. inconsistent, etc.) and ask participants to make judgments (e.g., accuracy) or choices (e.g., whether they would share it on social media). This guide is intended to help researchers navigate the unique challenges that come with this type of research. Principle among these issues is that the nature of news content that is being spread on social media (whether it is false, misleading, or true) is a moving target that reflects current affairs in the context of interest. Steps are required if one wishes to present stimuli that allow generalization from the study to the real-world phenomenon. Furthermore, the selection of content to include can be highly consequential for the study’s outcome, and researcher biases can easily result in biases in a stimulus set. As such, we advocate for pretesting materials and, to this end, report our own pretest of 225 recent true and false news headlines, both relating to U.S. political issues and the COVID-19 pandemic. These headlines may be of use in the short term, but, more importantly, the pretest is intended to serve as an example of best practices in a quickly evolving area of research.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Pereira ◽  
Jay Joseph Van Bavel ◽  
Elizabeth Ann Harris

Political misinformation, often called “fake news”, represents a threat to our democracies because it impedes citizens from being appropriately informed. Evidence suggests that fake news spreads more rapidly than real news—especially when it contains political content. The present article tests three competing theoretical accounts that have been proposed to explain the rise and spread of political (fake) news: (1) the ideology hypothesis— people prefer news that bolsters their values and worldviews; (2) the confirmation bias hypothesis—people prefer news that fits their pre-existing stereotypical knowledge; and (3) the political identity hypothesis—people prefer news that allows their political in-group to fulfill certain social goals. We conducted three experiments in which American participants read news that concerned behaviors perpetrated by their political in-group or out-group and measured the extent to which they believed the news (Exp. 1, Exp. 2, Exp. 3), and were willing to share the news on social media (Exp. 2 and 3). Results revealed that Democrats and Republicans were both more likely to believe news about the value-upholding behavior of their in-group or the value-undermining behavior of their out-group, supporting a political identity hypothesis. However, although belief was positively correlated with willingness to share on social media in all conditions, we also found that Republicans were more likely to believe and want to share apolitical fake new. We discuss the implications for theoretical explanations of political beliefs and application of these concepts in in polarized political system.


2021 ◽  
pp. 096366252198919
Author(s):  
Roderik Rekker

People have a tendency to disregard information that contradicts their partisan or ideological identity. This inclination can become especially striking when citizens reject notions that scientists would consider “facts” in the light of overwhelming scientific evidence and consensus. The resulting polarization over science has reached alarming levels in recent years. This theoretical review conceptualizes political polarization over science and argues that it is driven by two interrelated processes. Through psychological science rejection, people can implicitly disregard scientific facts that are inconsistent with their political identity. Alternatively, citizens can engage in ideological science rejection by adhering to a political ideology that explicitly contests science. This contestation can in turn be subdivided into four levels of generalization: An ideology can dispute either specific scientific claims, distinct research fields, science in general, or the entire political system and elite. By proposing this interdisciplinary framework, this article aims to integrate insights from various disciplines.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 300-333
Author(s):  
José Ricardo Ledur ◽  
Renato P. dos Santos

Context: The production of scientific knowledge is not clearly understood by most individuals. In the information age, society faces challenges generated by discrediting institutions, including science, the proliferation of false news, disinformation and the relativisation of truth. These are significant issues that the school cannot refrain from discussing if it wants to educate for citizenship. Objectives: To investigate how conceptions about science influence and are influenced by fake news conveyed by the media and the contribution of literacy to minimise the effects of misinformation. Design: The methodology used in this research used a mixed-methods approach through content analysis of students’ responses combined with descriptive statistical techniques. Environment and participants: The research was carried out with 32 students, divided into two groups, attending the 9th grade of an elementary public school in Bom Princípio/RS. Data collection and analysis: Two questionnaires were applied: one for the conceptions about science and another to identify fake news. Results: Most students have a limited view of science and find it difficult to identify fake news through verification criteria. A correlation between student perceptions and the identification of false news was observed. Conclusions: Knowledge about science possibly enhances students’ perception of doubtful information. It is crucial to develop mediatic and information literacy skills as they can positively impact the identification of fake news and reduce its shares.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert M Ross ◽  
David Gertler Rand ◽  
Gordon Pennycook

Why is misleading partisan content believed and shared? An influential account posits that political partisanship pervasively biases reasoning, such that engaging in analytic thinking exacerbates motivated reasoning and, in turn, the acceptance of hyperpartisan content. Alternatively, it may be that susceptibility to hyperpartisan misinformation is explained by a lack of reasoning. Across two studies using different subject pools (total N = 1977), we had participants assess true, false, and hyperpartisan headlines taken from social media. We found no evidence that analytic thinking was associated with increased polarization for either judgments about the accuracy of the headlines or willingness to share the news content on social media. Instead, analytic thinking was broadly associated with an increased capacity to discern between true headlines and either false or hyperpartisan headlines. These results suggest that reasoning typically helps people differentiate between low and high quality news content, rather than facilitating political bias.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Rogers

Ushering in the contemporary ‘fake news’ crisis, Craig Silverman of Buzzfeed News reported that it outperformed mainstream news on Facebook in the three months prior to the 2016 US presidential elections. Here the report’s methods and findings are revisited for 2020. Examining Facebook user engagement of election-related stories, and applying Silverman’s classification of fake news, it was found that the problem has worsened, implying that the measures undertaken to date have not remedied the issue. If, however, one were to classify ‘fake news’ in a stricter fashion, as Facebook as well as certain media organizations do with the notion of ‘false news’, the scale of the problem shrinks. A smaller scale problem could imply a greater role for fact-checkers (rather than deferring to mass-scale content moderation), while a larger one could lead to the further politicisation of source adjudication, where labelling particular sources broadly as ‘fake’, ‘problematic’ and/or ‘junk’ results in backlash.


2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 351-368
Author(s):  
Vience Mutiara Rumata ◽  
◽  
Fajar Kuala Nugraha ◽  

Social media become a public sphere for political discussion in the world, with no exception in Indonesia. Social media have broadened public engagement but at the same time, it creates an inevitable effect of polarization particularly during the heightened political situation such as a presidential election. Studies found that there is a correlation between fake news and political polarization. In this paper, we identify and the pattern of fake narratives in Indonesia in three different time frames: (1) the Presidential campaign (23 September 2018 -13 April 2019); (2) the vote (14-17 April 2019); (3) the announcement (21-22 May 2019). We extracted and analyzed a data-set consisting of 806,742 Twitter messages, 143 Facebook posts, and 16,082 Instagram posts. We classified 43 fake narratives where Twitter was the most used platform to distribute fake narratives massively. The accusation of Muslim radical group behind Prabowo and Communist accusation towards the incumbent President Joko Widodo were the two top fake narratives during the campaign on Twitter and Facebook. The distribution of fake narratives to Prabowo was larger than that to Joko Widodo on those three platforms in this period. On the contrary, the distribution of fake narratives to Joko Widodo was significantly larger than that to Prabowo during the election and the announcement periods. The death threat of Joko Widodo was top fake narratives on these three platforms. Keywords: Fake narratives, Indonesian presidential election, social media, political polarization, post.


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